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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays on intragenerational and intergenerational inequal-
ity. It focuses on the largest developing country, China, and examines historically and
currently under-represented groups.
The first chapter, “Does Adversity Affect Long-term Consumption and Financial
Behaviour? Evidence from China’s Rustication Programme”, investigates the long-
term effects of early experiences on economic behaviour, by referring to the largest forced
migration experiment in history. Focusing on the historically under-represented group of
people who were sent from urban to rural areas to do manual farm work during their
adolescence, I demonstrate that they behave conservatively over the long term. They
spend less on housing, accumulate more savings and insurance, and invest less in risky
assets. One mechanism for the conservative behaviour lies in the habits formed during
adversity. My study sheds light on how a policy, experienced especially in the early stage
of life, influences a generation over the long term.
In addition to inequality, the second and the third chapters examine intergenerational
mobility. The second chapter, “The Great Gatsby Curve in China: Cross-Sectional
Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility”, estimates the extent of the decline in inter-
generational mobility in income and education during China’s economic transition. The
decline is more evident for the currently under-represented groups: females, and resi-
dents of rural areas and the western regions. To correlate intergenerational mobility with
cross-sectional inequality, a Great Gatsby Curve with a negative slope is presented, and
related institutional factors are discussed. This chapter is written jointly with Junjian Yi
and Junsen Zhang.
The third chapter, “Intergenerational Income Persistence and Transmission through
Identity: Evidence from Urban China”, investigates the mechanism of the decreasing
intergenerational mobility in income during China’s transition. I demonstrate a shift in
the leading contributor to the intergenerational income persistence conditional on income
group and age cohort. Specifically, education is a leading contributor for all families be-
fore the market reform, and for households with below-average income in the post-reform
era. However, a new transmission channel, political identity, plays a leading role in house-
holds with above-average income in the post-reform era. It sheds light on the necessity of
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Preface
Inequality is a rising concern in developing countries. In this thesis, I examine intragener-
ational and intergenerational inequality in the largest developing country, China. Specif-
ically, the thesis analyses the long-term consequences of the largest forced migration in
history, estimates intergenerational mobility in education and income in the contemporary
era, discusses the mechanism of intergenerational income transmission, and examines the
interaction of cross-sectional inequality and intergenerational mobility.
The thesis contains three essays. The first investigates the long-term consequences of
early adversity on economic behaviours, using the largest forced migration experiment
in history. From 1966 to 1978, 17 million urban youths in China, mostly junior or se-
nior high school graduates, were sent under a rustication policy to the countryside to do
farm work for an average of three to four years. Using difference-in-difference estimation
with data from the 2005 mini-census, I find that the rusticated generation behaves more
conservatively than their earlier and later counterparts. They spend less on housing and
purchase more insurance and pension. The intragenerational estimates reveal the same
conservative pattern as the intergenerational research. Compared to their age-eligible but
non-rusticated peers, the rusticated individuals spend less on housing, accumulate more
savings and insurance, and invest less in risky assets. Based on data from the Chinese
Household Income Project and Chinese Twins Survey in 2002, the results remain robust
under both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and twin fixed-effects estimations. I demon-
strate that one interpretation of the conservative behaviour lies in the habits shaped during
adversity.
Forced migration to rural areas has happened in countries other than China, such as
Indonesia, Russia, and the United States (Conquest, 1987; Fearnside, 1997; Taubman,
2004; Viola, 2007). However, China’s rustication programme stands as the largest with
17 million population affected. Another important difference from forced migrations in
other countries is that in China the migration was by youth in adolescence, when young
people become aware of the world. To the best of my knowledge, the present paper is the
first to systematically analyse the long-term consequences of rustication on consumption,
saving, and investment behaviours. In addition, it investigates where these heterogeneous
behaviours come from. This chapter also contributes to the literature on the long-term ef-
fects of the Great Depression, military service, and war (Romer, 1990; Bellows & Miguel,
2009; Crafts & Fearon, 2010; Malmendier & Nagel, 2011; Benmelech & Frydman, 2014).
It sheds light on how a policy, especially in the early stage of life, affects one generation
over the long term.
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In addition to the intragenerational inequality, I investigate in the second chapter in-
tergenerational mobility in China’s present transitional period, as well as its interplay
with cross-sectional inequality. This chapter is written jointly with Junjian Yi and Junsen
Zhang. Our results show that intergenerational mobility in both income and education de-
clines sharply along with China’s market reform. This trend is particularly significant for
females and residents of economically disadvantaged regions, such as rural and western
parts. To interpret these patterns, we develop a conceptual framework from the human-
capital perspective (Becker & Tomes, 1979, 1986; Solon, 2004; Corak, 2013). We explain
the changes in China’s intergenerational mobility with reference to five factors: return
to human capital, cost of education, government policies on human-capital investment,
household income, and income inequality. Linking cross-sectional inequality to intergen-
erational mobility, we draw a Great Gatsby Curve with a negative slope to understand the
dynamic interplay of the two. Intergenerational mobility has declined with the increase in
cross-sectional inequality since China’s economic reform. Poor families benefit less from
this growth than rich families do. Given this decline, China’s cross-sectional inequality is
expected to increase in the future.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to systematically explore the dy-
namic interplay of inequality and mobility in China. It contributes to the literature on
intergenerational mobility (Black & Devereux, 2011; Chetty et al., 2014a,b), and stands
out as the first analysis of its patterns with respect to cohort, gender, and region in China’s
reform era. Moreover, we present the first attempt to relate declining intergenerational
mobility to the rising cross-sectional inequality in China by finding a negatively sloped
Great Gatsby Curve. It may enrich understanding of the dynamic evolution of inequality
in other transitional or developing economies.
In the third chapter, I investigate the channels for intergenerational income transmis-
sion during China’s economic transition. In addition to the conventional channel of edu-
cation, I examine two new ones, political and occupational identities. Using the decom-
position method (Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Blanden et al., 2007), I discover that for both
rich and poor families in the pre-reform era, the conventional channel of education acts
as the leading contributor to intergenerational income persistence. In the post-reform era,
however, the leading contributor varies across income groups. Education still contributes
most to the income persistence across generations in poor households. For the rich, it is
the political identity of Communist Party member that leads. The effect of occupational
identity as working in the state-owned sector is less important in both types of household
in the post-reform period than that in the pre-reform era.
Different from the literature which focuses on the transmission of educational attain-
13
ment (Chen et al., 2010), this chapter concentrates on the roles of political and occupa-
tional identity in the transmission of economic status across generations. The literature
has concentrated on wage differences between the state- and privately- owned sectors in
China (Zhao, 2002; De´murger et al., 2006), and left the family effects aside. To the best
of my knowledge, this is the first paper to estimate the role of occupational identity in
a society where intergenerational income mobility is decreasing. It sheds light on the
necessity of intensifying the contemporary reforms in China.
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Chapter 1
Does Adversity Affect Long-Term Consumption and Fi-
nancial Behaviour? Evidence from China’s Rustication
Programme1
Does adversity affect long-term economic behaviour? How does a policy influence
one generation over the long term? In the first chapter, I examine the long-term conse-
quences of adversity on consumption and financial behaviour, using the largest forced
migration experiment in history.
From 1966 to 1978, 17 million urban youths in China, mostly junior or senior high
school graduates, were sent to the countryside to do farm work for an average of three
to four years under a rustication policy. Using data from the mini-census in 2005, I find
that the rusticated generation behaves more conservatively than the non-rusticated gener-
ations over the long term, as they consume less housing and purchase more insurance and
pension.
In addition to the cross-generational influence, I investigate the intra-generational ef-
fects of rustication with data from the Chinese Household Income Project in 2002 and
the Chinese Twins Survey in the same year. A similar conservative behavioural pattern is
revealed. Individuals with rustication experience spend less on housing, accumulate more
savings and insurance, and invest less in risky assets, compared to their age-eligible but
non-rusticated peers. Applying a habit-forming model, I suggest that one interpretation
for the conservative behaviour lies in the habits formed during adversity. The results shed
light on how a policy, especially in the early stage of life, influences one generation over
the long term.
As the first chapter of the thesis, it starts with an investigation of inequality with a
focus on the historically under-represented group - the rusticated population. This chap-
ter examines how early experience affects one generation, and lays foundation for the
analyses of intergenerational inequality and its interplay with cross-sectional inequality
in chapters 2 and 3.
1A preliminary version of this chapter began circulating in 2013 with the title “Adolescent Shock,
Resilience, and Long-Run Effects on Income and Consumption”.
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1.1 Introduction
Does adversity affect long-term consumption and financial behaviour? How does a policy
influence one generation over the long term? I aim to address these two questions in this
paper. Literature in economics, sociology, and psychology demonstrates evidence to sup-
port the correlation between early life experience and later economic behaviour. In the
literature for the Great Depression, Malmendier & Nagel (2011) find that macroeconomic
experiences influence individuals’ risk taking behaviour. The generation which experi-
enced the Great Depression tends to take fewer financial risks throughout their lives. They
also have a markedly lower consumption of durable goods, as shown in Romer (1990) and
Crafts & Fearon (2010). Schoar & Zuo (2013) examine the managerial styles of CEOs,
and find that those entering the labour market during recession periods behave in a more
conservative way.
Similar evidence is revealed among studies on the median- or long- term effects of
military service or wars. Benmelech & Frydman (2014) study the behaviour of CEOs
with military experience, and find that they are associated with conservative corporate
policies and ethical behaviour. Blattman (2009) and Bellows & Miguel (2009) indicate
that war violence changes individuals’ political attitudes. They are more likely to join
local political groups and vote after wars. With respect to other life adversities, Alesina
& La Ferrara (2002) and Castillo & Carter (2007) present empirical evidence that people
with traumatic experiences, such as disease or divorce, have less trust in others but show
more altruism.
In this paper, I use a new quasi-natural experiment, China’s rustication policy (pro-
gramme), to investigate the long-term effects of adversity on economic behaviour. From
1966 to 1978, 17 million urban youths, mostly junior or senior high school graduates
(born between 1946 and 1961), were sent to the countryside to do manual work for three
to four years on average. With a shift from privileged urban status to an unprivileged
rural one during adolescence, their behaviour on consumption and finance is expected to
change. Previous studies have intensively investigated the long-term influence of rustica-
tion on education and income (Deng & Treiman, 1997; Giles et al., 2008; Xie et al., 2008;
Yang & Li, 2011). Several papers touch upon its impacts on mentality or consumption,
though with limited empirical evidence or remaining in the dimension of home appliances
(Zhang et al., 2007; Zhou, 2013). Nevertheless, as a big change in identity during adoles-
cence when one’s belief toward the world is first established (Ghitza & Gelman, 2014),
the influence of rustication on later economic behaviour is worth investigating. In this
paper, I concentrate on examining its impacts on consumption and financial behaviour, as
well as demonstrating auxiliary findings on labour input, education, and income, which
16
echo the literature (Deng & Treiman, 1997; Xie et al., 2008; Yang & Li, 2011).
I apply difference-in-difference, ordinary least squares (OLS), and fixed-effects esti-
mations to the mini-census in 2005, the Chinese Household Income Project in 2002, and
the Chinese Twins Survey in 2002 respectively, to examine the cross- and intra- gener-
ational impacts of rustication. To start with, I apply difference-in-difference strategy to
the mini-census in 2005 to depict the general behavioural pattern of the rusticated versus
non-rusticated generations. Rustication varies across cohort and region. The generation
of 1946-1961 were subject to the policy, with almost half of the population rusticated in
practice. Cohorts born before 1946 or after 1961 were rarely sent to the countryside. In
addition, rustication was more severe in large cities than small ones as the revolutionary
propaganda was much stronger and coercion was enforced (Deng & Treiman, 1997). I
find that the rusticated generation behaves more conservatively in consumption and fi-
nance than the non-rusticated cohorts. They live in smaller houses, spend less on housing
purchase, and buy more insurance and pension even after three to four decades. These
findings are consistent with the literature that individuals experiencing economic reces-
sion tend to spend less on durable goods (Romer, 1990; Crafts & Fearon, 2010), and have
a lower willingness to take financial risk (Malmendier & Nagel, 2011; Schoar & Zuo,
2013; Benmelech & Frydman, 2014).
Rustication was announced as compulsory for all age-eligible high-school graduates
at the start. However, the quotas of rustication varied according to economic situation and
policy changes. When the quota was less than 100% (not all high-school graduates were
required to be rusticated), some selection occurred (Li et al., 2010). There are two types of
selection in the rustication. First, there exists cross-household selection, as the previously
privileged families (such as the rich and/or educated) lost power in the social re-shuﬄe
and were less able to help their children acquire exemptions from rustication (Zhou &
Hou, 1999; Li et al., 2010). Second, there is within-household selection. In the case of a
binding quota, the parents had to choose which child(ren) to be rusticated. To overcome
the potential endogeneity, I specify two empirical strategies. On the one hand, I explicitly
control fathers’ socioeconomic traits as proxies for the family background in the OLS
estimation, with data from the 2002 Chinese Household Income Project in absence of the
co-residency bias.2 On the other hand, I apply twin and sibling fixed-effects estimations
to the 2002 Chinese Twins Survey, which is the first dataset on twins in China. Bias from
common family background is eliminated. In addition, the within-household selection is
largely reduced in the specification for identical twins, as they are genetically the same,
2The 2002 Chinese Household Income Project collects socioeconomic information on parents, despite
their living separately or being deceased. Thus it overcomes the co-residency bias in conventional household
surveys.
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and have far less difference than non-identical twins or siblings that are further apart (Li
et al., 2010). Moreover, I specify a robustness check controlling the difference between
identical twins using birth weight as a proxy for initial endowment following the literature
(Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1995; Behrman & Rosenzweig, 2004).
Just as with the difference-in-difference estimation, I find that individuals with rus-
tication experience behave more conservatively than their age-eligible but non-rusticated
peers. They spend less on housing consumption, save more, purchase more insurance, and
invest less in risky assets such as stocks and bonds. Consistently across the three empirical
strategies, I find that rustication decreases lifetime schooling, but does not have a signif-
icant influence on long-term income, as shown in previous studies (Meng & Gregory,
2002, 2007; Xie et al., 2008; Yang & Li, 2011). The results remain robust if the potential
influence from initial endowment, occupational choice, and spousal traits is taken into
account.
Why do the rusticated individuals behave conservatively? With a simple habit-forming
model, I consider one interpretation lies in the habits shaped during adversity (Becker &
Murphy, 1988; Orphanides & Zervos, 1994; Crawford, 2010; Costa, 2013). Take hous-
ing for instance: given that the past and current consumption of habit-forming goods are
complementary, the habit of depressed housing consumption formed during the rustica-
tion leads the later consumption to converge to a low steady state.3 Empirical evidence
examining the influence from the incidence versus the intensity of rustication supports the
habit explanation. I find that it is mainly the rusticated years (the intensity) rather than the
participation in the programme itself (the incidence) that contributes to the findings. The
longer the rusticated period, the more likely is the convergence to a steady state of housing
consumption. Interview evidence also supports this interpretation. The sent-down youths
self-reported that they learned about the toughness of life from the adverse experience in
rural areas (Zhou, 2013). It is consistent as well with the evidence on the role of habits
and values as determinants for behaviour and socioeconomic changes, such as the rise of
the middle class during the Industrial Revolution and modern capitalism (Doepke & Zili-
botti, 2008; Weber, 2013). What is worth mentioning is that the habit explanation does
not exclude other possible interpretations. Various channels could co-exist, interact with
each other, and influence long-term economic behaviour together.
Forced migration to rural areas happened in countries other than China, though none
is comparable to its huge population and age concentration in adolescence. Indonesia
had a Transmigration programme through the 20th century, moving landless people from
3During the rustication, the sent-down youths lived in small shabby houses, called “collective units”
that were shared with many others. Even by the end of 1976, about 1 million rusticated youths still had no
proper dwellings to live in, especially for those who were married (Bonnin, 2013).
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densely populated areas to less populous areas. The total population influenced was
around five million (Fearnside, 1997). The Soviet campaign, Dekulakization, deported
better-off peasants and their families to distant parts of the Soviet Union and other parts
of the provinces between 1929 and 1932. More than 1.8 million rich peasants were de-
ported during the peak time of 1930-1931 (Conquest, 1987; Viola, 2007). Russia’s Virgin
Lands Campaign between 1954 and 1963 was considered the predecessor for China’s rus-
tication programme. Advertised as a socialist adventure, 300,000 youths travelled to the
Virgin Lands in the summer of 1954 (Taubman, 2004). Another parallel can be drawn
with the U.S.’s Indian Removal in the 19th century. About 70 thousand Indians were
forcibly relocated to designated territories, because of population density concerns and
the availability of arable land. Nonetheless, China’s rustication programme affects a huge
population of 17 million, and has a demographic concentration on adolescence when the
attitude towards the world is first established (Ghitza & Gelman, 2014).
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that systematically investigates the
long-term impacts of this biggest inner-country migration on economic behaviour. Pre-
vious studies focused on its impacts on education and income (Meng & Gregory, 2002,
2007; Xie et al., 2008; Yang & Li, 2011). Other literature touches upon its influence on
mentality or consumption, though with little empirical evidence or focusing on the out-
come of household appliances (Zhang et al., 2007; Zhou, 2013). Given that rustication
shifts urban youths’ privileged status into an unprivileged rural one during their adoles-
cence when values are established, its impacts on behaviour are expected to be profound
and worthy of investigation. In this study, I try to provide empirical evidence and expla-
nation to locate the heterogeneity in economic behaviour. The study also sheds light on
how a policy, pertaining to those in the early stage of life, exerts long-term impacts on
a generation through changing their behaviour. The policy implication lies in the impor-
tance of later policy interventions if the policy makers take the long-term influence of one
policy on economic behaviour into account.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1.2 specifies the theo-
retical framework. Section 1.3 provides institutional background on China’s rustication
programme. Section 1.4 describes three data sets followed by Section 1.5 which speci-
fies corresponding empirical specifications. Section 1.6 presents and discusses empirical




I adopt a habit-forming model to elaborate the long-term effects of rustication (Becker &
Murphy, 1988; Abel, 1990; Orphanides & Zervos, 1994, 1995; Crawford, 2010). Suppose
an individual has two consumption goods at period t: an ordinary good ct with price
1, and a habit-forming good ht (eg., housing consumption) with price p. Her current
utility, u(ct, ht, st), depends on ct, ht, and a measure of stock of past consumption st,
which depends on ht but not ct. The individual accumulates her future stock from previous
consumption st and ht. The evolution of stock is described below:
st+1 = δst + ht,
where δ is the depreciation rate of the past consumption stock. Through st and ht, st+1
enters the current utility u(ct, ht, st). Her income y, is set constant following the literature





βtu(ct, ht, st) (1)
s.t. ct + pht ≤ y, (2)
st+1 = δst + ht. (3)
Following Orphanides & Zervos (1994), the utility function u(ct, ht, st) follows the com-
plementarity assumption that the current consumption ht and the past consumption st are
complements (uhs > 0). In addition, this complementarity is stronger than that between c
and s(uhs ≥ ucs).4
Along an optimal path, the budget constraint (2) binds. By substituting ct = y−pht into
the utility function, the objective function can be redefined as x(ht, st) ≡ u(y − pht, ht, st),




[x(h, s) + βV(δs + h)]. (4)
The correspondence describing the optimal consumption path is: φ∗(s) ≡ {s′|V(s) =
x(s′ − δs, s) + βV(s′)}. s¯ is a steady state if s¯ ∈ φ∗(s¯). Define sc as a critical level if
4The other three assumptions of the utility function are: Assumption 1. the function u(c, h, s) is second-
order continuous for c, h, s ≥ 0. Assumption 2. the function u is increasing and strongly concave in c and
h. Assumption 3. uc(c, h, s) > 0 for all c, h, s ≥ 0 (Orphanides & Zervos, 1994).
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the optimal local dynamic diverges around it. Following Proposition 1 in Orphanides &
Zervos (1994), the optimal paths are described as below:
Proposition: The optimal paths converge to a steady state monotonically from any initial
stock; if the initial stock lies between two consecutive steady states, the optimal paths
converge to either one or the other; exactly one critical level exists between any two con-
secutive stable steady states (Orphanides & Zervos, 1994).
1.2.2 Modelling the Impact of Rustication
I take the long-term impact of rustication on housing consumption as one instance to
illustrate the incorporation of rustication into this model. Housing is habit-adjusted as
discussed in the literature (Huang, 2012). Denote s0 the initial individual stock of con-
sumption at the start of rustication, and τ the duration of rustication. Define h∗(s) the
optimal unconstrained housing consumption, where s is the stock of past consumption.
During the rustication, the housing consumption is depressed, as the sent-down youths
lived in small shabby houses called “collective units”, which were shared with many oth-
ers.5 Thus I impose a cap on the housing consumption during the rustication, consistent
with previous research (Costa, 2013). Set:
ht = h¯ < h∗(s0),∀t ∈ [0, τ]. (5)
From the budget constraint (2), ct = c¯ = y − ph¯,∀t ∈ [0, τ]. Inserting h¯ into eq.(3) and
iterating, I obtain the stock of consumption at the end of rustication:
sτ(s0) = δτs0 +
1 − δτ
1 − δ h¯, s0 given. (6)
If at the end of the rustication, the stock of consumption sτ(s0) is less than the critical
level sc, the housing consumption ht will converge to a low steady state. Figure 1.1
illustrates the dynamics, with housing consumption on the vertical axis and the stock of
consumption on the horizontal axis. The graphing follows Orphanides & Zervos (1995)
and Costa (2013). Assume an individual is at the steady state s0 = sh initially. During
the rustication, she is forced to consume below h¯, reducing her stock of consumption over
the rustication period, τ. If by the end of the rustication, the stock of consumption sτ(s0)
is less than a critical point sc (sc < s0), she will enter a new optimal path converging
to a new stable steady state with lower housing consumption. Alternatively, if the stock
5Even by the end of 1976, about 1 million rusticated youth still did not lived in proper dwellings,
especially for those married couples (Bonnin, 2013).
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of consumption after the rustication does not drop below any critical value, the housing
consumption will converge back to the original level. To summarise:
Prediction: After the rustication, if an individual’s stock of housing consumption
drops below a critical level, she will enter a new optimal path converging to a steady state
with lower utilization of housing consumption.
From the conventional budget constraint with saving, an increase in the financial assets
is expected from the decreasing consumption as demonstrated in the prediction above.
What is worth mentioning is that the habit channel could co-exist with other channels,
such as the changing risk aversion or discount rate.6 However, those mechanisms are
not mutually exclusive. Moreover, they interact with each other, and shape the long-term
economic behaviour together.7
1.3 Institutional Background
From 1966 to 1978 during China’s Cultural Revolution, approximately 17 million urban
youths (1/10 of the urban population), most of whom were junior or senior high school
graduates, were sent to the countryside (Li et al., 2010). With no access to formal educa-
tion, they spent 3-4 years on average in the rural area. They did heavy manual farm work
for 12 hours per day and 7 days per week, as documented in Bernstein et al. (1977) and
Zhou (2013). More than 90% returned to the cities by 1980, two years after the official
end of the Cultural Revolution (Bonnin, 2013). About 5% never returned having married
local peasants or found employment in non-agricultural jobs in rural areas (Zhou & Hou,
1999).
1.3.1 Origins and Rules of the Rustication
The earliest documented rustication was in 1955. It was small scale with less than 8,000
individuals affected (Bonnin, 2013). Large-scale rustication was initiated in 1966, with
the start of the Cultural Revolution. In the first two years of the Cultural Revolution,
primary schools, high schools, and universities were shut down. Many urban youths
participated in the revolutionary activities. The rustication was made official in 1968,
6For instance, when the rusticated youths returned to cities, they were subject to fewer resources com-
pared to their non-rusticated peers because of the lost years in the countryside. Poor economic status is
associated with high risk aversion (Binswanger, 1981; Guiso & Paiella, 2008). To prepare for future rainy
days, the rusticated youngsters are expected to consume less, save and insure more, and invest less in the
risky assets. In addition, it is also plausible that the discount rate alters among the rusticated youths. They
discount the future less and save more.
7For instance, the wealth effect after returning to cities could interact with the habit-forming channel,
and aggravate the negative effect of rustication on housing consumption.
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as Mao urged the urban youths to go to the rural areas to be re-educated by the farmers
(Zhang et al., 2007; Li et al., 2010). Most were unwilling to be separated from families,
and thus coercive techniques such as threatening parents with job loss were used (Deng
& Treiman, 1997).
In addition to the revolutionary propaganda, rustication was motivated by deep eco-
nomic concerns. The rising urban unemployment was an important cause for the large-
scale rustication. Interrupted by the Cultural Revolution, senior high schools and uni-
versities closed and did not admit new students until 1971/1972. When they reopened,
senior high schools did not recruit old students who missed the chance in previous years
(Meng & Gregory, 2002). Universities did not admit senior high school graduates di-
rectly (Li et al., 2010). The recruiting criterion was not academic merit, but performance
in the Cultural Revolution (e.g., participation in the rustication), political attitude, or fam-
ily background.8 The dysfunction of senior high schools and universities in absorbing
graduates served to increase youth unemployment. In addition, shortly after the founda-
tion of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the baby boom enhanced the employment
pressure among urban youths (Banerjee et al., 2010; Zhou, 2013). The red line in Figure
1.2 circles the first baby boom shortly after 1949. Those children were of high-school age
when the Cultural Revolution started, and would enter the labour market if there was no
rustication.
The local government had yearly send-down quotas to meet. The quota varied ac-
cording to the economic situation and policy changes. Figure 1.3 depicts the number of
rusticated youths migrating into rural areas (Kojima, 1996). From 1967 to 1968, approxi-
mately 2 million people were sent to the rural areas. This number peaked at 2.67 million in
1969 (Kojima, 1996; Bonnin, 2013). With the economic recovery and increasing supply
of urban jobs, the number of rusticated youths dropped in the following years. A second
peak appeared around 1975 when the four leaders of the Revolution, called the “Gang of
Four”, seized power and strongly advocated rustication using patriotic propaganda (Bai,
2014).
1.3.2 Variation Across Cohort and Region
The majority of the rusticated youths were junior or senior high school graduates. I focus
on the cohorts born between 1946 and 1961 following the literature (Li et al., 2010).
The earliest birth cohort of 1946 contains the senior high school graduates in 1966 when
8Section 1.3.3 discusses the role of family background on rustication in detail.
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large-scale rustication began.9 The latest birth cohort of 1961 includes the junior high
school graduates in 1978 when the rustication programme was officially ended. Figure
1.4 graphs the rustication rate in each cohort. It validates the specification on the treated
generation between 1946 and 1961. For cohorts out of this range, the rustication rate is
less than 10%.
The destination of rustication also varies, depending on the home cities and time
of rustication. Bonnin (2013) documents that most rustication was within the province
and students were sent to the nearby countryside. However, there was about 8% cross-
province migration, mostly from big municipalities to the remote frontiers. Figure 1.5
demonstrates the direction of cross-province migration. It was concentrated in the three
biggest municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai), but also included other provincial
capitals such as Wuhan and Chengdu. The destinations were the remote frontiers, such
as Heilongjiang in the northeast, Xinjiang in the northwest, and Yunnan in the southwest.
Because of the variation of rustication across cohort and region, I adopt a difference-in-
difference estimation to capture the generation effect of rustication. Details are displayed
in Section 1.5.1.
1.3.3 Potential Endogeneity
Rustication was announced as compulsory for almost all age-eligible high school grad-
uates at the beginning. Nevertheless, when the sent-down quota was binding (not all
high school graduates were requested to be rusticated), some selection occurred. There
was cross- and within- household selection during the rustication (Zhou & Hou, 1999;
Li et al., 2010). On the one hand, the possibility of being sent to the countryside var-
ied across households. This is because the previously privileged families (eg., the rich
and/or the educated) lost power in the social re-shuﬄing of the Cultural Revolution. Thus
they are less able to help their children acquire exemptions from rustication. One the
other hand, children from previously unprivileged families with parents who were work-
ers, farmers, or soldiers during that time period, were more likely to be able to inherit
their parents’ jobs or join the army. Thus they were able to return to cities earlier, or even
be exempted from rustication. In the 1970s, the rustication policy was relaxed. A small
proportion of junior high school graduates, most with favoured family backgrounds, were
directly admitted into senior high schools.
Figure 1.6 displays one instance of how the possibility of rustication varies with family
9During that period, children were admitted into primary school around the age of 8. Primary-school
education lasted for six years, followed by three years of junior- and senior- high school education, respec-
tively (Li et al., 2010).
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background. The bar indicates the possibility of being rusticated. Numbers in brackets
indicate observations in each category with percentages in the parentheses. A majority of
the fathers have educational level at elementary school level (35.6%), followed by those
who with no schooling (29.3%), with junior high school level (18.3%), and with senior
high school level or above (16.8%). Clearly, children from previously privileged family
backgrounds, such as those with fathers who were intellectuals, had a higher probability
of being sent to the countryside. This is because intellectuals were considered elites before
the Cultural Revolution, and were against in the programme. A similar scenario applies
to children of enterprise owners, as shown in Figure 1A.1. However, the magnitude of
selection is small, with less than 5% conditional on fathers’ educational level, or less than
10% on their social status.
In contrast, there is within-household selection in addition to the cross-household se-
lection (Li et al., 2010). Parents had to choose the child(ren) to go to the countryside if
not all children were requested for rustication. Different empirical strategies are applied
to address the cross- and within- household endogeneity, and will be described in Section
1.5.
1.4 Data
I use three data sets, each of which is associated with one empirical specification, to exam-
ine the long-term effects of rustication on housing consumption and financial behaviour.
The three data sets supplement each other and are described as below.
1.4.1 Mini-Census 2005
I first use the 2005 mini-census to describe the behaviour of the rusticated generation
versus non-rusticated generations. The generation experiencing rustication is expected to
behave in a different way from their earlier or later counterparts, as almost half of them
were rusticated, and the effect could spill over to other age-eligible but non-rusticated
individuals. Figure 1.7 illustrates examples of the spill-over effects. For instance, the
surge of population returning to cities after the programme may generate a demand shock
on urban housing.10 Importantly, the cross-generation investigation is not subject to the
cross- or within- household selection as described in Section 1.3.3.
The mini-census was implemented from November 1 to November 10 in 2005 by
the National Bureau of Statistics of China and the office of the 1% population sampling
10The rustication programme was ended officially in 1978. In the following year, 3.95 million rusticated
youths returned to cities (Kojima, 1996).
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investigation in the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. It covered 1% of
the national population, or approximately 13,000,000 observations. The data I use covers
20% of the mini-census. My sample focuses on the urban areas, since the target of the
large-scale rustication policy was urban educated youths. Rural residents and urban-to-
rural migrants are excluded.11
The merits of using this data set are two-fold: first, the sample covers all provinces
and is representative of the general population. My sample contains approximately 1
million observations with intact information on education and income. The sampling is
according to the population in each province, autonomous region, and municipality, and
thus representative of the general population. Second, unlike the population census, the
mini-census asks detailed questions on housing size, purchasing price, insurance, and
working time, in addition to education and income. It provides a rare opportunity to
investigate the overall pattern of consumption and financial behaviour across China.
The summary statistics are presented in Column (1) of Table 1.1. Individuals are
in their late 40s in 2005 and are sex balanced (52% are male). Almost half (45%) of
the sample has at least a senior high school level of education in 2005, but only 5%
achieves university level. The annual income is 1,630 U.S. dollars (USD) in 2002 values.
The average housing size is 59 square metres, with an estimated market housing price
of 7,645 USD in 2002 values. The average working hours are 46 hours per week, or
approximately 9 hours per day.12 Concerning insurance purchase, 30% of the population
have unemployment insurance. The proportion of pension and health insurance almost
doubles, possibly because of the average age being in the late 40s, when old-age support
and medical care become increasingly important.
One possible caveat lies in no direct measurement on rustication being available in
the mini-census. However, as I am interested in the cross-generational influence, this
information is not necessarily needed. The following two datasets provide detailed rus-
tication information at the individual level, which examines the intra-generational effects
of rustication.
1.4.2 Chinese Household Income Project 2002
I apply the 2002 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP 2002) to examine the intra-
generational effect of rustication. CHIP 2002 is a joint research study sponsored by the In-
stitute of Economics at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Asian Development Bank,
11Migrants from rural to urban areas still hold rural registration (Hukou), and do not have equal access
to the same educational and occupational opportunities as urban citizens.
12The official working days per week in China are five after 1995.
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the Ford Foundation, and the East Asian Institute at Columbia University. Consistent
with the previous strategy, I focus on urban residents only. The data covers 54 cities or
municipalities from 11 provinces in China, as marked in dark grey in Figure 1.8.
The advantages of using CHIP 2002 data to analyse the long-term impacts of rustica-
tion lie in the following features. First, the CHIP project provides rich data on rustication
and outcome variables. The survey asks each individual above 35 years old about the ex-
perience of rustication and the length of time one was sent to the countryside. In addition,
it records the individual’s housing consumption (housing size and market price), saving,
investment portfolio, expenditure on insurance, as well as working time, occupation, ed-
ucation and income. It provides a rare opportunity to investigate the consequences of
rustication from various perspectives. Secondly, it collects information on family back-
ground in the absence of co-residency bias. The survey reports socioeconomic status on
the parents of household heads and spouses, regardless of whether they live together or are
alive. The information contains parental educational levels, social status classified before
the Cultural Revolution, and political party affiliation. To the best of my knowledge, this
is the only household survey in China that provides such detailed information on family
background and overcomes co-residency bias. Last but not least, the area under this sur-
vey is geographically and economically representative, which provides an opportunity to
yield nationally representative estimates.13
Column (2) in Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics. They are generally the same
as those found in the mini-census, with no statistically significant differences reported.
Among those age-eligible youths born between 1946 and 1961, 42% have been rusticated.
Conditional on being rusticated, the average length of being sent to the countryside is 3.89
years (detailed tabulation of the rusticated years is shown in Table 1A.1). By the end of
2002, they have saved 4,342 USD, which is about three years’ income.14 In addition, they
have invested 828 USD in stocks and bonds by the end of that year, which is almost half
of their annual income. They also spend 195 USD on insurance, which is about 1/10 of
annual income.
13CHIP is considered geographically representative as the areas under survey cover the northeast (Liaon-
ing), the south (Guangdong), the southwest (Yunnan), and the west (Gansu). It is considered to be economi-
cally representative as the surveyed areas include the richest parts in China such as Beijing and Guangdong,
as well as the least developed parts such as Gansu.
14Saving is defined as the summation of fixed and current deposits, stocks and bonds, and others. Other
sources contain money lent, self-owned funds for family business, investment in enterprises/business (ex-
cept stocks and bonds), and monetary value of commercial insurance as a deposit.
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1.4.3 Chinese Twins Survey 2002
The third data set I apply is that of the Chinese Twins Survey in 2002, which is the first
twins data set in China, designed by Professors Mark Rosenzweig and Junsen Zhang.15
The survey was carried out by the National Bureau of Statistics in 2002 in five cities
in China, depicted in yellow triangles in Figure 1.8.16 It includes 1,838 identical twins,
1,152 non-identical twins, and 1,672 singletons (as control group) aged between 18 and
65. The survey collects information on each twin’s housing consumption, working time,
schooling, income, emotional control, and other demographic details, such as age, gender,
and number of household members. Similar questions are also asked to their non-twin
siblings and singletons in the control group.
My sample contains 602 identical twins and 4,866 siblings born between 1946 and
1961 with intact information on rustication, education, and income.17 In addition to pro-
viding a rich set of outcome variables, I consider the following advantages of using the
Twins Survey for this study. First, it contains detailed information on rustication, such
as whether individuals were rusticated and for how many years. Second, it facilitates
the elimination of bias from cross- and within- household selection, as discussed in Sec-
tion 1.3.3. This is because identical twins share similar genetics and have same family
background. By adopting a twin fixed-effects strategy, I can eliminate influence from the
unobserved family background. In addition, the differences between identical twins are
much less than those between the non-identical twins and among further apart siblings.
Thus the within-household bias on rustication is much reduced under this strategy. Sim-
ilarly, siblings share the same family background although with various genetic traits.
The sibling fixed-effects estimation supplements the results from the twin fixed-effects
strategy.
Summary statistics on identical twins and siblings are displayed in Columns (3) and
(4) of Table 1.1, respectively. They are roughly the same as those presented in the pre-
vious two data sets. No statistically significant differences are found for the variables.
Specifically, for identical twins born between 1946 and 1961, more than half (54.2%)
were rusticated. Almost 30% (180 twins from 90 pairs) of them have within-twin differ-
ence in rustication, which generates the variation in the twin fixed-effects estimation. The
variation of rustication within identical twins is demonstrated in Table 1A.2.
15Professor Mark Rosenzweig is Frank Altschul professor of Economics at the Yale University. Profes-
sor Junsen Zhang is Wei Lun Professor of Economics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
16The five cities are Chengdu, Chongqing, Harbin, Hefei, and Wuhan.




Rustication varies across cohort and region, as discussed in Section 1.3.2. Therefore I
apply difference-in-difference estimation to the mini-census in 2005 to investigate the
generational effect of rustication. The outcome variables contain housing consumption,
insurance and pension purchase, as well as working time, education, and income.
The treated generation includes individuals born between 1946 and 1961. The com-
parison group contains individuals born between 1940 and 1966 but not in the treated
generation. I also specify a complementary strategy as comparing balanced rusticated co-
horts of 1946-1950 and 1954-1958 versus non-rusticated cohorts of 1941-1945 and 1962-
1966. They are the earliest (1946-1950) and latest (1954-1958) rusticated cohorts versus
the non-rusticated cohorts ahead (1941-1945) and afterwards (1962-1966). Specifically,
the 1959-1961 birth cohort is excluded as individuals in that cohort were born during the
Great Famine, and may otherwise contaminate the results.
In addition to birth cohort, rustication also varies across region. As documented in
Bonnin (2013), the rustication was more severe in big cities, as the revolutionary pro-
paganda was stronger and coercion was applied more heavily. To test this argument, I
plot the city rustication rate against the logarithm of the city population using the census
data in 1953, and present the result in Figure 1.9. A positive and statistically significant
coefficient is revealed. With a 1% increase in the city population, the rustication rate is
raised by 0.03 percentage points, and is statistically significant at the 5% level. As the
average city rustication rate is 0.31 revealed from the Chinese Household Income Project
2002, the 1% rise in the city population indeed increases the city rustication rate by al-
most 10%. Consistent with the classification in the City Statistical Yearbook, I define
cities with population above 1 million as big cities (NBS, 1985, 2002).18
The empirical specification is as follows:
yict = α1bigc + α2treatedt + α3bigc ∗ treatedt + Xictαx + µict (7)
where i stands for individual, c represents city, and t identifies time. big equals 1 if an
individual lives in a big city. Otherwise, it equals 0. The dummy of treated equals 1 if an
individual was born between 1946 and 1961. It equals 0 if he/she was born between 1940
and 1966 but not in the treated generation. In the complementary specification, treated
18The cut-off points of city size are 2 million, 1 million, 0.5 million, and 0.2 million according to the City
Statistical Yearbook. The range of the population in big cities in 1953 was from 1,091,600 to 6,204,417.
The range for small cities was from 26,200 to 916,800.
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equals 1 if an individual was born in 1946-1950 or 1954-1958 cohort. It equals 0 if in
either the 1941-1945 or 1962-1966 cohort.
yict is the outcome variable. It includes housing consumption (housing size and price),
pension and insurance purchase (unemployment and health insurance), as well as edu-
cation (dummies of having education at senior high school/above or university/above),
income (logarithm of income in the last month), and working time (working hours last
week). Xict is a vector of control variables, which contain age, ethnicity, gender, and
regional dummies. ict is the disturbance term. Standard errors are clustered at the city
level.
α3 identifies the effect of rustication. One assumption for α3 picking up the influence
of rustication is that there is a parallel trend in outcome variables between big and small
cities before the programme. Otherwise, the change may be because of events other than
the rustication. Figures 1.10 - 1.12 check those trends. For instance, the senior high
school rates in big cities (blue solid line) and small cities (red dashed line) are roughly
parallel for cohorts prior to 1946 (Figure 1.10). With the start of the rustication, the
senior high school rate remains stagnant in small cities but drops sharply in big cities.
The deviation from the preceding parallel trend identifies the effect of rustication. Similar
parallel trends are displayed in income (Figure 1.11) and housing consumption (Figure
1.12), which validate my method of difference-in-difference.
A similar specification as that in Eq. (7) is carried out, except the dummy of bigc is
replaced with a continuous variable of city population in 1953:
yict = β1 pop53c + β2treatedt + β3 pop53c ∗ treatedt + Xictβx + ξict (8)
where pop53c is the logarithm of city population in 1953. Others variables remain the
same as in Eq. (7).
1.5.2 OLS Estimation Controlling Family Background Explicitly
With application to the Chinese Household Income Project in 2002 as described in Section
1.4.2, I specify OLS regression controlling family background explicitly as follows:
yi = γ1rusi + γ2 f amilyi + Xiγx + i (9)
The sample is restricted to individuals born between 1946 and 1961. Standard errors are
clustered at the city level and yi is the outcome variable. It includes housing consumption
(housing size and price), and a set of measures on financial behaviour such as saving,
share of investment out of income on risky assets, and expenditure on insurance, which
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examines individual allocation of net consumption wealth. It also contains education
(senior high school/above or university/above), income (logarithm of annual income),
and working time (monthly working days and daily working hours).
rusi is the interested independent variable. It is either a dummy for being rusticated,
or the total rusticated years. f amilyi is a vector indicating family background, which in-
cludes dummies for fathers’ social status, educational level, and political status. Xi is a
vector of control variables, including age, ethnicity, gender, and provincial dummies in
all specifications. Additional controls vary slightly in different regressions. In the speci-
fication for housing consumption, I control education, income, and number of household
members. In the specification for financial behaviour, education and income are addi-
tional controls. In the specification for income, I follow the literature (Mincer, 1974; Li
et al., 2010) by controlling for schooling, working years, and the squared form. Schooling
is included as one additional control in the equation for working time.
1.5.3 Twin and Sibling Fixed-Effects Estimation
Regressions under twin fixed-effects follow conventional specification in the literature (Li
et al., 2007, 2010). Conditional on the data availability, my empirical work focuses on
estimating the effects of rustication on housing consumption, working time, education and
income, with data from the Chinese Twins Survey. The econometric specifications are as
below:
y1 j = λ1rus1 j + Z jλZ + X1 jλX + µ j + e1 j + ε1 j (10)
y2 j = λ1rus2 j + Z jλZ + X2 jλX + µ j + e2 j + ε2 j (11)
where the subscript j indicates family. The subscripts 1 and 2 refer to twin orders. All
identical twins born between 1946 and 1961 were age-eligible for the rustication. yi j
(i = 1, 2) is the outcome variable, which includes housing consumption (housing size and
property rights), working time (monthly working days and weekly working hours), edu-
cation (dummies for having education at senior high school/above or university/above),
and income (logarithm of income in the last month). rusi j (i = 1, 2) is the interested in-
dependent variable. Similar to that in the OLS estimation, it indicates a dummy for being
rusticated or the total rusticated years.
Z j is a vector of observed family variables, such as regions, which are the same for
identical twins. Xi j (i = 1, 2) is a set of twin-specific control variables, which differ
slightly in the regressions for different outcome variables. Specifically, in the specifica-
tion for housing consumption, Xi j contains age, gender, schooling, number of household
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members and logarithm of monthly income. In the specification for working time, Xi j
contains schooling years, in addition to the common controls of age and gender. In the
regression for logarithm income, Xi j includes additional controls of schooling years, ex-
perience, and square form of experience, as under the OLS estimation. µ j stands for unob-
served family effect, such as parents’ social, educational, or political status. ei j (i = 1, 2)
indicates unobserved twin-specific endowment, such as ability, and εi j is the disturbance
term. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
Estimate of λ1 under OLS estimation is biased because children from previously priv-
ileged families are more likely to be sent to the countryside, as discussed in Section 1.3.3.
However, it is difficult to find proxies to identify unobserved family effect µ j and twin-
specific endowment ei j, which are possibly correlated with rusi j. To address the bias in
OLS estimates, I apply fixed-effects estimation to identical twins. By taking difference
between Eqs. (10) and (11), the fixed-effects estimator λ1 below is obtained:
y1 j − y2 j = λ1(rus1 j − rus2 j) + (X1 j − X2 j)λX + ε1 j − ε2 j (12)
The unobserved family effects µ j are eliminated as twins share the same family back-
ground. Because identical twins are genetically the same, the influence from twin-specific
endowment ei j is reduced. One potential remaining concern is about within-twin selec-
tion. Parents may select one twin rather than the other to be sent down, depending on
their unobserved endowment.19 Nonetheless, this difference is far less between identical
twins than that between non-identical twins or spaced siblings (Li et al., 2010). I also
implement sensitivity analyses to control for the twins’ birth weight as measure for initial
endowment in Section 1.6.6.
In addition, I apply sibling fixed-effects estimation to siblings of all twins and single-
tons. The specification is as follow:
y j = λ1rus j + Z jλZ + X jλX + µ j + ε j (13)
where µ j stands for the unobserved family-specific heterogeneity, which can be eliminated
by the fixed-effects estimation. Other variables are defined the same as in Eqs. (10) and
(11).
19In the later stage of rustication, if a child was an only child or the only one staying at home, he/she
could be exempted from the rustication (Liu et al., 1995; Zhou & Hou, 1999).
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1.6 Empirical Results
Literature has intensively investigated the influence of rustication since the 1990s, al-
though most focuses on education and income, or on household appliance in recent work
(Zhou & Hou, 1999; Xie et al., 2008; Li et al., 2010; Yang & Li, 2011; Zhou, 2013). In
this section, I present my new findings on the long-term consequence of rustication on
consumption and financial behaviour. I also display the similar results on education and
income as shown in the literature, and the auxiliary finding on working time.20
1.6.1 The Long-Term Effect of Rustication on Housing Consumption
Table 1.2 presents the long-term effect of rustication on housing consumption. Panel A
displays the cross-generational effects of rustication from difference-in-difference strat-
egy. Columns (1) and (3) demonstrate the estimates from Eq. (7), while Columns (2) and
(4) show the corresponding estimates from Eq. (8). The first row presents results compar-
ing generation 1946-1961 versus other cohorts born between 1940 and 1966. The second
row displays the estimates for cohorts 1946-1950 and 1954-1958 versus 1941-1945 and
1962-1966. Panels B-D present the intra-generational effects of rustication. Specifically,
Panel B presents the OLS estimates controlling family background explicitly. Panels C
and D display the results from twin and sibling fixed-effects estimations, separately. The
effects of being rusticated and the length of rustication are demonstrated in different rows.
I find that the rusticated generation spends significantly less on housing consumption
even in the 2000s, compared to their non-rusticated counterparts as shown in Panel A.
Rustication has negative and statistically significant impacts on both housing size and
purchase price, consistently across various specifications. As expected, the magnitudes
of estimates in Columns (1) and (3) are consistently larger than those in Columns (2) and
(4), as the former aggregates the effect from all big cities.
Controlling family background explicitly, the OLS estimates in Panel B reveal a sim-
ilar pattern. The sent-down youths live in smaller dwellings by 1.8 square metres on
average, compared to non-rusticated individuals with education and income controlled
(Column (1) of Panel B). It is statistically significant at the 10% level of significance.
One additional year of rustication reduces housing size by 0.5 square metres with statisti-
cal significance at the high 1% level (Column (2) in Panel B). With respect to the housing
price, sent-down individuals spend 796 USD less than their non-rusticated counterparts.
One more year of rustication is associated with 187 USD less in housing expenditure.
The two estimates are at the 5% and 1% levels of statistical significance respectively. The
20Additional findings on self control and self reliance are shown in Table 1A.5 in the appendix.
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magnitudes are similar to or within reasonable variation compared to those of estimates
presented in Panels A.
Similar results are revealed under twin and sibling fixed-effects strategies. With one
more year of rustication, the housing size decreases by 0.8 and 0.5 square metres among
identical twins (Column (2) of Panel C) and siblings (Column (2) of Panel D) separately.
The magnitude is similar to the one found under OLS specification. The two estimates are
statistically significant at conventional levels. The rate of private home ownership drops
as well, although with no statistical significance.
The negative impact of rustication on housing consumption is consistent with studies
on the influence of the Great Depression. Romer (1990) and Crafts & Fearon (2010) find
that the generation experiencing the economic crisis has a markedly lower consumption
of durable goods. Similar to the economic recession, rustication induces individuals to
forgo the pursuit of the largest household durable goods of housing.
1.6.2 The Long-Term Effect of Rustication on Saving and Investment
Table 1.3 presents the OLS estimates on the long-run influence of rustication on saving
and investment, controlling family background explicitly. Columns (1) and (2) present
the effects of rustication on the logarithm of household savings, which contains fixed and
current deposits, stocks and bonds, and the monetary value of commercial insurance as
a deposit. The last two columns display the corresponding results on the ratio of stocks
and bonds relative to annual income. It aims to estimate the influence of rustication on
the behaviour of investing in risky assets.
I find that rustication increases saving and decreases the investment in risky assets.
Specifically, the rusticated youths accumulate 6.5% more saving compared with their
non-rusticated counterparts, with statistical significance at the 10% level (Column (1)).
In addition, with one more year of rustication, the ratio of stocks and bonds relative to
the total income declines by approximately 0.03 percentage points (Column (4)). The
estimates are statistically significant at the 10% level.
This financial behaviour is consistent with that of the depression babies (Malmendier
& Nagel, 2011). The generation which experiences low stock/bond returns is less likely
to participate in the stock/bond market throughout their life. Even if they participate, they
invest a lower proportion of their income in such risky assets. Schoar & Zuo (2013) show
that CEOs who enter the labour market during recession periods accumulate more long-
term assets but have less asset turnover. Evidence on rustication agrees with the literature
in the sense that the rusticated individuals accumulate more saving. However, contrast to
the effect of the Great Depression, no stocks or bonds existed during the rustication period.
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Nonetheless, the rustication still changes their investment behaviour as they spend less in
risky assets.
1.6.3 The Long-Term Effect of Rustication on Insurance and Pension
Table 1.4 presents the long-term impacts of rustication on insurance and pension purchase.
Panel A presents the difference-in-difference estimates from the 2005 mini-census. The
outcome variables are dummies if an individual purchases unemployment or health in-
surance, or a pension. Panel B displays the OLS estimates of the effect of rustication on
annual insurance expenditure from CHIP 2002.
I find that the sent-down generation purchases more insurance than the non-rusticated
generations as shown under the difference-in-difference strategy in Panel A. Rustication
increases the possibility of purchasing a pension by 0.9%-4.1% (Columns (2) and (5)
in Panel A). The probability of buying health insurance is also increased by 1.2%-5%
(Columns (3) and (6) in Panel A). All the coefficients are statistically significant at a high
1% level of significance.
Similar evidence is found under the OLS strategy controlling family background ex-
plicitly. The sent-down experience increases annual insurance expenditure by 51 USD
(Column (1) in Panel B). This estimate is statistically significant at the 10% level of sig-
nificance. Given the average insurance expenditure is 195 USD (Column (2) in Table 1.1),
rustication raises the insurance purchase by almost 25%.
This finding is consistent with the literature that individuals born during the Great De-
pression are less willing to take financial risks in later life (Malmendier & Nagel, 2011).
It is also in accord with the mass media report that Millennials experiencing the economic
recession in late-2000s behave in a more risk-averse manner (Groth & Giang, 2012). As
shown in the literature, more risk aversion is associated with more insurance purchases
(Cicchetti & Dubin, 1994; Rabin & Thaler, 2001). Although no insurance or pension ex-
isted during the rustication, the adverse experience still influences the treated population
in that they purchase more health insurance and pension in the long run. Nevertheless,
rustication does not have a statistically significant impact on the purchase of unemploy-
ment insurance. A possible explanation is that the rusticated youths were at the late stage
of their working life cycle (44-59 years old) in 2005. The risk of unemployment is low
and replaced by the approaching retirement.
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1.6.4 Auxiliary Findings: The Long-Term Effect of Rustication on Education, In-
come, and Working Time
The Long-Term Effect of Rustication on Education and Income The effects of rusti-
cation on education and income are first-order results and are studied intensively (Deng &
Treiman, 1997; Zhang et al., 2007; Giles et al., 2008; Xie et al., 2008; Yang & Li, 2011).
In this section I display similar findings in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 to those in the literature.
The table structure is the same as that of Table 1.2.
Lifetime education is decreased, as shown graphically in Figure 1.10 and empirically
in Table 1.5. The rusticated generation has lower educational stock than the earlier or
later generations, as shown in Panel A of Table 1.5. The finding is robust under various
specifications of the difference-in-difference estimation. The intra-generational effect of
rustication, as shown in Panels B-D, is consistent with the cross-generational evidence.
Controlling for family background explicitly, one more rustication year reduces senior
high school and university rates by 0.9% and 0.3% respectively, at a high 1% level of
significance (Columns (2) and (4) in Panel B). Similar results are repeated under fixed-
effects estimation. Compared to non-rusticated twins, the rusticated twins are 4.4% less
likely to reach university level (Column (3) in Panel C). This coefficient is statistically
significant at the 10% level of significance.
Although rustication reduces lifetime schooling, it has no statistically significant im-
pact on income across various empirical specifications as shown in Table 1.6. The litera-
ture demonstrates similar results (Zhang et al., 2007; Xie et al., 2008; Yang & Li, 2011).
Zhang et al. (2007) suggest that the insignificant change in income can be ascribed to the
improved interpersonal skills and resilience generated by hardship. Detailed discussion is
provided in Section 1.6.5.
The Long-Term Effect of Rustication on Working Time A consumer’s utility is formed
through consumption and leisure, as described in conventional microeconomic settings
(MaCurdy, 1981; Seckin, 2001; Arrow & Dasgupta, 2009). Thus in addition to investi-
gating the effect of rustication on housing consumption, I examine its impact on working
time, which is a complement for leisure given the total time fixed. Table 1.7 reports the
estimates under the four empirical specifications.
I find that there is no statistically significant cross-generational effect of rustication,
as presented in Panel A of Table 1.7. In other words, the working pattern does not differ
significantly between rusticated and non-rusticated generations. One explanation is the
squeezing effect. As the rusticated youths work longer, they squeeze the working time
for their peers. Therefore on average, the rustication does not have statistically significant
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influence on working time for the overall treated generation.
In comparison to the insignificant cross-generational effect of rustication, the intra-
generational effect of rustication on working time is positive and statistically significant as
presented in Panels B-D. Specifically, rusticated youths spend around five more hours per
week working (Columns (3) in Panels C and D), compared to non-rusticated individuals.
The two estimates are statistically significant at 1% or 5% levels respectively. Similar
results are revealed for the impact from the total length of rustication. With one additional
year of being sent down, working time is raised by 0.2-0.3 days per month (Columns (2) in
Panels C and D), and 1.7-1.9 hours per week (Columns (4) in Panels C-D), with statistical
significance at conventional levels.21
These findings are consistent with mass media reports on the changing work ethic of
generation Y who experienced the late-2000s recession.22 They are “twice as keen to
work” (Keogh, 2012), and “work incredibly hard” to protect their jobs (Groth & Giang,
2012), as they start to consider a good job as a “privilege” rather than a “given” (Levit,
2010). However, to the best of my knowledge, all of these claims are from employers’
reports or interviews. No empirical studies have been done in this area. This research at-
tempts to provide evidence from survey data to examine the impact of adverse experience
on work ethic.
1.6.5 Incidence Versus Intensity of Rustication
Does the incidence or the intensity of rustication shape long-term economic behaviour?
In this section, I examine the effects of being rusticated and the length of rustication
simultaneously, under a twin fixed-effects estimation. Supporting evidence for the habit
channel is revealed in Table 1.8.
With the rustication dummy (the incidence) and the total years (the intensity) entering
the equations simultaneously, I discover that it is the intensity, rather than the incidence of
rustication, that drives the behaviour pattern. Specifically, with one more year of rustica-
tion, housing size is reduced by 0.63 square metres, with statistical significance at the 10%
level (Column (1)). One additional rusticated year is also associated with 1.8 more hours
of work per week, as demonstrated in Column (2). The estimate is statistically significant
at the 5% level. The incidence of rustication, however, is not statistically significant in
21The measurement on working time from the Chinese Household Income Project (Panel B) is consid-
ered less precise than that from the Twins Survey (Panels C and D). In the former survey, average working
time in the previous year is collected rather than that in the previous week as in the Twins Survey. Thus it
introduces more memory errors.
22Generation Y, also known as Millennials, refers to those born between the early 1980s and early 2000s,
who are the descendants of the Generation X.
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either of the specifications.
Consistent with previous findings, neither the incidence nor the intensity of rustication
affects long-term income, as shown in Column (3). In addition, neither of them has a sta-
tistically significant influence on education (Columns (4) and (5)), possibly because of the
dispersed effects when putting the rustication dummy and length of time simultaneously
into the regression.
The finding that the intensity rather than the incidence of rustication drives the results
supports the explanation of habit formation. It is because the longer the rusticated years,
the more stable the habit is. In this scenario, an individual is more likely to converge to
the steady state in the long term.
1.6.6 Robustness Checks
Tables 1A.3 - 1A.4 show the robustness checks. To address the potential endogeneity
from cross- and within- household selection, I use a twin fixed-effects strategy with an
application to identical twins.
The first concern is that individuals’ initial endowment may be correlated with their
exposure to rustication and the later outcome simultaneously. In such a case, the esti-
mates are contaminated. Although identical twins, for instance, are genetically similar to
each other, their slight difference may still bias parental choice in making the rustication
decision as discussed in Section 1.3.3. Following the literature, I choose weight at birth
as one measure for initial endowment, and include it as an additional control in Eq. (12)
(Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1995; Behrman & Rosenzweig, 2004). Results are presented in
Panel A of Table 1A.3. A similar pattern as that in the baseline results is revealed. The
magnitudes and levels of significance of the robustness estimates are similar or within
reasonable variation.
The second concern is that rustication may alter individuals’ occupational choice
and thus affect their long-term working behaviour. Taking the endogenous occupational
choice into account, I control explicitly for the working sector and occupational type in
the main regressions. Results are displayed in Panel B of Table 1A.3. Similar to the find-
ings in the baseline results, the rusticated individuals decrease their housing consumption
but work for longer hours. Moreover, I test directly the effects of rustication on partic-
ipating in the state-owned sector, being a white-collar worker, or the possibility of self-
employment. Results are presented in Table 1A.4. No statistically significant influence is
revealed from rustication on the sectoral or occupational choice.
Last but not least, as housing consumption and time allocation are jointly decided
between married couples, the traits of the spouse may also affect the results. To address
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this concern, I include the schooling and working sector of the spouses of twins into
the estimation. Again, the baseline results remain robust after controlling for spousal
information, as shown in Panel C of Table 1A.3.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the long-term consequence of adverse experience on economic
behaviour. Using the largest forced migration experiment of China’s rustication pro-
gramme between 1966 and 1978, I estimate its influence on housing consumption and
financial behaviour in the 2000s.
By applying a difference-in-difference estimation to the mini-census in 2005, I first
examine the cross-generational effect of the rustication. I find that the rusticated gener-
ation behave more conservatively than the non-rusticated cohorts. They live in smaller
houses, spend less on housing purchases, and buy more insurance and pension in the long
term. Second, I investigate the intra-generational impact of rustication, applying OLS
and fixed-effects estimations to the Chinese Household Income Project and the Chinese
Twins Survey in 2002 respectively. A similar behavioural pattern was demonstrated. The
rusticated individuals behave more conservatively than their non-rusticated counterparts.
They reduce housing consumption, increase saving and insurance, and decrease invest-
ment in risky assets even three to four decades after the programme. The findings are
consistent with the literature that consumer behaviour changes following economically
hard times. Romer (1990) and Crafts & Fearon (2010) find that consumption on durable
goods dropped sharply during the Great Depression. In addition, the depression babies
who experienced low returns from stocks and bonds invest less in risky assets throughout
their lifetime.
How to explain the long-term conservative behaviour after experiencing an adversity?
I suggest that one interpretation lies in the habits formed during adversity. In the sce-
nario of rustication, the sent-down individuals experienced depressed housing consump-
tion during the rustication (Bonnin, 2013). Following the habit-forming model (Becker
& Murphy, 1988; Abel, 1990; Orphanides & Zervos, 1994, 1995; Crawford, 2010), if
their stock of housing consumption drops below a critical level at the end of the rustica-
tion, their lifetime consumption is expected to converge to a low steady state. Empirical
evidence that the effects of rustication mainly derive from the intensity rather than the
incidence supports this interpretation. The longer the rusticated years, the more likely it
is that the housing consumption converges to a steady state. Consequently, saving can be
expected to increase. What is worth mentioning is that, the habit interpretation does not
exclude other possibly co-existing mechanisms.
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This research fits with the literature on how adversity, such as economic recession,
wars, or other traumatic life experiences, influences long-term economic behaviour (Bel-
lows & Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Malmendier & Nagel, 2011; Schoar & Zuo, 2013;
Benmelech & Frydman, 2014). It also contributes to studies on migration (Conquest,
1987; Mitchneck & Plane, 1995; Fearnside, 1997; Viola, 2007), and stands out as an
analysis of the largest inner-country migration. Furthermore, it provides evidence on how
a policy, and especially one applied in the early stage of life, influences long-term so-
cioeconomic development. The future research agenda includes a general equilibrium
analysis on the effects of rustication on cross-sectional inequality and intergenerational
investment, its long-term effects on the connection between urban and rural areas, and on
rural development.
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Figure 1.1: Illustration of Rustication Dynamics in an Optimisation Problem
with Multiple Steady States
Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.
The red line circles the first baby boom after the foundation of P.R.China in 1949.
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Data source: Kojima (1996).
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Data source: Chinese Household Income Project 2002.
Figure 1.4: Rustication Rate in Each Cohort
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Data source: Bonnin (2013).
Figure 1.5: Migration in the Rustication
Data source: Chinese Household Income Project 2002.
Figure 1.6: Variation in the Possibility of Rustication by Father’s Educational Status
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Figure 1.7: An Illustration on the Spill-over Effect of Rustication
Figure 1.8: Data Coverage in the Chinese Household Income Project 2002,
Chinese Twins Survey 2002, and mini-census 2005
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Data source: Chinese Household Income Project 2002 and Census 1953.
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Data source: Mini-census 2005.
Figure 1.12: Housing Size (square metres) in Each Cohort
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for the Rusticated Generation (Birth Cohort 1946-1961)
Mean (Standard deviation)
Mini census 2005 CHIP 2002 Identical twins 2002 All siblings 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 49.75 48.02 47.19 47.81
(7.39) (4.13) (3.93) (4.04)
Gender (male = 1)
0.52 0.49 0.48 0.48
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Being rusticated - 0.42 0.54 0.45
(yes = 1) - (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
Rusticated years - 3.89 3.40 4.02
(conditional on rustication) - (2.66) (3.46) (3.29)
Senior high school 0.45 0.59 0.54 0.50
or above (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
University or above
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
Annual income (USD)a
1,630.07 1,447.50 1,391.79 1,242.76
(1,507.98) (1,066.13) (2,153.70) (1,898.29)
Housing size (m2) 58.92 50.13 60.35 58.66
(41.14) (22.76) (40.81) (38.55)
Private housing (=1)
- - 0.77 0.78
- - (0.42) (0.41)
Housing value (USD)b
7,645.06 10,135.41 - -
(14,623.06) (11,798.46) - -
Saving (USD) - 4,341.84 - -
- (5,162.82) - -
Investment on stocks - 828.14 - -
And bonds (USD) - (2,679.77) - -
Annual insurance - 194.96 - -
expenditure (USD) - (756.40) - -
Unemployment insurance 0.30 - - -
(purchased = 1) (0.46) - - -
Pension 0.62 - - -
(purchased = 1) (0.49) - - -
Health insurance 0.61 - - -
(purchased = 1) (0.49) - - -
Monthly working days
- 22.86 22.27 22.38
- (3.89) (5.76) (5.59)
Weekly working hoursc
45.56 40.25 42.88 42.87
(10.96) (6.73) (15.14) (15.71)
Observationsd 223,722 4,469 602 4,866
Notes: a Annual income in Columns (1) and (2) is transferred from monthly income.
b Housing price in Columns (1) and (2) is purchasing price and estimated market price respectively.
c The weekly working hours in Column (2) is transferred by daily working hours*5, as the legal weekly
working days are five in China in 2002.
d Number of observations varies slightly in the specifications for income, housing consumption, working













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Long-Term Effect of Rustication on Self Control and Self Reliance
As an exogenous shock, rustication transformed the youngsters’ privileged urban status
into an unprivileged rural one, and exposed them to unfamiliar environment. It is there-
fore expected to change their attitude toward others and control over themselves. Table
1A.5 presents my findings on the long-term effects of rustication on self control and self
reliance.
Panel A presents the impact of rustication on self control ability, specifically on the
capacity of controlling negative emotions, from the data of identical twins. The outcome
variable is a dummy equal to 1 if an individual self-reports that he/she can always control
anger or disgust. Otherwise it equals 0. Under twin fixed-effect estimation, I discover that
individuals experiencing rustication are 17.5% and 18.1% more able to control anger and
disgust respectively than their non-rusticated counterparts (Columns (1) and (3)). Both
of the two estimates are at the 5% level of statistical significance. Similarly, with one
more year of rustication, their capacity to inhibit negative emotion increases by 3%-4%
(Columns (2) and (4)). Although the result is potentially subject to the self-report bias, it
sheds light on the influence of rustication on non-cognitive skills (Zhang et al., 2007).
Panel B shows the influence of rustication on self reliance. The outcome variable
is a dummy of borrowing money from family or friends in emergency rather than from
financial institutes with data from CHIP 2002. Columns (1) and (2) display the OLS
estimates, while Columns (3) - (4) show the corresponding probit estimates, with family
background controlled explicitly. With one additional sent-down year, an individual is
about 0.4% less likely to borrow money from family members or friends in emergency,
under both OLS and probit estimations (Columns (2) and (4)). Both of the two estimates
are statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. In other words, they are more
inclined to rely on themselves in the case of a financial crisis.
These findings are consistent with the literature that individual experiences affect psy-
chosocial outcomes and shape attitude toward others. Blattman & Annan (2010) find that
people exposed to severe war violence have higher psychological distress afterwards than
those experiencing little war violence. Individuals with life traumatic experience, such as
disease or divorce, are less likely to trust others (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002). It is also
coherent with the way that economic recession in the 2000s alters the Generation Y. They
are reported to behave more modestly and hate conflicts (Groth & Giang, 2012).
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Data source: Chinese Household and Income Project 2002.
Figure 1A.1: Variation in the Possibility of Rustication by Father’s Social Status
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Table 1A.1: Tabulation of Rustication Years
Years of rustication

























Notes: The data is from the Chinese Household Income Project 2002.
The sample is restricted to individuals born between 1946 and 1961.
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Table 1A.2: Variation in Rustication within Identical Twins









Notes: The data is from the Chinese Twins Survey in 2002.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Great Gatsby Curve in China: Cross-Sectional In-
equality and Intergenerational Mobility
In addition to the investigation of the long-term consequences of adversity on his-
torically under-represented rusticated group, this chapter surveys the intergenerational
mobility during China’s current transition period and explores its interplay with the cross-
sectional inequality.
Since the 1979 market-oriented reform, China’s economic growth has been impres-
sive. However, the rising income inequality is equally remarkable though less well un-
derstood (Brandt & Rawski, 2008; Xie & Zhou, 2014). In this chapter we first estimate
the patterns of intergenerational mobility in income and education with respect to cohort.
Our results show that intergenerational mobility in both income and education declines
sharply along with the economic transition. Different from the focus on the historically
under-represented group in chapter 1, we pay special attention to the currently under-
represented groups in this chapter: females and residents from economically disadvan-
taged regions, such as rural and western parts. We find that the decreasing trend in the
intergenerational mobility is particularly significant for those groups.
How does cross-sectional inequality interplay with intergenerational mobility? We
second correlate intergenerational mobility with cross-sectional inequality and find a Great
Gatsby Curve with a negative slope in China (Krueger, 2012). The negative slope indi-
cates that with the increasing inequality in this country, poor families benefit less from the
economic growth than rich families do. Together with the decreasing intergenerational
mobility demonstrated above, we expect that cross-sectional inequality may increase in
the future.
Finally, to interpret these patterns, we develop a conceptual framework from the
human-capital perspective (Becker & Tomes, 1979, 1986; Solon, 2004; Corak, 2013). We
explain the changes through five factors: return to human capital, cost of education, gov-
ernment policies on human-capital investment, household income, and income inequality.
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2.1 Introduction
In this study, we investigate the cross-sectional and intergenerational inequalities in China
amid its economic transition. Although its economic growth since the 1979 market-
oriented reform has been impressive, the rising income inequality in the country is equally
remarkable but less well understood (Brandt & Rawski, 2008; Xie & Zhou, 2014). With
respect to the inequality, the Gini coefficient rockets from 0.26 to 0.43 between 1980 and
2010, which is equal to that of the US (Figures 2.1 and 2.2). Would the rising inequal-
ity continue or even get worse? To what extent would the cross-sectional inequality be
persistent across generations? How does cross-sectional inequality interplay with inter-
generational mobility? In particular, what is the relevance of the Great Gatsby Curve in
China (Krueger, 2012)?23 What are the institutional and policy factors driving the changes
in inequality and intergenerational mobility? This paper tries to answer these questions.
Understanding the interplay between inequality and mobility in China over the 40 years
of economic reform may provide interesting insights to the economics literature and draw
policy implications for other countries at the similar stage of economic transition and
development.
We first estimate the patterns of intergenerational mobility in income and education
with respect to cohort, gender, and region in China using multiple micro data sets and
recent methodologies in the literature. We then correlate cross-sectional inequality with
intergenerational mobility. Finally, we develop a conceptual framework to explain the
stylized facts and empirical regularities on changes in cross-sectional inequality and in-
tergenerational mobility. To the best knowledge of our knowledge, this study is the first
attempt to systematically explore the dynamic evolution of inequality and mobility in
China.
Our results show that intergenerational mobility in both income and education de-
clines sharply. This trend is particularly significant for females and residents from eco-
nomically disadvantaged regions, such as rural and western parts. We show an increase
from 0.315 to 0.442 in the intergenerational income elasticity (IGE) between cohorts born
before and after 1970, using data from the Chinese Household Income Projects (CHIPs)
in 1995 and 2002. Following Chetty et al. (2014a,b), we also examine the change in the
percentile rank in the income distribution of a child if the parents’ rank increases by one
percentile rank. The rank-rank estimate increases from 0.273 to 0.347 across cohorts.
Moreover, the rank estimates for daughters and residents of western region reach 0.39
23The Great Gatsby Curve describes the negative association between cross-sectional inequality and in-
tergenerational mobility. It was introduced by Alan Krueger using data from developed countries (Krueger,
2012).
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and 0.455 in the late cohort. Since education is a major determinant of income, we also
examine the intergenerational education mobility. We find that the rank-rank estimate in-
creases from 0.235 to 0.292 across the two cohorts using the 2010 Chinese Family Panel
Studies (CFPS), thereby indicating a declining trend in mobility. As with income, the
result is especially significant for girls and residents from less developed regions.
To interpret these patterns, we develop a conceptual framework from the human-
capital perspective (Becker & Tomes, 1979, 1986; Solon, 2004; Corak, 2013). We explain
the changes in China’s intergenerational mobility through five factors: return to human
capital, educational cost, government policies on human-capital investment, household
income, and income inequality. As a result of the rapid economic growth, increasing
numbers of households become rich and are less likely to be constrained to invest in the
schooling of their children (Figure 2.1). The substantial increase in the educational expen-
diture of the government also contributes to the undoing of household constraints (Figure
2.3). These two factors are expected to enhance intergenerational mobility jointly.24 How-
ever, the return to schooling has increased sharply along with the reforms because of the
rapid accumulation of physical capital, improvement in technology, and market-oriented
institutional reforms (Figure 2.4). Educational costs, such as tuition, have increased con-
siderably as well (Figure 2.5). The increase in inequality prohibits children in poor fam-
ilies from being accessible to high-quality education. The changes in these three factors
are expected to reduce intergenerational mobility. Our estimated declining intergener-
ational mobility implies that the effect of the latter three factors dominates that of the
former two.
This framework also effectively explains the gender and regional patterns. We suggest
that the gender-specific pattern is due to the greater increase in return to human capital for
girls than boys (Figure 2.6). In a country where sons are typically preferred, girls from
poor households are under severer family constraints with respect to educational invest-
ment than their brothers. We ascribe the regional disparity in inequality to the localization
of government expenditure on public education and the difference in income levels across
regions (Figure 2.7). Hence, households from rural and western areas are more likely to
be subject to family constraints given the insufficient educational expenditure of the local
government and low household income.
By linking cross-sectional inequality to intergenerational mobility, we have an under-
24However, with the decentralization of government expenditure on education, the increase in public
expenditure is concentrated in economically developed areas, in which local governments are financially
well off. Children from poor regions are less likely to benefit or even suffer from the decentralization.
Therefore, the positive effect of the increase in public educational expenditure on intergenerational mobility
is partly offset by the decentralization of government expenditure.
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standing of the dynamic evolution of the two in China. Despite China’s fast economic
growth, inequality in this country has increased and poor families benefit less from this
growth than rich families do. With the significant increase in the educational cost and
the decentralization of governmental expenditure on education, poor parents are less able
to support their children to access quality education. By contrast, rich parents increas-
ingly invest in the education of their children with the rise in the return to human capital.
The educational opportunity for children from poor families has been reduced relative to
that for children from rich families. Therefore, intergenerational mobility has declined
with the increase in cross-sectional inequality since China’s economic reform. Given this
decline, China’s cross-sectional inequality may increase in the future.
To our best knowledge, this study is the first attempt to understand the dynamic evo-
lution of cross-sectional inequality and intergenerational mobility in China. It stands out
as the first systematical analysis of the patterns of intergenerational mobility with respect
to cohort, gender, and region in China’s reform era. Early empirical works focus on de-
veloped countries. Recent studies on China’s intergenerational mobility concentrate on
one or two dimensions only, and do not investigate the causes of the changing patterns
(Knight et al., 2011; Deng et al., 2013). We utilize multiple micro data sets and recent
methodologies to study intergenerational mobility in China.
Moreover, we present the first attempt to relate the declining intergenerational mo-
bility to the rising cross-sectional inequality in China by finding a negatively sloped
Great Gatsby Curve. This negative relationship is originally derived from cross-country
or cross-zone evidence from developed countries (Krueger, 2012; Corak, 2013; Chetty
et al., 2014a). However, the literature does not provide time-series evidence support-
ing the Great Gatsby Curve, and has focused exclusively on the OECD counties. Our
study is the first to investigate the Great Gatsby Curve outside those developed countries.
Therefore, it may enrich understanding of the dynamic evolution of inequality in other
transitional or developing economies.
Finally, we propose a conceptual economic framework to explain the stylized facts and
empirical regularities on inequality and mobility in China. We theoretically link market-
oriented institutional reforms, fiscal policy transformations, and socioeconomic changes
to the changes in China’s cross-sectional inequality and intergenerational mobility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces China’s market-
oriented institutional, educational, and fiscal policy reforms. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 present
the empirical results of intergenerational mobility in income and education, respectively.
Section 2.5 links intergenerational inequality with cross-sectional inequality by drawing
and analysing the Great Gatsby Curve in China. Section 2.6 interprets the increase in
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inequality and the decline in intergenerational mobility. Section 2.7 discusses the policy
implications of our paper. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Research Background
2.2.1 Market-oriented Institutional Reforms, Increasing Return to Human Capi-
tal, and Income Inequality
Over the past four decades, China experienced rapid economic growth. It was one of the
poorest countries in 1978, with a real GDP per capita one-fortieth of that of the US. Since
that period, however, China undertook structural reforms and achieved an annual growth
rate in per capita GDP that exceeded 8% (Zhu, 2012). In 2012, its real GDP per capita
reached one-fifth that of the US.
China’s economic growth is spurred by a series of market-oriented institutional re-
forms, which increase the return to human capital significantly.25 This economic reform
was initiated in the late 1970s by the establishment of the Rural Household Responsibil-
ity System. The new system adjusted the incentive structure in the agricultural sector,
enhanced the agricultural productivity, and generated a surplus of rural labour (Rozelle
et al., 1997). Simultaneously, China adopted an Open-Door Policy that resulted in a huge
influx of foreign direct investment. The great inflow of capital generated a high demand
for labour in urban and coastal areas.
Given the surplus of labour in rural and inland areas and the high demand in the
urban and coastal regions, the household registration (hukou) system that restricts rural-
to-urban migration was gradually loosened from the late 1980s.26 The relaxation of this
restraint resulted in an unprecedented increase in domestic migration: according to the
2005 1% mini-census, the total number of rural-to-urban migrants amounted to 0.2 billion.
The efficiency of the labour market allocation improved remarkably following this period
(Zhao, 1997; West & Zhao, 2000).
In the mid-1990s, the government began reforming the state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
and encouraged the diversification of ownership. Prior to the economic reform, China
had only two types of enterprises, namely, the stated-owned and collective enterprises.
Since the late 1970s, however, the institutional reforms were accompanied by introducing
three types of foreign enterprises: Chinese-foreign joint venture management enterprise,
Chinese-foreign cooperative joint venture, and foreign sole-source investment enterprise.
25See Zhu (2012) for the discussion on the structural transformation and the economic growth in China.
26Individuals born in rural areas are designated as “agricultural hukou.” Their counterparts in urban areas
are “non-agricultural hukou.” Prior to the economic reform, the labour mobility between rural and urban
areas was virtually illegal. This hukou system segregated China into two labour markets.
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Nonetheless, private firms were not legalized until 1997 during the 15th Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party (Zhu, 2012). Many of the SOEs and collective enterprises
were privatized. Thus, market-oriented privatization resulted in a flexible labour market
and promoted economic growth (Dong & Xu, 2008, 2009).
Market-oriented institutional reforms adjusted the incentive structure, enhanced labour
productivity, and increased private return to human capital (Ge & Yang, 2014, 2011). Fig-
ure 2.4 demonstrates that the return to one additional year of schooling increased by four
times from 2% in 1998 to 10% in 2008. The increase in return to college education during
the same period was more drastic from 7% to 49% (Li et al., 2012a).
Along with the increase in return to education, income inequality increased sharply.
Li et al. (2012a) review the changes in wage structure and return to education in China
since the economic reform. They find that the gap in annual wage between the low- and
medium- education groups was almost null in 1988 (Figure 2.8). The annual wage of
the high-education group was only marginally higher than that of the other two groups.
By contrast, the annual wage of the high-education group was twice that of the low-
education group and 1.5 times that of the medium-education group in the late 2000s.
Through decomposition analysis, Ge & Yang (2014) attribute 80% of the wage growth
in the reform era to “higher pay for basic labour, rising returns to human capital, and
increases in the state sector wage premium”. The Gini coefficient nearly doubled from
0.26 to 0.43 between 1980 and 2010 (Figures 2.1). Inequality is particularly evident in
the rural-urban gap and the regional disparity (Fleisher et al., 2010; Xie & Zhou, 2014).
Moreover, the degree and timing of the institutional reforms vary across areas, which
further exacerbate pre-existing regional inequality. 27
2.2.2 Education, Fiscal Policies, and Family Constraints in the Investment in the
Human Capital of Children
China’s economic growth also benefited from the large stock of medium-skilled labour
accumulated prior to the economic reform (Heckman & Yi, 2012). The enrolment rate of
primary school (grades 1-6) was 98% in 1981, as shown in Figure 2.9. The progression
rate to secondary school, that is, the ratio of junior secondary school (grades 7-9) enrol-
ments over the primary school graduates, was 70% in the same year. This rate almost
reached 100% by 2000. The progression rate to senior secondary school (grades 10-12)
rose from 26% in 1981 to 82% in 2008. The primary and junior secondary completion
27For instance, the market-oriented reforms initiated in coastal provinces, and eventually spread into the
central and western areas. Thus, the eastern region is exposed to reforms for a longer period and benefits
more than its central and western counterparts.
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rates were much higher in China than those in other Asian countries/regions, such as
South Korea and Taiwan, in the early stage of the economic take-off (Becker, 2012).
The fiscal decentralization in primary and secondary education aggravates educational
inequality.28 Prior to the economic reform, the schooling costs were mainly borne by the
central government. In the mid-1980s, however, the government initiated fiscal decentral-
ization and designated multiple sources of funding for education for local governments.
In urban areas, district governments were financially responsible for primary schools,
whereas city governments for secondary schools. In rural areas, counties, towns, and
villages were responsible for senior secondary, junior secondary, and primary schools,
respectively. Under this policy, the local government relied heavily on surtaxes to finance
public educational expenditure. Figure 2.7 shows the central and local governmental ed-
ucation expenditure in 1991-2006. During this period, the share of local governmental
expenditure out of total governmental educational expenditure has been increasing. In-
deed, Heckman (2005) (Figure 1) shows that the per pupil expenditure is highly positively
correlated with the local per capital GDP. For example, the per pupil governmental expen-
diture in Beijing was 16 times higher than that in Guizhou in 2004 (Table 7 in Heckman
(2005)). Thus, the inequality in the access to the quality education increased across re-
gions.
In 1994, a tax reform on fiscal re-centralization was implemented. This reform dete-
riorated the local governments’ fiscal capacity. The central government conducted par-
tial transfers to finance local primary and secondary schools. Local governments were
expected to meet the remaining gap. However, the central-to-local transfers were insuf-
ficient. Hence, local governments, especially those in poor rural areas, were unable to
fulfill their obligations. As a result, this reform exacerbated the regional inequality.
Nevertheless, the public finance of basic education has improved since the early 2000s.
In 2001, the responsibility for the salary of teachers was shifted from village to county
governments. In the same year, the “Two Exemptions and One Subsidy” program was
initiated. All tuition fees for students in primary and junior secondary schools were sup-
posed to be borne by the central government. However, this goal was not fully achieved
until 2006, when all of the corresponding fees were exempted in rural areas. However,
non-compulsory senior secondary education is not covered by this program.
In addition, China’s tertiary education has developed significantly since 1999, al-
though it was stagnant during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). From 1978 to 1995,
tertiary school enrolment rates hovered around 1.5% to 2.5% (NBS, 2011a). With the
economic growth and the rapid accumulation of physical capital, the return to educa-
28Knight et al. (2011) review the evolution of China’s educational system in detail.
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tion increased substantially (Li et al., 2012a).29 The increasing marginal productivity of
labour, especially of high-skilled labour, led to the increase in the demand for higher ed-
ucation, and finally to the radical expansion of higher education in 1999 (Chow & Shen,
2006). The total number of fresh college graduates rose by more than six folds from less
than one million in 2001 to seven million in 2013 (NBS, 2011b). Figure 2.10 displays the
sharp increase in the share of college students in the 18-22 age cohort.
Meanwhile, the private costs of tertiary education increased drastically, exacerbating
the inequality in access to higher education. Prior to the late 1990s, higher education
was heavily subsidized by the government. However, annual tuition fee rocketed from
RMB 800 in 1995 to RMB 5,000 in 2004 (Li et al., 2013). Yearly expenditure per college
student even reached RMB 12,318 in 2010 (Li et al., 2013).30 However, approximately
22% of college students come from families whose annual income was less than that
amount in 2010. Nonetheless, loans and scholarships for college students account for less
than 10% of the expenditure. Furthermore, these loans are mis-allocated. They have been
granted to only 47% of college students from poor households, whereas the corresponding
number for those from well-off families is 57%.
In addition, the regional disparity was amplified by the decentralization of the admin-
istration of colleges and universities (Li & Xing, 2010). This decentralization classified
the higher education into two layers. The central government administrates a small num-
ber of distinguished universities, whereas local governments administrate most local col-
leges and universities. Thus, the quality of local tertiary education depends largely on
regional economy. Figure 2.3 summarizes the ratio of government expenditure on edu-
cation relative to GDP (NBS, 2013). This ratio increases mildly from 2.4% in 1992 to
4.4% in 2012. Thus, the increase in the government expenditure is small relative to the
remarkable expansion of tertiary education.
Hence, individual households may be the ones financing the substantially rising edu-
cational cost given that schooling cost increases much more quickly than public expen-
diture. Figure 2.5 depicts the increasing trends of tuition over government educational
expenditure and GDP from 1991 to 2007. Schooling cost increased by six times from 5%
in 1991 to 35% in 2004, followed by a mild decrease after the “Two Exemptions and One
Subsidy” program. The ratio of tuition over GDP rose by seven times from 0.1% in 1991
to 0.8% in 2007. Nonetheless, tuition is only a part of total schooling cost. The consider-
able increase in educational cost exacerbates family constraint in investing in children’s
human capital. Richer parents are more able to finance their children’s education, whereas
29The national gross saving rate is as high as 35%-55% throughout the economic reform.
30It was based on a national survey of college students that was conducted by Tsinghua University in
2010.
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their poorer counterparts have less capacity to do so. Therefore, the inequality in access
to education increases over generations.
2.3 Intergenerational Income Mobility in China
2.3.1 Chinese Household Income Projects
We use data from the Chinese Household Income Projects (CHIPs) in 1995 and 2002 to
estimate intergenerational income mobility.31 Literature on developed countries uses in-
come tax records to examine income correlation across generations (Chetty et al., 2014a,b).
However, in developing countries such as China, the tax system is immature. The tax data
are not available to link children with parents, or track parental income in previous years,
which are essential for studies in intergenerational mobility. Thus, we consider household
surveys such as CHIPs, which are repeated cross-sectional surveys collecting information
on individual and household income in the survey year and previous years.
Our sample focuses on urban China. Rural residents and rural-to-urban migrants are
not included.32 We consider the following advantages of using CHIP data to analyse
intergenerational mobility in income. First, CHIPs provide detailed income of each in-
dividual based on wage, subsidy, bonus, private business, and capital income over the
preceding six (1995 survey) or five (2002 survey) years. By averaging the income across
years, we can eliminate random income shock in a specific year. Thus, CHIPs provide
a rare opportunity to calculate lifetime income in China. Second, this survey records
the relations among household members in detail, which facilitate our identification of
the parent-child pairs. Finally, the data cover 11 province-level administrative units in
China. The surveyed areas are geographically and economically representative and can
yield nationally representative estimates.33
In the appendix, we describes the main variables (Table 2A.1). To estimate the time
trend in intergenerational income mobility, we categorize the sample into early and late
cohorts. The former includes individuals born between 1949 (when the People’s Republic
of China was founded) and 1970 (including 1970).34 Most of these individuals completed
31It is jointly sponsored by the Institute of Economics at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Asian
Development Bank, the Ford Foundation, and the East Asian Institute at Columbia University.
32Migrants from rural to urban areas still hold rural registration (hukou), and do not have equal access
to educational and occupational opportunities as urban citizens do.
33CHIPs are considered geographically representative because the surveyed areas cover the northeast
(Liaoning), the south (Guangdong), the southwest (Yunnan), and the west (Gansu). It is economically
representative as well because the surveyed areas include the richest areas in China such as Beijing and
Guangdong, as along with the least developed parts such as Gansu.
34We choose 1970 as a cut-off point because the economic reform began in 1978. The normal age at
which children enrol in primary school is around 7 in China. Thus, those born after 1970 are considered to
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their education prior to the economic reform. The late birth cohort covers children born
after 1970. Most of whom were educated and began working during the post-reform era.
To reduce income measurement errors among freshmen in the labour market, we restrict
children to those who are at least 23 years old and have worked for a minimum of three
years. The average ages of the early and late cohorts are 30 and 25 years, respectively.
These ages belong to the early-middle stage in life cycle of working individuals. The
average ages of fathers in the early and late cohorts are 57 and 53 years, respectively,
which belong to a late stage for the working people.
In order to smooth income shocks in specific year(s), our sample contains fathers hav-
ing income records for at least three years. No restriction on mothers’ income is applied,
nevertheless, as there can be housewives with no income, especially in the early birth
cohort. Annual family income refers to the yearly income from both parents, which is
averaged across at least three preceding years (survey year included). From early to late
cohorts, the yearly household income increases by almost two-thirds, from RMB 9,331
(USD 1,127) to RMB 15,432 (USD 1,864) in 2002 price. Children’s average income is
RMB 6,628 (USD 800) and RMB 8,940 (USD 1,080) in the two cohorts, respectively.35
Across regions, both parents and children in the eastern (coastal) areas consistently re-
port a much higher income than their counterparts in the western and central areas. The
regional disparity between the central and western areas is minimal, although the family
income almost doubles from early to late cohorts in the western region, from RMB 7,860
(USD 949) to RMB 13,234 (USD 1,598).
2.3.2 Econometric Specification
Following conventional specification in the literature of intergenerational mobility, we
regress the log child income on log parental income to estimate the IGE. We calculate the
IGEs in both cohorts separately to determine the changes in intergenerational mobility
over the institutional reforms. The regression is specified as follows:
ln yit = α0 + α1 ln yi,t−1 + αX Xi + εit, (14)
where ln yit is the natural logarithm of the annual income of a child. ln yi,t−1 is the average
natural logarithm of the family income derived from both fathers and mothers over a
period of at least three years. Xi is a vector of control variables, which include age, the
squared age of the child and the father, the gender dummy of the child, wave dummy,
have been educated in the new era. We distinguish the two cohorts based on education because education
is the main cause of intergenerational income persistence in previous studies.
35The income reported in the 1995 wave is adjusted by Consumer Price Index to the price in 2002.
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and provincial dummies.36 Standard errors are clustered at the household level. We are
interested in the slope of α1 because it measures the percentage change in the income of
children with respect to the percentage change in parental income. This slope is labelled
as the IGE. A larger α1 indicates a stronger intergenerational association and implies less
mobility across generations. We also examine the gender- and region- specific effects in
each cohort.
However, the elasticity may be biased if the cross-sectional dispersion of log income
differs across the two generations. By considering this potential difference, we investigate
the intergenerational income correlation, which is defined as follows:
correlation in log income = α1 ∗ σt−1
σt
, (15)
where σt−1 and σt are the standard deviations of the logarithm income of parents and
children, respectively. The correlation is bounded between 0 and 1, and factors out the
influence of the various dispersion of log income across the two generations.
In addition, we specify a rank-rank regression following the recent literature (Chetty
et al., 2014a,b) because the log-log specification has two shortcomings (Chetty et al.,
2014a). First, the log of the income of the children and log parental income are nonlin-
early related. Figure 2.13 depicts mean log child income vs. the log parental income.37
The association is flat at the bottom and increases sharply after the cut-off at approx-
imately RMB 4,915, which is roughly the 38th quintile of the family income.38 This
pattern is similar to that in developed countries (Chetty et al., 2014a,b). Non-linearity is
evident. Therefore, the intergenerational elasticity/correlation is sensitive to the point of
estimation.
Second, the log-log specification excludes zero income and is restricted to families
with positive income. Thus, it may overestimate intergenerational mobility because chil-
dren from families with low income are more likely to be trapped in the bottom than their
richer counterparts. The rank-rank regression overcomes these two problems. We plot the
association between the percentile ranks of children against parents in Figure 2.14. We
find that the income rank of the children is almost linearly dependent on parental rank. In
addition, we can examine the intergenerational association between generations from the
entire population (including individuals with zero income).
36We include father’s age rather than mother’s because in China, household income is mainly earned by
males. In addition, it is sufficient to include one of them because the ages of parents are highly correlated.
37We draw this non-parametric graph by sequentially averaging every 50 log of parental income and by
calculating the mean of the corresponding logarithm income of the children.
384,915 is the natural exponential of 8.5.
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The rank-rank regression is specified as below:
rankit = β0 + β1ranki,t−1 + βX Xi + it, (16)
where rankit and ranki,t−1 are the percentile ranks of children and parents in their income
distribution, respectively. β1 is the rank-rank estimate that measures the change in the
percentile rank in the child’s income distribution if the income of his/her parents changes
by one percentile rank. A higher β1 indicates a stronger intergenerational rank association
and in turn, lower intergenerational mobility. Xi is the vector of control variables, as
described in Eq. (14). As with elasticity and correlation specifications, we also investigate
the gender and regional patterns. Specifically, we rank parents and children within each
subgroup in term of income distribution.
2.3.3 Temporal Patterns in Intergenerational Income Mobility
We first examine the cohort pattern in intergenerational income mobility. Before we
present the intergenerational income association among the three specifications, we dis-
play the quintile transition matrices to provide an intuition on the mobility pattern. Table
2A.2 in the appendix shows the percentage of children in quintile i (i=1,2,3,4,5), given
parents in quintile j (j=1,2,3,4,5) for each cohort, where 1 indicates the lowest quintile
and 5 refers to the highest quintile. A statistic of particular interest is the proportion of
children moving into the top quintile given their parents in the bottom quintile (Chetty
et al., 2014a). The statistic is 3.17% in the early cohort, and 3.64% in the late one, im-
plying slightly higher probability of “success” after the market reform. However, the
proportion of children trapped in the bottom quintile conditional on parents in the bottom
increases by a larger magnitude, from 39.20% to 45.12% across cohorts. This finding
implies less mobility along with the institutional changes. The proportions of children
staying in the top quintile as their parents did are 51.59% and 45.45% in each cohort,
sequentially. Given the mixed information, we need a regression analysis to examine the
degree of intergenerational income mobility.
Panels A-C in Table 2.1 report the IGE, correlation, and rank-rank estimates across
cohorts. The first two columns present the estimates of the early and late cohorts. Column
(3) shows the corresponding changes in each specification. Within each panel, the first
row exhibits the overall estimation of intergenerational mobility, whereas the two other
rows display the gender-specific estimates. We find a statistically significant increase in
the intergenerational association, thus implying declining intergenerational mobility. The
pattern remains robust across the three specifications. With a 1% increase in the lifetime
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income of parents in the early and late cohorts, the income of their children increases
by 0.315% and 0.442%. Both estimates are statistically significant at the high 1% level.
After adjusting the IGEs with different variances of log income across generations, we
find a similar increase in the intergenerational correlation. The increases in elasticity and
correlation are 0.127 and 0.105, respectively, and are statistically significant at the 10%
and 5% levels. The rank-rank estimates are slightly smaller than the corresponding log-
log estimates, which is attributable to the inclusion of zero observations. One percentile
increase of parental ranking in their income distribution in the early and late cohorts raises
the ranking of the children by 0.273 and 0.347 percentiles, respectively. The difference
between the two estimates is statistically significant at the high 1% level. Figure 2.15
depicts the rank-rank association across cohorts.
With respect to gender-specific patterns, the decline in intergenerational mobility is
more significant for girls than boys, as demonstrated in row 3 of each panel in Table 2.1.
All three estimates for girls are more than doubled in the late cohort than the correspond-
ing ones in the early cohort (0.496 vs. 0.205 for elasticity, 0.373 vs. 0.155 for correlation,
and 0.390 vs. 0.172 for rank-rank estimate). The increases are all statistically significant
at the 5% level (Columns (3)). However, no such significant increase is observed in boys.
We ascribe this gender difference to the higher return to human capital for girls than boys
with the market reform (Figure 2.6). In addition, girls are more subject to family con-
straints than boys, especially those in the poor regions (Figure 2.11).39 Our results are not
likely to be biased by women’s shift from labour market into households because of mar-
riage. The labour force participation rates for urban non-migrant women is above 90%
for those between 25 and 40 years old from 1990 census. Nevertheless, the estimates for
girls are likely to be an upper bound of the true value possibly because of the co-residency
issue in the data.40
We note that the estimates may be contaminated by unobservables. Thus, we include
pre-labour market entry controls, such as average schooling years of parents and political
status of fathers (Communist Party membership). The patterns remain robust, although
the magnitudes are reduced in the sensitivity analysis (Table 2.2).41 Similarly, the decline
in mobility is driven by girls, with statistically significant increases across three specifi-
cations (Columns (7)-(9)).
Three sets of estimates are also generated for regional specific intergenerational mo-
39This topic is detailed in section 2.6.2.
40This issue is discussed in section 2.3.4.
41Columns (1)-(2) display the log-log estimates of early and late cohorts respectively. Columns (3)-(4)
present the adjusted intergenerational correlations. Columns (5)-(6) report the rank-rank coefficients. The
numbers in Columns (7)-(9) refer to the corresponding changes across cohorts.
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bility in East, Central, and West China, as shown in Table 2.3.42 The table format follows
that of Table 2.1. For the early cohort, intergenerational mobility is lower (the estimate
is higher) in the east than in the central and west areas. This finding is consistent across
the three empirical specifications. However, the intergenerational income association in
West China increases sharply with institutional changes. The income elasticity, correla-
tion, and rank-rank estimate are 0.545, 0.411, and 0.455, respectively, and even exceed
the levels of the early cohort in eastern areas. For the late cohorts in West China, all of the
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. Across cohorts, the IGE, intergener-
ational correlation, and rank-rank estimate increase by 0.321, 0.256 and 0.254 (Column
(3)), respectively, in West China. These increases are statistically significant at the 5%
level. The eastern and central areas display a similar trend, although the increases are
statistically insignificant. These results may be ascribed to insufficient subsidies by the
local government for public education in economically disadvantaged regions, such as the
West. Parents in such areas have increasingly more difficulties to finance their children’s
education, given their traditionally poor economic situation and the increase in schooling
cost as a result of the reform. Section 2.6 explains these findings in detail.
2.3.4 Absolute vs. Relative Intergenerational Income Mobility
In addition to estimating the relative intergenerational income mobility as in section 2.3.3,
we are also interested in the absolute mobility which measures the expected rank in the
income distribution of a child conditional on a specific percentile rank of parental income
(Chetty et al., 2014a,b). The rank-rank estimation (Eq. (16)) describes the change in the
income ranks of children when parental income rank changes by one unit. Therefore it
measures the relative income mobility. However, its implication is ambiguous because
it may be driven by the worse outcome of children from high-income families than the
better outcome of children from the low-income households (Chetty et al., 2014a). Thus,
we also explore absolute upward mobility, which is defined as the absolute percentile rank
of children if the income of their parents are at the 25th percentile rank in the distribution
(Chetty et al., 2014a). The 25th percentile rank is selected because we are interested in the
upward mobility of children from poor households. The rank-rank association is linear;
thus, the average of the bottom half of parental distribution is the 25th percentile (Chetty
et al., 2014a). For family i in region r (r=east, central, west) the association between the
42Because the data points are less than 100 in each province, we investigate the regional income mobility
at the level of three general geographic regions based on the definition from the National Bureau of Statistics
of China instead of the provincial level.
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percentile rank of children (rankt) and parental percentile rank (rankt−1) is:
rankirt = β0,r + β1,rrankir,t−1 + irt, (17)
where β1,r estimates the relative income mobility across generations (within region r).
It measures the change in the percentile rank of the income distribution of a child (in
region r) if the parental percentile rank changes by one unit (in that region). A large
β1,r indicates a strong intergenerational association and limited relative mobility across
generations. The intercept, β0,r, denotes the expected rank of children from the lowest-
income families.
We define absolute income mobility as the expected rank of a child if his/her parents
are in the 25th rank in their income distribution in region r (r=east, central, west) based
on relative income mobility estimate (β1,r) and intercept (β0,r) in Eq. (17):
rank25,r = β0,r + 25β1,r. (18)
Specifically, rank25,r measures the expected percentile rank of a child in his/her income
distribution (in region r) if his/her parents are at the 25th rank in the income distribution
of their generation (in that region). A large rank25,r indicates a high expected rank of a
child from poor families and a mobile society.
Table 2.4 summarizes absolute and relative intergenerational income mobility by re-
gion. Panels A and B demonstrate the rank-rank association in early and late cohorts,
respectively. In the early cohort, the west area displays the highest intergenerational mo-
bility, as indicated by the highest estimate for the absolute upward mobility (43 in Col-
umn (3) of Panel A) and the lowest estimate for the relative mobility (0.2 in Column (4)
of Panel A). In the late cohort, consistently across three regions, it is more difficult for
children in the low-income families to move upward, as shown by the smaller estimates
in Column (3) of Panel B compared with the corresponding ones in Panel A. Importantly,
the absolute upward mobility estimate in the western region shifts downward to the bot-
tom, with a rank of 36. At the same time, the relative mobility estimate in the western
region climbs up to the top, indicating the highest income association across generations
(0.455 in Column (4) in Panel B). The difference between the central and east regions is
not statistically significant though.
To visually depict the relative and absolute intergenerational income mobility, we
draw the heat maps in Figures 2A.1 - 2A.4 in the appendix. The smaller the relative
estimate, the more mobile a society is (in lighter colour). By contrast, the larger the ab-
solute estimate, the more mobile a society is (in darker colour). In the early cohort, it is
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more mobile across generations for children from western families, compared with their
counterparts in the eastern and central areas (the lightest colour in Figure 2A.1 and the
darkest colour in Figure 2A.2). In the late cohort, however, the western region shows the
least intergenerational mobility (Figures 2A.3 - 2A.4).
Households from the western areas were traditionally poor. Thus, they benefited more
from the national development policies after the foundation of the People’s Republic of
China, such as the promotion of primary and junior high school education, compared
with their counterparts in the central or eastern areas. In the late cohort, however, this
premium diminishes because of the increasing cost of education and the localization of the
government expenditure on education. Educational funding is more difficult to obtain for
local governments in less developed regions. Consequently, local households bear more
financial burden to invest in the human capital of their children. The tightening of the
household constraints in poor regions increases the intergenerational income association
along with the market reform.
Finally, we note two potential biases in our estimates of intergenerational income
mobility using the CHIPs data, namely, the co-residency and life-cycle biases. On the
one hand, the surveyed individuals are either those who live in the households or those
who maintain close economic relationships with their households even if absent at the
time of the survey.43 In this case, children who migrated permanently are not included.
On the other hand, the average age of 25 in the late cohort still belongs to the early state
of the working life cycle, although we restrict children to be at least 23 years old and
have worked for at least three years. To overcome both limitations of the data, now we
use a new data set derived from the 2010 Chinese Family Panel Studies to investigate
intergenerational education mobility.
2.4 Intergenerational Education Mobility
2.4.1 Chinese Family Panel Studies
Education is a main determinant of income (Mincer, 1974). Thus, we examine the in-
tergenerational education mobility together with our previous findings regarding income
mobility to provide an overall mobility pattern across generations in China. We apply
data derived from the 2010 Chinese Family Panel Studies (CFPS). To our best knowl-
edge, CFPS is the only household survey in China that tracks down lineal relatives and
43The CHIP sample is a sub-sample of the national census. It follows the definition of household mem-
bers provided by the National Bureau of Statistics of China.
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siblings who are not living at home and collects their socioeconomic information.44 The
use of CFPS to examine intergenerational mobility in education is important because of
the following four aspects. First, it overcomes the co-residency bias by providing detailed
information on the heads of households, their spouses, children, parents, and siblings,
regardless of whether they live together or not. Second, schooling years are less affected
than income by the life-cycle bias. In addition, the measurement errors related to school-
ing years are much less than those associated with income. Finally, the sample size is
large and covers 25 provinces, municipalities, or autonomous regions. CFPS contains
approximately 15,000 households.45
Table 2A.3 in the appendix summarizes statistics across two birth cohorts, namely,
1956-1970 and 1971-1985. The cut-off point of 1970 echoes that under the specification
for income mobility. Children in the early cohort were educated prior to the market re-
form, and those in the late cohort were educated when the reform began.46 By considering
assortative mating, we present the average schooling years of parents. The statistics show
that schooling years of both generations increase gradually. On the one hand, the average
schooling years for children increase from 7.6 in the early cohort to 8.6 in the late cohort,
which approaches the completion of junior high school. On the other hand, the average
schooling years of parents are merely 2.7 for the early cohort; however, most parents of
the late cohort completed primary school (4.5 years). Nearly 70% of the parent-child pairs
are obtained from rural area, and are representative of the general population in China.
Columns (2) - (6) describe the data by region. Specifically, Columns (2) - (3) describe
the data in urban and rural areas, respectively. The remaining three columns describe the
data from East, Central, and West China.47 The disparity in education between urban and
rural areas persists for both generations. In each cohort, the schooling years of children
in urban area are consistently higher than their rural counterparts by three to four years.48
Across cohorts, the average schooling years of parents are almost doubled in both urban
44The 2010 survey was conducted by the Institute of Social Science Survey at Peking University and was
sponsored by Peking University, the Ministry of Education, and the National Natural Science Foundation
of China.
45CFPS does not track the income of individuals in previous years. Therefore we cannot investigate
intergenerational income mobility by calculating parental lifetime income net of random shock in specific
year(s).
46The economic reform began in 1978. In China, the normal age of enrolment in primary school is about
seven. Thus, those born after 1970 are considered to have been educated in the new era.
47The region is divided according to parental status, specifically, the status of mothers, because we
are interested in children’s educational outcome conditional on parental education, taking their possible
migration into concern. In addition, a child’s hukou status at birth naturally follows that of his/her mother
by law.
4810.4 vs. 6.6 in the early cohort, and 12.2 vs. 7.8 in the late cohort.
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and rural areas.49 The disparity between eastern and western regions increases signifi-
cantly in both generations. The schooling years of children in the western area increase
by only 8.6% (6.2 vs. 6.7) from early to late cohorts. Correspondingly, that in the eastern
region increases significantly by almost 20% (8.2 vs. 9.8). Furthermore, the standard de-
viation of schooling years of children in the western region is larger than that of children
in the eastern region, thereby indicating the severer cross-sectional inequality in West
China.
2.4.2 Econometric Specification
Following the literature (Hertz et al., 2008; Knight et al., 2011), we regress child’s school-
ing years on parental average schooling years:
sit = γ0 + γ1si,t−1 + ZiγX + it, (19)
where sit represents the schooling years of the children; si,t−1 denotes the average school-
ing years of parents; Zi is a vector of the control variables, including child’s age, gender,
hukou status, mother’s age, dummies for surviving parents, and regional dummies.50 Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the household level. γ1 picks up the educational association
across generations. We estimate γ1 in cohorts 1956-1970 and 1971-1985 separately to
examine the trend in the intergenerational education mobility.
As in income mobility, we consider the differential variance in schooling across gen-
erations and examine the intergenerational education correlation as follows (Hertz et al.,
2008):
intergenerational education correlation = γ1 ∗ σt−1
σt
, (20)
where σt−1 and σt are the standard deviation of the schooling years of parents and chil-
dren, respectively.
Furthermore, we measure the rank-rank educational association across generations by:
rankit = λ0 + λ1ranki,t−1 + λZ Zi + φit, (21)
where rankit and ranki,t−1 are the percentile ranks of the children and their parents in their
schooling distribution, respectively. λ1 measures percentile change in the distribution of
schooling years of children if the average schooling years of their parents change by 1
percentile rank. Zi denotes the same vector of control variables as in Eq. (19). Similar
49From 4.6 to 7.7 in the urban area, and 2 to 3.7 in the rural area.
50CFPS records individual schooling regardless of whether the individual is alive. Thus, we include the
dummy variables that control for the status of each surviving parent in the survey year.
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as the definition under intergenerational income mobility, the gender- and region- specific
ranks refer to those of the distribution of schooling years in each subgroup.
2.4.3 Temporal Patterns of Educational Mobility
In this section, we first examine the cohort pattern. Panels A and B in Table 2A.4 in the
appendix display the quintile transition matrices for early and late cohorts, respectively.
Each cell reports the percentage of children in quintile i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), as given by
the rows, conditional on having parents in quintile j ( j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) indicated by the
columns. 1 refers to the lowest educational quintile and 5 indicates the highest. In the
early cohort, 28.36% of children from the lowest-education families remain at the bottom.
The corresponding proportion of children remaining at the top given their parents at the
top is 38.99%. The polarization becomes severer with the market reform. In the late
cohort, almost 40% of children from families with the lowest schooling are trapped in
the lowest educational bin in their generation. On the other extreme of the spectrum,
about half (48.64%) of the children with highest-education parents remain in the top.
In addition, upward mobility becomes more difficult with the institutional change. In
the early cohort, 14.79% of children from the lowest-education families move up to the
highest quintile. The corresponding percentage is merely 8.16% in the late cohort. To
sum up, the transition matrices imply that the educational mobility across generations
declines significantly with the market reform.
Panels A-C in Table 2.5 present the intergenerational education association from three
empirical specifications. The table format is similar to that of Table 2.1. We find an in-
creasing trend in the intergenerational schooling association from early into late birth
cohorts. Specifically, for early-cohort children, an additional year of parental schooling
increases their schooling by 0.339 years. For late-cohort children, this increment is 0.352
years. Both estimates are statistically significant at a high 1% level. The trend of statis-
tically significant increase persists in intergenerational education correlation (Panel B of
Table 2.5) when it is corrected by the ratio of the standard deviation of parental schooling
over the schooling of children (Eq. (20)). The smaller magnitude of this result compared
with that of the regression coefficients may be attributed to the smaller variance of school-
ing in the generation of the parents compared with that in the generation of the children.
Rank-rank estimation generates a similar rising trend. The magnitude of increase from
early to late cohort is 0.057. This increase is statistically significant at a high 1% level.
Figure 2.16 depicts the rank-rank association across cohorts. The association in the late
cohort is almost perfectly linear.
We then examine the change in the gender pattern. Increasing educational association
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across generations is mainly driven by girls, similar to that observed in income estima-
tion. Within each cohort, the estimates are consistently larger for girls than for boys.
Across cohorts, the increase in intergenerational association is more significant for girls
as well. In the intergenerational education correlation, the association for daughters in-
creases statistically significantly by 13% from 0.299 to 0.339 with the market reform.
However, this statistically significant trend is not observed for sons under this specifica-
tion. In the rank-rank estimation, both girls and boys demonstrate statistically significant
increases in schooling association with their parents. Nonetheless, the estimated magni-
tude of increase for sons is almost 40% less than that for daughters. We consider the more
significant increase for daughters an outcome of an interaction between the preference for
sons in China and the rising educational cost. As a result of the traditional son preference,
girls are more severely constrained in obtaining investment in their human capital than
boys, especially in rural area. In other words, if a family has both sons and daughters,
the parents typically invest in the education of the boys rather than that of the girls. In
addition, the family constraints on the educational investment in girls are tightened by the
sharp increase in educational cost during the market reform.
Tables 2.6 - 2.7 show the regional disparity in intergenerational schooling mobility.
Table 2.6 reports the intergenerational education association in urban and rural areas,
whereas Table 2.7 presents the association in eastern, central, and western areas. We fo-
cus on the correlation and rank-rank estimation as these consider the differential positions
of individual distribution in each generation. The patterns of significant increase in edu-
cational association are consistent across generations in less developed regions, such as
the rural and western areas. However, this trend is not observed in either urban area or in
the economically developed eastern (coastal) area. Specifically, the rank-rank estimate in
rural area increases statistically significantly by 31.4% from 0.207 to 0.272 (Panel C in
Table 2.6). The significant decrease in intergenerational mobility in less developed areas
remains in the geographic comparison among East, Central, and West China. As shown
in Panel B of Table 2.7, the intergenerational schooling correlation in western region is
as low as 0.276 in the 1956-1970 cohort, but reaches 0.348 for the 1971-1985 cohort.
The increase of 0.072 is statistically significant at the high 1% level. Mobility in the cen-
tral region decreases under the rank-rank specification as well, although the magnitude of
decline is much smaller than that in the western region (0.0438 vs. 0.121). In sum, in-
tergenerational education mobility decreases significantly in economically disadvantaged
areas, such as the rural and western regions. This decline may be ascribed to the localiza-
tion of government expenditure on education and to the sharp rise in educational cost with
the institutional changes. The funding for local education is difficult to obtain for local
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governments in less developed regions, especially given the pressure of rising schooling
cost following the reform. Therefore, the financial burden of investment in the human
capital of children shifts to households. This issue is discussed in detail in section 2.6.
2.4.4 Absolute vs. Relative Education Mobility
We investigate the absolute vs. relative education mobility over the course of reform
and development at the provincial level to depict the variation in mobility across geogra-
phy and time. Relative education mobility is based on estimates of Eq. (21). Absolute
education mobility is based on Eqs. (17) and (18), except replacing parental and chil-
dren’s income ranks with their schooling ranks.51 Table 2.8 presents the absolute vs.
relative intergenerational education mobility. The first four columns display the ranks of
upward mobility, province/region names, estimates of absolute mobility and relative mo-
bility in the early cohort. The last four columns show the corresponding information for
the late cohort. Panels A and B display estimates of absolute and relative mobility in each
province and the three general geographic regions, respectively. The findings are consis-
tent with those for income mobility, as shown in Table 2.4. The western region loses its
premium with regard to absolute upward mobility in both education and income with the
market reform.
Figures 2A.5 - 2A.8 in the appendix translate Table 2.8 into heat maps that visually
describe the geographic patterns in intergenerational mobility under institutional reforms.
In the early cohort, neither relative nor absolute mobility are clearly segregated geograph-
ically, as shown in Figures 2A.5 - 2A.6. In the late cohort, however, we observe a clear
geographic pattern. East coastal areas, such as Jiangsu, Anhui, Fujian, and Jiangxi, re-
port the lowest intergenerational relative mobility (lightest colour in Figure 2A.7) and the
highest absolute upward mobility (darkest colour in Figure 2A.8). In comparison, the
inner areas of China (central and western regions) display much higher relative mobility
and lower absolute mobility. This result may be attributed to the fact that the market re-
form originated in the coastal area. Thus, individuals in that region benefited from the
reform and became rich earlier than their peers in the inner land. In the post-reform era,
therefore, wealthy parents from this region can fund the education of their children, es-
pecially in the background of the sharp increase in the educational cost. In addition, the
localization of educational cost may also tighten the family constraint on human-capital
investment in children in relatively poor inner regions, thereby enlarging the geographic
51Our sample includes provinces or municipalities with at least 150 observations and with statistically
significant estimates. Therefore, we exclude seven and three data points from the early and late cohorts,
respectively. The seven data points omitted in the early cohort are Chongqing, Beijing, Tianjin, Zhejiang,
Anhui, Jiangxi, and Fujian. The three excluded in the late cohort are Chongqing, Beijing, and Tianjin.
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disparity between the coastal and inner areas.
2.5 The Great Gatsby Curve in China: Cross-Sectional Inequality
and Intergenerational Mobility
This section investigates the correlation between cross-sectional inequality and intergen-
erational mobility in China amid rapid economic growth and structural transformation.
The aggregate time-series statistics imply a negative correlation between income inequal-
ity and intergenerational income mobility. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show a drastic increase in
cross-sectional inequality over the past four decades. Our estimates indicate that inter-
generational income mobility decreases in the same time period.
As a preliminary check, Figures 2A.9 - 2A.10 graph correlations between income in-
equality and intergenerational income mobility. Figure 2A.9 ranks cohorts in different
regions by two dimensions.52 The horizontal axis shows the income inequality of the par-
ents of a cohort in a given region, which is measured by the Gini coefficient of family
income. The vertical line is the rank-rank estimate of relative income mobility.53 A large
estimate indicates low intergenerational mobility. Given two cohorts and three regions,
we obtain six data points. In Figure 2A.10, we replace estimates of relative income mo-
bility with estimates of absolute mobility in the vertical line. A high estimate of absolute
income mobility denotes high intergenerational upward mobility. Both figures suggest
that intergenerational mobility is negatively correlated with income inequality. The slope
coefficients are marginally statistically significant when we control for fixed regional ef-
fects.54 The slope coefficients also imply that the association between cross-sectional
inequality and intergenerational mobility is economically important. For instance, Figure
2A.10 shows that the average rank of children whose parents belong to the bottom half
of the income distribution decreases by 14 when the Gini coefficient of the generation
of their parents increases by 0.1. Based on Figures 2A.9 - 2A.10, we may conclude that
income inequality and intergenerational income mobility are negatively correlated and
display a pattern similar to that of developed countries. But we should be cautious in
drawing conclusions from these two figures because there are only six data points in each
figure.55
52The definition of cohort is similar to that provided in Section 2.3.2 where we analysed the cohort
pattern of intergenerational income mobility.
53The estimates are reported in Table 2.6.
54The fixed-effects estimates are identical to the between estimates when we have only two periods.
Hence, the estimates measure the association between the change in cross-sectional inequality and the
change in intergenerational mobility.
55With a small number of observations, the slope of the fitted line is more likely to be driven by outliers.
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So, we examine the relationship between educational inequality and intergenerational
education mobility with variations across cohort and geography, which generate more
data points and more precise estimates (Figures 2.17 - 2.18). The horizontal lines in both
figures show the educational inequality in parental generation indicated by the standard
deviation of the log schooling years. The vertical line displays the rank-rank estimate of
the relative education mobility in Figure 2.17, and the estimate of the absolute mobility in
Figure 2.18.56 The sample size of CFPS is larger than that of CHIP; therefore, we stratify
the sample at the provincial level to obtain a total of 40 points for both figures. Across
cohorts and provinces, cross-sectional educational inequality and intergenerational edu-
cation mobility are negatively related. The slope coefficients are both statistically and
economically significant. For instance, Figure 2.18 indicates that the average rank of
children whose parents belong to the bottom half of the distribution decreases by approx-
imately 4 when the standard deviation of the log schooling years of the parents increases
by 0.1. This relationship may be labelled as the Great Gatsby Curve of education.
Therefore, we have that: (1) the cross-sectional inequality of both parental income and
schooling years increases across the early and late cohorts; (2) the intergenerational mo-
bility in both income and education declines across these two cohorts; (3) cross-sectional
inequality and intergenerational mobility in terms of income and education are negatively
correlated. Although these negative correlations do not necessarily indicate causality,
they provide insight into the dynamic interplay of cross-sectional inequality and inter-
generational mobility in China. Hence, we outline a simple framework to determine the
structural drivers underlying these negative relationships in the following section.
2.6 Explaining the Declining Intergenerational Mobility and the Great
Gatsby Curve in China
This section explains the decline in intergenerational mobility and relates it to the increase
in cross-section inequality in China. First, we develop a simple conceptual framework to
understand intergenerational mobility from a human-capital perspective (see also a simple
model in the appendix). We then incorporate the Chinese market-oriented institutional
reforms and policy, as well as other socioeconomic changes, into this unified framework to
explain the negative relationship between cross-sectional inequality and intergenerational
mobility. We also explain the estimated patterns of intergenerational mobility in China in
terms of cohort, gender, and region. Finally, we compare the explanations for the changes
in intergenerational mobility reported by China and the US.
56The estimates are reported in Table 2.8.
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2.6.1 A Conceptual Discussion from a Human-Capital Perspective
This section presents a conceptual discussion of intergenerational mobility, based on
Becker & Tomes (1986), Becker & Tomes (1979), and Solon (2004).57 The detailed
model is provided in the appendix. This model emphasizes the difference between rich
and poor families with respect to economic incentives and opportunities to invest in the
human capital of children. The income of children is determined by their human capi-
tal, which is a function of endowments and family investment. Various incentives and
opportunities result in different degrees of intergenerational income mobility. The eco-
nomic incentive to invest in the human capital of children is mainly affected by the return
to human capital in the labour market. The economic opportunity refers to the family
credit constraints to invest in the human capital of children. The severity of family credit
constraint is influenced by the return to human capital, educational cost, government ed-
ucational expenditure, family income, and income inequality. Intergenerational mobility
is low when more families are subject to credit constraints and the severity of the fam-
ily constraint increases. We summarize five factors that affect intergenerational mobility
below.
The first factor is the return to human capital, which lowers intergenerational mobility.
With the increase in return to human capital, both rich and poor parents want to increase
investments in the human capital of their children. However, poor parents are less able to
do so than rich ones because of the tight credit constraint. The second factor is the price or
cost of investment in the human capital of their children. With the rising cost of human-
capital investment in children, increasingly more poor families are not able to invest in
their children’s human capital. Consequently, intergenerational mobility decreases.
The third factor is government expenditure on the human capital of children, which
generally enhances the educational opportunities of all children. Because children from
poor families gain marginally more from the expenditure, intergenerational mobility in-
creases. In real life, however, this effect depends on the distribution of government ex-
penditure. If public expenditure mainly targets disadvantaged families, intergenerational
mobility increases. On the opposite, the mobility decreases if children from wealthy fami-
lies benefit more from the public expenditure. The fourth factor is average family income.
Given the distribution of family income, higher average family income suggests that more
57A similar framework has also been discussed by Corak (2013) on income inequality, equality of op-
portunity, and intergenerational mobility. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, the rising cross-sectional inequality
is largely due to the increase in the return to human capital, and the timing and degree (or the differential
treatments) of the institutional reforms and public policy changes across areas (rural vs. urban), regions
(west, central, vs. east (coast)), and sectors (public (SOEs) vs. private). In what follows, we focus on the
driving forces behind the declining intergenerational mobility, and on explaining the negative correlation
between cross-sectional inequality and intergenerational mobility.
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families are able to invest in the human capital of their children. As poor families gain
marginally more from the increase in family income, intergenerational mobility increases.
The fifth factor is the degree of inequality in family income. Given the average family
income, a higher degree of inequality (say, due to an exogenous policy shock, holding
the above four factors constant) implies more poor families subject to credit constraint in
investing in their children’s human capital; consequently, the intergenerational mobility
is lower. Moreover, the effect of inequality interacts with the effects of other four factors.
The intuition is as follows. The effects of other four factors on intergenerational mobility
are stronger for poorer families. As inequality increases, the effects of the other four
factors are larger. Therefore, a high degree of inequality inflates the negative effects of
the increase in return to human capital and the price of human-capital investment, as
well as the positive effects of government educational expenditure and family income on
intergenerational mobility.
2.6.2 Institutional and Socioeconomic Causes of the Decrease in Intergenerational
Mobility and the Great Gatsby Curve in China
Based on the conceptual framework discussed above, this section explains our estimated
pattern of intergenerational mobility. We also explain the negative association between
the increasing cross-sectional inequality and the declining intergenerational mobility. We
link the institutional, educational, fiscal, and socioeconomic changes discussed in the
background section to the theoretical determinants of intergenerational mobility. The
decline of China’s intergenerational mobility is mainly determined by the “fights” among
these factors.
First, the return to human capital has increased considerably which is contributable
to the rapid accumulation of physical capital, technological progress, and especially the
market-oriented institutional reforms. Figure 2.4 shows that from 1998 to 2008, the return
to one additional year of schooling increased by four times. In the same period, the return
to college education was seven times higher than that to senior high school education.
Second, educational cost also rises sharply. Figure 2.5 indicates that from 1991 to 2007,
the ratio of tuition fees relative to GDP increases more than eight times. In particular, the
annual tuition fee for tertiary education increases by more than fifteen times from 1995 to
2010.
Third, Figure 2.3 suggests that the share of government expenditure for education in
GDP has doubled from 2% in 1992 to 4% in 2012. However, the public expenditure on
education is heavily concentrated in economically developed areas, in which local govern-
ments are financially well off with the decentralization of the public finance of education.
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Therefore, children from poor regions are less likely to benefit from the increase in the
expenditure on public education (Figure 2.7).58 Fourth, the real per capita income has in-
creased by less than five times since the early 1990s (Zhu, 2012). Fifth, income inequality
as measured by the Gini coefficient has also doubled in the same period (Figure 2.1).
Our estimated decreasing intergenerational mobility implies that the negative effects
of the increases in the return to human capital, the price of human-capital investment, and
income inequality offset the positive effects of the increases in government expenditure on
child human capital and family income. Specifically, the statistics show that the increases
in the return to human capital and in the price of human-capital investment are greater
than the increases in government expenditure on the human capital of children and family
income on average. Moreover, the increase in inequality exacerbates this situation. Con-
sequently, poor families are increasingly subject to severe credit constraint on investment
in the human capital of their children. This conclusion is supported by the survey reported
in Li et al. (2013). This study notes that the share of college students coming from rural
and west areas have been decreasing since the 1990s. More families cannot afford the
tuition for their children’s tertiary education. In 2010, 22% of current college students
were from families whose annual income was less than the average yearly expenditure
of the college students. By contrast, college education was almost free before 1995, as
discussed in the background section. Thus, the educational opportunity for children from
poor families has decreased relative to that for children from rich families.
The negative correlation between cross-sectional inequality and intergenerational mo-
bility can be driven by the interplay among the four effects as follows. First, with the in-
crease in inequality, more poor families are less able to provide quality education to their
children, thereby reducing intergenerational mobility. Second, the increase in inequality
inflates the negative effect of the increases in return to human capital and the price of
human-capital investment on intergenerational mobility. Third, inequality also inflates
the positive effects of the increases in government educational expenditure and family in-
come. Given that the increases in return to human capital and the price of human-capital
investment are greater than the increases in government educational expenditure and fam-
ily income, the net effect of inequality on intergenerational mobility is negative. Fourth,
Becker & Tomes (1986) show that a low intergenerational mobility leads to a high steady
state of the degree of cross-sectional inequality.
We now turn to explain our estimated gender- and region- patterns of intergenerational
mobility. The estimates show that the pattern of decline is more significant for girls. This
58So, the positive effect of the increase in government educational expenditure on intergenerational
mobility is partly offset by the decentralization.
87
finding is attributed to two main reasons. First, the return to schooling is higher for
females than males. The gender gap in return to schooling has been widening (Zhang
et al., 2005). Figure 2.6 presents the return to schooling by gender for urban residents
from 1988 to 2001. In 1988, the rate of return to one additional schooling year is 5.2%
for girls but only 2.9% for boys. In 2001, the return rates are 13.2% and 8.4% for girls and
boys, respectively. Second, girls from poor families are subject to tighter credit constraint
than boys because of the preference for sons. Based on the CFPS data, Figure 2.11 graphs
schooling years by gender and rural/urban areas. The figure shows the persistent gender
gap in schooling years for rural area. By contrast, the corresponding gap in the urban area
shrinks and eventually disappears.
In addition to gender difference, intergenerational mobility displays regional disparity.
The pattern of decline is more significant in less developed areas, such as rural and west-
ern regions. Figure 2.12 graphs the return to schooling years for six provinces according
to Zhang et al. (2005), and suggests that the increase in return to schooling is more signif-
icant in the two most developed provinces/municipalities, namely, Zhejiang and Beijing.
However, this increase lowers intergenerational mobility. Given the declining mobility in
less developed rural/western regions, the regional pattern may not be driven by return to
human capital. Alternatively, we suggest that the regional disparity is mainly driven by
the gap in per capita income and the severity of credit constraint. Given the distribution of
family income, intergenerational mobility is expected higher in a society with higher av-
erage income, as fewer households are subject to credit constraint. However, households
in rural and western regions have tighter credit constraint on investment in the human
capital of their children than their wealthier counterparts. As discussed in the background
section, the public finance for education has been localized; therefore, the share of gov-
ernment expenditure on education is low in less developed areas, such as rural area and
western provinces. The drastic increase in educational costs has exacerbated credit con-
straints, especially in these regions. As per a recent national survey of college students,
Li et al. (2013) reports that the poverty rates are 28% and 32% for students from western
provinces and rural area, respectively. These values exceed the national average level of
22%.
2.7 Policy Implications
To draw policy implications, we first compare our interpretation of the change in intergen-
erational mobility in China to that of a recent study in the US (Chetty et al., 2014a). This
study outlines five significant factors correlated with intergenerational mobility in the US:
residential segregation, income inequality, quality of the primary school attended, social
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capital, and family stability. Among these factors, family stability is the most significant
factor (Table IX in (Chetty et al., 2014a)). Although we cannot conduct a similar analysis
at the level of cross-commuting zones given our small sample size, we note that some of
the factors can be incorporated into our framework to explain China’s declining intergen-
erational mobility. With regard to school quality, for instance, the fiscal decentralization
of educational expenditure increases the geographic variation in school quality. Thus,
school quality is also likely to be a major determinant of the geographic variations in in-
tergenerational mobility in China. Nevertheless, some factors in Chetty et al. (2014a) may
not be applicable to China. For example, out-of-wedlock births and divorces were rare
during our study period; less than 1% of parents in both early and late cohorts were di-
vorced at the time of the survey year, when their average age was 55 years old. Therefore,
marital stability should not be a major contributing factor in the analyses of the patterns
of intergenerational mobility in China.
Because the US and China are at different stages of economic development, it is rea-
sonable that the findings in Chetty et al. (2014a) may not be fully applicable to China.
Over the past four decades, China has experienced fundamental structural change, whereas
the economic structure in the US has remained relatively stable. Interestingly, our expla-
nation is more similar to that of Olivetti & Paserman (2014), which examined the change
in intergenerational mobility across two or three generations in the US in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries. At that time, the US underwent drastic structural changes and
rapid economic growth. Our estimate of the intergenerational income elasticity in the
early cohorts (born before 1970) in China is similar to that of the 1880 cohort in the US.
The results of Olivetti & Paserman (2014) indicated that intergenerational mobility in the
US decreased during the early 20th century. This decline was attributed to an increase in
the return to human capital and to regional disparities in economic development. In the
present study, we also consider these two factors as determinants of the patterns in China
in terms of cohort, gender, and region. Furthermore, we regard the fiscal decentralization
of public educational expenditure in China to be another major factor.
We then compare the US and China in terms of both cross-sectional inequality and
intergenerational mobility. Cross-sectional inequality has increased in both countries,
although the increase in China is more significant (Figure 2.2). Specifically, the Gini
coefficient of China in 1970 was only half of that of the US. In 2008, the Gini coefficient
of China equalled that of the US and reached a historic maximum of 0.45. The increase in
cross-sectional inequality is mainly caused by the increase in return to human capital and
the regional disparity in economic development (Ge & Yang, 2014; Xie & Zhou, 2014).
In contrast to China’s declining intergenerational mobility, that in the US has either
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increased or remained constant over the past few decades (Chetty et al., 2014b). This
finding may be ascribed to the sharp increase in federal and state government expenditure
on human capital of children. Since the 1970s, the US government has initiated a series of
means-tested programs to alleviate the credit constraints on disadvantaged families, such
as Medicaid, food stamps, and Head Start. Therefore, the positive effect of the reduction
in credit constraint on intergenerational mobility overcomes the negative effect of the
increases in return to human capital and cross-sectional inequality. In China, however, the
tightening of household credit constraints may reinforce the negative effect of increase in
return to human capital on intergenerational mobility.
This comparison between the US and China has significant implications for the design
and revision of relevant public policies to improve intergenerational mobility and to re-
duce cross-sectional inequality in China. To promote intergenerational mobility, the Chi-
nese government should aim to reduce the household credit constraints on investment in
the human capital of children promptly and effectively. Moreover, the government should
initiate various programs to subsidize the education of children from disadvantaged fam-
ilies, such as the left-behind children with parents who are rural-to-urban migrants. In
addition, the efficacy of loan and scholarship programs at the tertiary level should be im-
proved. Furthermore, the central government should increase the spending on education
and enhance the efficiency of its usage. China has progressed substantially in these aspects
(Meng, 2013). But more efforts are needed to ensure equal access to quality education for
all age-eligible children.
2.8 Conclusion
In this study, we investigate the temporal patterns of cross-sectional inequality and inter-
generational mobility during the economic reform era in China. First, we find that the
intergenerational mobility in both income and education has decreased. Specifically, the
percentile rank of a child increases from 0.27 to 0.35 for cohorts born before and after
1970, with one-unit increase in the percentile rank of family income in his/her parents’
generation. The corresponding rank-rank estimates of intergenerational education mobil-
ity are 0.24 and 0.29 for early and late cohorts, respectively. Second, we discover that
the cross-sectional inequality is negatively correlated with the intergenerational mobility,
and illustrate a Great Gatsby Curve in China. Finally, we discuss the structural forces in
the decline of intergenerational mobility and in the negative correlation between cross-
sectional inequality and intergenerational mobility. These forces are the increase in return
to human capital and educational cost, as well as the decentralization of government ex-
penditure on education and rising income.
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Our results imply that the cross-sectional inequality in China may increase in the fu-
ture. On the one hand, the increase in inequality in the parental generation intensifies
the severity of family credit constraints, thereby decreasing the intergenerational mobil-
ity. On the other hand, low intergenerational mobility raises the steady state of cross-
sectional inequality in the long run (Becker & Tomes, 1986).59 Therefore, the increase in
cross-sectional inequality and the decline in intergenerational mobility may dynamically
reinforce each other, thus aggravating the inequality in the future.
Our study remains limited. It is beyond the scope of our paper to establish causality
between a specific institutional, policy, or socioeconomic change and intergenerational
mobility. We also do not distinguish the mechanisms through which these changes affect
intergenerational mobility in China. We instead attempt to statistically characterize the
temporal patterns of inequality and mobility during China’s economic reform era as the
majority of the literature on intergenerational mobility does. We then try to understand
these patterns by incorporating the institutional, policy, and socioeconomic changes into
a unified economic framework from a human capital perspective. Our study provides a
foundation for future studies that seek to identify causality and mechanisms.
59The cross-sectional inequality in an economy may converge to the steady state from either a high or
a low level. If the degree of inequality initiated from a high level, the trend was decreasing; otherwise, the
trend was increasing. Because the income inequality was very low at the beginning of the economic reform
(Figure 2.1), the trend of inequality is expected to be increasing. Furthermore, the decline in intergener-
ational mobility increases the steady-state level of inequality in China. Therefore, the increasing trend of
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Figure 2.17: Relative Mobility vs. Standard Deviation of Parental Schooling
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Figure 2.18: Absolute Mobility vs. Standard Deviation of Parental Schooling
Note: slope=-41.340 with a standard error of 12.985.
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Table 2.1: Intergenerational Income Mobility by Gender
Estimates Changes in estimates
Early cohort Late cohort (2) - (1)
(1) (2) (3)







Daughters 0.205* 0.496*** 0.291**
(0.116) (0.074) (0.137)







Daughters 0.155* 0.373*** 0.218**
(0.088) (0.055) (0.104)







Daughters 0.172** 0.390*** 0.218**
(0.081) (0.054) (0.097)
Note: The children are at least 23 years old, and fathers are less than 65 years old. Income
is converted to RMB 2002 using the CPI. Data source: Chinese Household and Income
Projects 1995 and 2002 in urban China. Standard errors clustered by households are in
brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
The dependent variable is the annual income of the child. The independent variable is the
average annual family income over three previous years (at least). The control variables
include the age and age squared of children and fathers, gender dummy (in the specifica-
tion for all children), wave dummies, and provincial dummies.
Early cohorts include children born between 1949 (the year the People’s Republic of
China was founded) and 1970 (included). Late cohorts include children born after 1970
who were educated and worked in the post-economic reform era.
a: Intergenerational income correlation = intergenerational income coefficient ∗σp/σc,




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3: Intergenerational Income Mobility by Region
Estimates Changes in estimates
Early cohort Late cohort (2) - (1)
(1) (2) (3)







West 0.224* 0.545*** 0.321**
(0.125) (0.098) (0.155)







West 0.155* 0.411*** 0.256**
(0.086) (0.074) (0.114)







West 0.200** 0.455*** 0.254**
(0.088) (0.074) (0.115)
Note: The children are at least 23 years old, and fathers are less than 65 years old.
Income is converted to RMB 2002 using the CPI. Data source: Chinese Household and
Income Projects 1995 and 2002 in urban China. Standard errors clustered by households
are in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
The dependent variable is the annual income of the child. The independent variable
is the average annual family income over three previous years (at least). The control
variables include the age and age squared of children and fathers, gender dummy (in the
specification for all children), wave dummies, and provincial dummies.
Early cohorts include children born between 1949 (the year the People’s Republic of
China was founded) and 1970 (included). Late cohorts include children born after 1970
who were educated and worked in the post-economic reform era.
a: Intergenerational income correlation = intergenerational income coefficient ∗σp/σc,
where σp and σc are the standard deviations of logarithm annual income of parents and
children, respectively.
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Table 2.4: Absolute vs. Relative Intergenerational Income Mobility in East, Central, and
West China
Upward mobility rank Region Absolute upward mobility Relative mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Early cohort
1 West 43.055 0.2
2 Central 40.617 0.243
3 East 38.973 0.266
Panel B. Late cohort
1 Central 38.683 0.303
2 East 36.09 0.318
3 West 36.002 0.455
Note: The children are at least 23 years old, and fathers are less than 65 years old. Income
is converted to RMB 2002 using the CPI. Data source: Chinese Household and Income
Projects 1995 and 2002 in urban China.
Early cohorts include children born between 1949 (the year the People’s Republic of
China was founded) and 1970 (included). Late cohorts include children born after 1970
who were educated and worked in the post-economic reform era.
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Table 2.5: Intergenerational Education Mobility
Estimates Changes in estimates
Early cohort Late cohort (2) - (1)
(1) (2) (3)







Daughters 0.372*** 0.392*** 0.02
(0.017) (0.013) (0.021)







Daughters 0.299*** 0.339*** 0.0400**
(0.014) (0.011) (0.018)







Daughters 0.241*** 0.317*** 0.0762***
(0.015) (0.011) (0.018)
Note: The dependent variable is the schooling years of the child. The independent vari-
able is the average schooling years of the parents. The control variables include the
age, gender (in the specification for all children), and Hukou status (agricultural or non-
agricultural) of the child, as well as the age of the mother, dummies if either parent was
alive in the survey year, and regional dummies. Data source: Chinese Family Panel Stud-
ies 2010. Standard errors clustered by households are in brackets; * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
a: Intergenerational educational correlation = intergenerational education coefficient
∗σp/σc, where σp and σc are the standard deviations of the schooling years of parents
and children, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Intergenerational Education Mobility by Hukou Status
Estimates Changes in estimates
Early cohort Late cohort (2) - (1)
(1) (2) (3)




Rural 0.384*** 0.349*** -0.0346
(0.019) (0.013) (0.023)




Rural 0.261*** 0.291*** 0.0300*
(0.013) (0.011) (0.017)




Rural 0.207*** 0.272*** 0.0650***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.018)
Note: The dependent variable is the schooling years of the child. The independent vari-
able is the average schooling years of the parents. The control variables include the age
and gender of the child, as well as the age of the mother, dummies if either parent was
alive in the survey year, and regional dummies. Data source: Chinese Family Panel Stud-
ies 2010. Standard errors clustered by households are in brackets; * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
a: Intergenerational educational correlation = intergenerational education coefficient
∗σp/σc, where σp and σc are the standard deviations of the schooling years of parents
and children, respectively.
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Table 2.7: Intergenerational Education Mobility by Region
Estimates Changes in estimates
Early cohort Late cohort (2) - (1)
(1) (2) (3)







West 0.449*** 0.479*** 0.0304
(0.032) (0.023) (0.039)







West 0.276*** 0.348*** 0.0719***
(0.020) (0.016) (0.026)







West 0.201*** 0.322*** 0.121***
(0.021) (0.017) (0.027)
Note: The dependent variable is the schooling years of the child. The independent vari-
able is the average schooling years of the parents. The control variables include the age,
gender, and Hukou status (agricultural or non-agricultural) of the child, as well as the age
of the mother, and dummies if either parent was alive in the survey year. Data source: Chi-
nese Family Panel Studies 2010. Standard errors clustered by households are in brackets;
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
a: Intergenerational educational correlation = intergenerational education coefficient






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A Simple Model on Intergenerational Income Mobility
Model Setup
For simplicity, we assume that family i contains one parent from generation t − 1 and one
child from generation t.60 The parents are altruistic. They care about not only their own
consumption (ci,t−1) but also earnings of their children (yit). Thus, parental preference can
be represented by a utility function in the following form
Ui,t−1 = (1 − a) ln Ci,t−1 + α ln yit, (22)
where 0 < α < 1 measures the degree of parental altruism toward their child. The parents
allocate their after-tax earnings ((1 − τ)yi,t−1) between their personal consumption (Ci,t−1)
and investment in the human capital of their child (Ii,t). The budget constraint is given by
(1 − τt)yi,t−1 = Ci,t−1 + pt−1Ii,t−1, (23)
where τ is the tax rate. We normalize the price of consumption good to one. Then, pt−1
is the price of human capital investment. In contrast to previous literature, we use pt−1 to
capture the rapid increase in the costs of human capital investment in China in the past
decades, such as tuition.
The child’s income is generated from the semi-log function:
ln yit = µ + rthit, (24)
where hit is the human capital and rt is the monetary return to human capital. We note that
var(ln yit) = r2t var(hit) + h
2
t var(rt) + 2cov(rt, hit).
Given the distribution of human capital stock, a high return to human capital implies great
cross-sectional income inequality.
Return to human capital is determined by four factors: stock of physical capital (Kt),
stock of human capital (Ht), technological progress (At), and market-oriented institutional
60In our empirical analysis, we use the average parental schooling years and the total parental income as
the dependent variables. Therefore, it is suitable to assume only one parent is present in the family.
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reforms (Mt) such that
rt = r(Kt,Ht, At,Mt).61
Both the stock of physical capital and the technological progress enhance the marginal
productivity of human capital rt. Thus, we have ∂rt/∂Kt > 0 and ∂rt/∂At > 0. In addition,
the market-oriented institutional reforms not only increase the marginal productivity of
human capital but also reduce the gap between marginal productivity and market wage.
Thus, we have ∂rt/∂Mt > 0. Institutional reforms significantly increase return to human
capital in China, as discussed in the background section. Finally, the marginal productiv-
ity of human capital decreases with the stock of human capital such that ∂rt/∂Ht < 0.
For simplicity, the human capital is produced by the following equation
hit = θt ln(Ii,t−1 + Gi,t−1) + eit, (25)
where Gi,t−1 is the governmental investment in child’s human capital, and eit is the child’s
endowment. We assume that governmental and family investments are substitutes in Eq.
(25).62
We also assume that the endowment transmission follows a first-order autoregressive
process such that
eit = δ + λtei,t−1 + vit, (26)
where vit is i.i.d. λt is determined by the biological heritability of genetic endowments,
degree of assortative mating, and intergenerational transmission of family culture. Fol-
lowing the literature, we assume that λt = λ which is exogenous in our analysis (Becker
& Tomes, 1979, 1986).
Intergenerational Income Elasticity without Credit Constraint
We first consider the scenario wherein the credit market is perfect; thus, parents can bor-
row against the child’s perspective earnings or they are sufficiently rich. In this case, in-
vestment decisions are independent of parental income (Becker & Tomes, 1986; Behrman
et al., 1982). Thus, a log-linear intergenerational income regression can be derived easily
as:
ln yit = µ1t + λtgt ln yi,t−1 + v
1
it,
where gt = rt/rt−1, µ1t is a constant and v
1
it is an error term.
61We assume that the aggregate production is Yt = Y(Kt,Ht, At,Mt).
62This function of human capital production follows that of Solon (2004) and is simplified for ana-
lytical convenience, as shown below. It does not allow human capital investment to complement genetic
endowments.
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Without credit constraints, the intergenerational transmission of endowments is the
only channel that bridges parental and child’s earnings.63 In this case, the increase in
return to human capital across generations can inflate the effect of intergenerational en-
dowment transmission on intergenerational mobility. In other words, the role of inter-
generational transmission of genetic ability in the intergenerational mobility of earning
is amplified by the increase in return to human capital.64 The higher the increase in the
return to human capital, the lower the intergenerational mobility is. At the steady state
rt = rt−1 and λt = λt−1, the IGE is uniquely determined by the intergenerational transmis-
sion of endowment such that:65
β1 = λ.
Intergenerational Income Elasticity with Credit Constraint
In this section, we consider the scenario wherein the credit market is imperfect. Parents
can neither borrow from the future earnings of their child nor from the credit market
(because they are too poor). In this case, the investment decision is determined by parental
income. By some simple algebras, we derive the log-linear equation of intergenerational
income regression as follows:66
ln yit ≈ µ2t + [(1 − γt)rt] ln yi,t−1 + rteit, (27)
where µ2t is a constant, eit includes an error term, and γt is a function of two variables. The
first variable is the progressivity in government investment in child’s human capital (st)
measured by the ratio of the government expenditure relative to household disposable in-
come st = s(Gi,t−1, τt, yi,t−1). The second variable is the price of human capital investment
(pt−1). Thus,
γt = γ(st1 , pt−1).
We have ∂(1 − γt)/∂st < 0 and ∂(1 − γt)/∂pt−1 > 0. We interpret 1 − γt as the severity
of the credit constraint. When the share of government expenditure is high or the price of
human capital investment is low, the credit constraint is mild.
The two channels through which parental income correlates with the income of the
child are shown in Eq. (27). The first channel is related to the credit constraint ((1 − γt)rt
63This conclusion is derived from our simplified framework. In real life other channels exist, including
parental characteristics.
64We assume that persons with higher genetic ability have more human capital.
65This result hinges on the assumption regarding the linear specification of the production function.
66We use an approximate equality because we derive the expression by using a first-order Taylor ap-
proximation.
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). A severe credit constraint suggests high IGE. The increase in the ratio of government
expenditure on the human capital of children relative to disposable household income pro-
motes intergenerational mobility. The increase in the price of human capital investment
limits intergenerational mobility. In addition, the effect of the severity of credit constraint
is enhanced by the return to human capital in the labour market. The second channel is the
intergenerational transmission of endowment, as the final term in Eq. (27) is a function of
parental endowment, which is in turn a determinant of parental income.
We then derive the IGE at the steady state. Eq. (27) is a first-order autoregression of
ln yit that contains a serially correlated error term. This term follows a first-order autore-
gression. As shown in Solon (2004), the steady-state of IGE is derived as follows:
β2 =
(1 − γ)r + λ
1 + (1 − γ)rλ. (28)
We find that ∂β2/∂r > 0, ∂β2/∂(1 − γ) > 0, and ∂β2/∂λ > 0. Because β2 > β1, IGE
is higher in the scenario with credit constraints than that in the case without credit con-
straints.
The Weighted Intergenerational Income Elasticity
In real life, poor households are subject to credit constraints to finance their child’s human
capital investment, whereas rich households do not. The estimated IGE combines both
scenarios. Therefore, IGE for a population containing both types of households is derived
as follows:









and nN (= d) is the share of parents subject to credit constraint. IGE
increases with the share of households that are subject to credit constraints in a population
(∂βt/∂dt > 0), because β1 < β2 and ∂pit/∂dt > 0.
The share of households subject to credit constraints is determined by the equilibrium
condition, which postulates that the marginal return to human capital investment is equal
to interest rate in the capital market. When the return to human capital investment is
higher than the interest rate, parents are subject to credit constraints. Otherwise, parents
invest in the human capital of the child at the point where the marginal return to human
capital investment equals the interest rate. Therefore, d is function of the following form:
d = d(D, y, r,G, p, ra),
where D is a measure of the degree of income inequality in the parental generation, y can
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be re-interpreted as the average family income, and ra is the return to asset or interest rate.
A larger D indicates that more families are subject to credit constraints, ∂d/∂D > 0.
Intergenerational mobility decreases with inequality.67 We also have ∂d/∂y < 0, ∂d/∂G >
0, ∂d/∂ra < 0, ∂d/∂r > 0, and ∂d/∂p > 0. As a result, the effects of average family
income, return to human capital, the price of human capital investment, and government
expenditure on the human capital of children on IGE are not only intensively marginal,
but also extensively marginal. The former refers to the change in the severity of credit
constraints, and the latter refers to the variation in the share of households subject to
credit constraints.
Finally, we summarize five major theoretical determinants of IGE, assuming that the
intergenerational transmission of endowment is constant. When we discuss a given vari-
able as below, other variables are held constant.
1. Return to human capital (r). We have ∂β/∂r = β2∂pi/∂r + pi∂β2/∂r > 0. The
return to human capital lowers intergenerational mobility not only by causing more
families subject to the credit constraints, but also by inflating the effect of the credit
constraints on the IGE.
2. Price of human capital investment (p). We have ∂β/∂p = β2∂pi/∂p + pi∂β2/∂p >
0. With the increasing educational cost, families become poorer in the relative
term. More families are subject to credit constraints, and the credit constraints on
households already suffering from them tighten further. Intergenerational mobility
decreases with the increase in the price of human capital investment.
3. Government expenditure on the human capital of children (G). We have ∂β/∂G =
β2∂pi/∂G+pi∂β2/∂G < 0. The effect of government expenditure on intergenerational
mobility is the opposite of that of the price of human capital investment. Therefore,
intergenerational mobility increases with the increase in government expenditure.
4. Average family income (y). We have ∂β/∂y = β2∂pi/∂y + pi∂β2/∂y < 0. With
the increase in family income, fewer households are subject to credit constraints.
Hence, intergenerational mobility increases with family income.
5. Degree of income inequality (D). We have ∂β/∂D = β2∂pi/∂D > 0. With the
increase in inequality (due to an exogenous (policy) change, holding the average
family income constant), more households are subject to credit constraints. Thus,
67In the long run, both inequality and intergenerational mobility are equilibrium outcomes. However,
some factors may independently affect inequality such as tax reforms and public transfers.
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intergenerational mobility decreases with inequality. Moreover, degree of inequal-
ity, return to human capital, price of human capital investment, government expen-
diture, and average family income interact with one another. For example, pi is large
when inequality is high. Therefore, ∂β/∂r = β2∂pi/∂r + pi∂β2/∂r increases. Hence,
the effect of the return to human capital on intergenerational mobility is strong. In
summary, the increase in inequality can enhance not only the negative effects of
the return to human capital and the price of human capital investment, but also the
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Figure 2A.9: Relative Mobility vs. Gini Coefficient of Family Income
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Figure 2A.10: Absolute Mobility vs. Gini Coefficient of Family Income
Note: slope=-135.779 with a standard error of 78.547.
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Table 2A.1: Summary Statistics on the Chinese Household Income Projects Data
Mean
(Standard deviation)
Overall East Central West
Early cohort
child’s annual income
6628.004 8572.219 4827.629 5087.22
(5,783.354) (6,822.393) (3,040.306) (5,231.885)
annual family incomea
9331.364 10899.52 8010.927 7859.751
(5,887.859) (6,497.635) (5,380.898) (3,972.818)
child’s gender (male=1)
0.705 0.679 0.722 0.738
(0.456) (0.468) (0.449) (0.442)
child’s age
29.523 30.072 29.269 28.648
(4.298) (4.473) (4.103) (4.041)
father’s age
57.139 57.467 57.151 55.334
(4.683) (4.609) (4.693) (4.782)
Observation 627 293 212 122
Late cohort
child’s annual income
8939.762 11502.71 6567.196 6888.833
(7,622.202) (8,973.904) (4,816.738) (5,885.124)
annual family incomea
15432.46 18809.11 11958.42 13234.25
(11,384.180) (14,051.720) (7,029.896) (7,396.300)
child’s gender (male=1)
0.6 0.608 0.61 0.57
(0.490) (0.489) (0.489) (0.496)
child’s age
25.462 25.632 25.154 25.542
(2.353) (2.407) (2.183) (2.441)
father’s age
53.28 53.378 53.098 53.334
(4.548) (4.163) (4.917) (4.793)
Observation 821 383 259 179
Note: Early cohorts include children born between 1949 (the year the People’s Republic
of China was founded) and 1970 (included). Late cohorts include children born after 1970
who were educated and worked in the post-economic reform era.
Income is converted to RMB 2002 using the CPI. Specifically, in the early cohort, child’s
annual income of RMB 6,628 equal to USD 800 in 2002 price. Annual family income
of 9,331 equals USD 1,127. In the late cohort, RMB 8,940 is equivalent to USD 1,080.
RMB 15,432 is equal to USD 1,864.
a: Annual family income refers to the average annual income from fathers and mothers
over a minimum of three years prior to the survey wave (included).
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Table 2A.2: Quintile Transition Matrix of Intergenerational Income Mobility
Panel A. Early cohort
Parent Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
1 39.20% 24.00% 18.40% 15.20% 3.20%
Child 2 19.35% 31.45% 25.00% 16.94% 7.26%
Quintile 3 21.26% 24.41% 19.69% 18.11% 16.54%
4 16.80% 12.80% 25.60% 23.20% 21.60%
5 3.17% 7.14% 11.11% 26.98% 51.59%
Panel B. Late cohort
Parent Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
1 45.12% 31.71% 15.24% 6.71% 1.22%
Child 2 23.03% 30.30% 25.45% 16.36% 4.85%
Quintile 3 16.97% 24.24% 24.85% 16.97% 16.97%
4 10.91% 7.27% 23.03% 27.27% 31.52%
5 3.64% 6.67% 11.52% 32.73% 45.45%
Note: Each cell reports the percentage of children in the quintile (as given by the row),
conditional on family income in the quintile (as given by the column). 1 indicates the
lowest quintile and 5 refers to the highest quintile.
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Table 2A.3: Summary Statistics on the Chinese Family Panel Studies Data
Mean (Standard deviation)
Overall Urban Rural East Central West
Early cohort: 1956-1970
child’s schooling years
7.577 10.407 6.587 8.191 7.899 6.179
(4.420) (3.452) (4.273) (4.077) (4.355) (4.751)
parental average schooling years
2.663 4.6 1.971 3.012 2.738 1.672
(3.667) (4.593) (2.910) (3.901) (3.555) (2.916)
child’s gender (male=1)
0.494 0.493 0.483 0.491 0.489 0.502
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
child’s Hukou status (agricultural=1)
0.666 0.0543 0.868 0.591 0.635 0.813
(0.472) (0.227) (0.338) (0.492) (0.482) (0.390)
Observation 11832 2469 7212 4805 3498 2834
Late cohort: 1971-1985
child’s schooling years
8.628 12.152 7.762 9.805 9.007 6.712
(4.474) (3.481) (4.190) (3.904) (4.119) (4.907)
parental average schooling years
4.501 7.7 3.695 5.234 4.917 2.972
(3.988) (4.047) (3.488) (3.952) (3.992) (3.558)
child’s gender (male=1)
0.444 0.479 0.427 0.442 0.442 0.44
(0.497) (0.500) (0.495) (0.497) (0.497) (0.496)
child’s Hukou status (agricultural=1)
0.678 0.0627 0.842 0.614 0.637 0.809
(0.467) (0.243) (0.365) (0.487) (0.481) (0.393)
Observation 13610 2566 9421 5168 4317 3721
Note: The divisions of urban vs. rural areas and of the three geographic regions are based
on the status of the mothers.
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Table 2A.4: Quintile Transition Matrix of Intergenerational Education Mobility
Panel A. early cohort 1956-1970
Parent Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
1 28.36% 26.80% 27.59% 12.21% 5.03%
Child 2 21.17% 22.53% 23.11% 22.06% 11.11%
Quintile 3 17.71% 19.32% 18.72% 22.53% 21.76%
4 17.96% 17.46% 17.49% 23.96% 23.11%
5 14.79% 13.91% 13.10% 19.23% 38.99%
Panel B. late cohort 1971-1985
Parent Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
1 37.69% 33.65% 17.68% 8.15% 2.83%
Child 2 24.76% 25.42% 23.34% 17.66% 8.82%
Quintile 3 16.46% 18.30% 23.89% 25.49% 15.83%
4 12.93% 15.10% 21.06% 27.07% 23.88%
5 8.16% 7.53% 14.04% 21.63% 48.64%
Note: Each cell reports the percentage of children in the quintile (as given by the row),
conditional on family income in the quintile (as given by the column). 1 indicates the
lowest quintile and 5 refers to the highest quintile.
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Chapter 3
Intergenerational Income Persistence and Transmission
through Identity: Evidence from Urban China
In chapter 2 we describe the patterns of intergenerational mobility in income and
education in contemporary China. In addition, we investigate its interplay with cross-
sectional inequality, drawing the Great Gatsby Curve. Based on the descriptive analysis,
in this chapter I explore the mechanism for the intergenerational income transmission
amid China’s current economic transition.
I find that the estimated intergenerational income elasticity increases by 40% for co-
horts educated before and after the market reform, from 0.32 to 0.44. It even reaches 0.52
among households with income above average in the post-reform era, and is 56% higher
than the corresponding one in households with below-average income.
How to interpret this intergenerational income persistence, especially among the rich
families? Besides the conventional channel of education, I innovatively estimate the con-
tribution from political and occupational identities. Schooling is a leading contributor
for all families before the market reform, and for households with income below average
in the post-reform era. However, a new transmission channel, political identity, plays a
leading role among households with above-average income in the post-reform era. The
contribution from occupational identity is smaller in the post-reform period than that of




To what extent do the children of the rich stay rich and those of the poor remain poor?
Is the intergenerational correlation aggravated or attenuated with the economic transition
and development? What is the mechanism for the intergenerational income transmission?
In this paper, I aim to answer the three questions. Becker & Tomes (1979, 1986) initiate
the concept of intergenerational elasticity (IGE) of income, incorporating families into
the general analysis of economic development.68 Specifically, it estimates how sensitive
the change in a child’s income corresponds to that of parental income. The literature
has investigated intensively how to improve the measurement of the IGE, and examined
the degree of intergenerational mobility in different countries and periods (Mazumder &
Levine, 2002; Mayer & Lopoo, 2005; Bratsberg et al., 2007; Lee & Solon, 2009). How-
ever, to the best of my knowledge, only several studies have been done on the interaction
between intergenerational mobility and economic transition, and the political economy of
intergenerational mobility (Chen et al., 2010; Ichino et al., 2011).
China’s contemporary transition period provides a good institutional background agai-
nst which to investigate this question. A heated debate is ongoing about the growing dif-
ferences between the rich second generation (fu er dai) and the poor second generation
(qiong er dai). Children of the first generation who benefited from China’s economic re-
form inherit privileged socioeconomic status from their parents.69 The poor second gen-
eration, in contrast, does not have equal access to economic opportunities and is trapped
in an intergenerational poverty trap. To link to the concept of intergenerational mobility,
on the one hand, with the introduction of market economy and privatization, altruistic
parents are motivated to accumulate wealth and hand it down to their children. With no
inheritance or bequest tax, the intergenerational income persistence is expected to rise.
On the other hand, the Chinese government has raised expenditure on public education
intensively (Guo & Min, 2008). Children from economically disadvantaged families are
facilitated with basic education, and are more able to climb up along the socioeconomic
ladder than before. The intergenerational income persistence is anticipated to decrease.
Therefore, the absolute degree of intergenerational mobility in contemporary China re-
mains an empirical question.
Adopting retrospective data in urban China from the Chinese Household Income
Projects (CHIPs) in 1995 and 2002, I investigate the degree of intergenerational elasticity
of income during its transition period. I find that the intergenerational income persistence
68The intergenerational income elasticity is defined as (∆Y1/Y1)/(∆Y0/Y0), where Y1 is child’s income,
and Y0 is parental income.
69The economic reform started in 1978, and is ongoing in China. It has introduced market economy to
replace the stagnant planned economy.
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is increased significantly along with economic development and market reform. The IGE
of income jumps from 0.32 to 0.44 from early into late cohorts, increasing by 40 per-
cent. Specifically, the early birth cohort refers to individuals born between the year of
1949 when the People’s Republic of China was founded and the year of 1970 (included).
Most of them complete education and work before the economic reform. Late birth co-
hort includes people born after 1970. Most of them receive education and work in the
post-reform era. In addition, the pattern of intergenerational transmission varies across
rich and poor families. I discover that in the pre-reform period, there is no statistically
significant difference in the IGE between the lower and upper 50% income groups. Nev-
ertheless, after the reform, the difference of IGE between the two income groups enlarges
and has statistical significance. Moreover, the intergenerational income elasticity in fam-
ilies with above-average income even reaches 0.52, which is 56% higher than that of the
lower 50% income group.
Recent literature also investigates channels through which income is transmitted from
one generation to the next (Blanden et al., 2007; Sacerdote, 2007; Mazumder, 2008).
Education is the most well-established channel (Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Blanden et al.,
2004). Children from rich families can get access to better education than their poorer
counterparts, and increase their future earnings. Blanden et al. (2007) characterize non-
cognitive skills as another channel for intergenerational income mobility with data from
Britain. They demonstrate that non-cognitive skills, together with ability, account for
almost half of the intergenerational elasticity of income. Other transmission mechanisms
include health (Eriksson et al., 2005; Currie & Moretti, 2007) and personality (Groves,
2005).
In this paper, I examine two new transmission channels, political and occupational
identities. Social networking is important for career success (Seibert et al., 2001); thus
obtaining identities in the network is crucial (Akerlof & Kranton, 2010). In China, family
plays a significant role in an individual’s networking in the labour market (Chen & Feng,
2011). I incorporate family influence on children’s political and occupational identities
into the analysis of the intergenerational income persistence. Specifically, being a Com-
munist Party member implies income premium, as it allows easy access to promotion
and possibly economic rents. Being in the state-owned sector implies earning a premium
and protection from market vicissitude. Nevertheless, in the post-reform era, the private
sector competes with state-owned sector, providing high earnings to attract high-skilled
workers. Parents are expected to make various investment portfolios in their children’s
political and occupational identities across different periods.
Using the decomposition method (Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Blanden et al., 2007), I
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find that for both rich and poor families in the pre-reform era, the conventional channel of
education acts as the leading contributor to intergenerational income persistence. In the
post-reform era, however, the leading contributor varies across income groups. Education
still contributes most to the income persistence across generations for poor households.
For the rich, it is political identity as being Communist Party members that contributes
most to the intergenerational income persistence. Impact from occupational identity from
working in the state-owned sector is less important in the post-reform period than that in
the pre-reform era in both types of households. Results remain robust when taking the
correlation between education and political or occupational identity into account.
To the best of my knowledge, only two studies have touched upon the effect of politi-
cal identity on intergenerational mobility. Ichino et al. (2011) predict through a theoretical
model that in societies where the rich participate more in politics, both social spending
on public education and intergenerational income mobility are lower. They also present
empirical evidence that party affiliation has stronger explanatory power than education in
determining intergenerational mobility. Chen et al. (2010) explore the linkage between
institutional change and intergenerational mobility in China. They find that the more open
the economic institutions are the less the social mobility, since the elites can jointly invest
in their children and the reform. In contrast to Chen et al. (2010) who focus on the trans-
mission of educational attainment, I concentrate on the roles of political and occupational
identities in the transmission of economic status across generations. Regarding the choice
between state- and privately- owned sectors in China, the literature has concentrated on
self-selection between the two sectors, leaving the family effects aside. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first paper estimating the role of occupational identity in a society
with decreasing intergenerational income mobility.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature. Sec-
tion 3.3 describes a simple model of intergenerational transmission. Section 3.4 provides
details of the data, followed by Section 3.5, which presents econometric specification.
Section 3.6 analyses empirical evidence. Section 3.7 discusses and Section 3.8 concludes
the paper.
3.2 Literature Review
The cornerstone paper on intergenerational income transmission is that of Becker &
Tomes (1979), who have developed an equilibrium theory of intergenerational mobil-
ity and distribution of income. Their later paper (Becker & Tomes, 1986) crystallizes a
model for the intergenerational transmission of income, and specify a possible concave
intergenerational income relationship under imperfect access to capital market. Solon
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(2004) rationalizes the log-linear regression commonly used in the empirical works to
examine the intergenerational income elasticity.
Early empirical work focuses on point estimation of income correlation between fa-
thers and sons in developed countries, and especially the United States. The estimated
coefficients are relatively low, around 0.2 or less in the U.S. (Sewell et al., 1975; Behrman
& Tarbman, 1985). Solon (1989, 1992) points out the bias in the estimates from previ-
ous studies, which are from “the error-ridden data”or “the unrepresentative samples”. In
addition, he proposes improved methods by taking an average across several years to mea-
sure the lifetime income for parents and using instrumental variables (IVs) to address the
endogeneity caused by unobserved common factors influencing both parents’ and chil-
dren’s income. A new estimate of IGE around 0.4 is generated, which reveals a less
mobile society than the one described before. Lee & Solon (2009) estimate the trend in
intergenerational income mobility in U.S. across twenty years. They find no statistically
significant variation in the intergenerational income mobility across the years, though this
result is challenged by other studies (Hauser, 1998; Mazumder & Levine, 2002; Mayer
& Lopoo, 2005). Mayer & Lopoo (2005) attempt to reconcile the previous conflicting
findings by claiming a nonlinear trend in the IGE.
Recent studies touch upon the intergenerational mobility patterns in developing coun-
tries. Lillard & Kilburn (1995) report an intergenerational income elasticity of 0.26 be-
tween parents and sons in Malaysia. Labar (2007) estimates the IGE of income to be
0.29 in China between 1991 and 2004. Guo & Min (2008) indicate that the overall IGE
of income for the father-son pairs in urban China is around 0.32 in 2004, though the es-
timate is potentially biased since one-year income may not be an appropriate proxy for
lifetime income. Gong et al. (2012) estimate that the intergenerational income elasticity
in China is 0.74 for father-son pairs, 0.84 for father-daughter pairs, 0.33 for mother-son
pairs, and 0.47 for mother-daughter pairs. However, the estimates are potentially biased
due to lack of panel datasets or valid instrumental variables.70 Chen et al. (2010) examine
the changes in IGE through pre-Mao, Mao, and post-Mao periods in urban China, show-
ing a decrease in intergenerational income mobility.71 Nevertheless, they use one-year
income to measure parental lifetime income due to the limitation of cross-sectional data
70Guo & Min (2008) use one-year income as proxy for father’s lifetime income which is vulnerable
to random shocks in specific year. Gong et al. (2012) adopt predicted parental permanent income with
education as an instrument. However, whether the prediction and instrument are convincing is open to
discussion. For instance, parental education can be positively correlated with some unobserved factors,
such as the diligence in the family culture, which can be positively correlated with children’s income. In
this scenario, this instrument violates the exclusion restriction, and biases the coefficients upward.
71 They consider cohorts “born before 1940 educated under the pre-Mao regime”, and those “born from
1970 on as educated under the post-Mao regime”.
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structure. Deng et al. (2013) correct for co-residency bias in urban China, and report an
estimated IGE of 0.45 in 1995 and 0.51 in 2002 between fathers and sons.
Researchers in recent decades have applied various methods to investigate causal
mechanisms through which economic status is transmitted from one generation to the
next. One method is to estimate sibling correlation in order to implicitly assess the impact
of family background on children’s earnings (Bjo¨rklund et al., 2006; Mazumder, 2008).
However, this method cannot provide a direct estimation of intergenerational mobility.
Another method is using adoptees or twins to identify the nature versus nurture effects
(Behrman & Rosenzweig, 2002, 2005; Plug, 2004; Antonovics & Goldberger, 2005; Sac-
erdote, 2007; Liu & Zeng, 2009). Nevertheless, the underlying assumptions of random
assignment of adoptees and equal treatment as biological children are not plausible (Black
& Devereux, 2011). For twins, assortative mating between the twin and his/her spouse
biases the estimates under fixed-effect estimation (Black & Devereux, 2011).
A third method is to decompose the intergenerational income persistence through in-
termediate variables. The basic idea is to account for intergenerational income persistence
by children’s intermediate attributes, which are affected by parental income, and will in-
fluence children’s future income. The prevalent intermediate variables include IQ test
scores (Bowles & Gintis, 2002), education, non-cognitive skills (Blanden et al., 2007),
and health (Currie & Moretti, 2007). However, the causality drawn from this method is
controversial, since it is difficult to distinguish among different transmitting channels. A
fourth method is to use natural experiments to isolate the direct causal effect of parental
income on children (Dahl & Lochner, 2005; Oreopoulos et al., 2008). Despite the diffi-
culty of having such natural experiments, this method, nevertheless, is also implausible
in drawing causal arguments since the shocks may influence not only parental income
but also other factors in the families, such as psychological ones, which may cause an
endogenous problem (Black & Devereux, 2011). Most studies in examining transmission
channels focus on developed countries. Little is known about developing countries.
Akerlof & Kranton (2010) bring the notion of ‘identity’ into economics, initiate the
concepts of Identity Economics, and emphasize the importance of identity in economic
behaviour. However, they focus on analysing the correlation between identity and eco-
nomic preference and outcome. The impact of identity on intergenerational mobility is
little touched upon. Recently, there has been a rising surge of studies in estimating the
impact of political force on intergenerational mobility. Ichino et al. (2011) find that party
affiliation has greater explanatory power than education, which is traditionally considered
the main determinant of IGE. In China’s context, Chen et al. (2010) study the connection
between the 1979 economic reform and intergenerational mobility. They demonstrate a
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decreasing social mobility in the context of a more open economy, and argue that elites
can invest in their children and the reform jointly. With regard to state- versus privately-
owned sectors, the literature focuses on wage differences (Zhao, 2002; De´murger et al.,
2006).
In this paper, I apply the decomposition method to investigate the degree and channel
of the intergenerational income transmission during China’s transition period. In contrast
to the literature, I concentrate on examining the impact of political and occupational iden-
tities on intergenerational mobility, and attempt to establish an interpretation framework
of identity transmission across generations. To the best of my knowledge, no previous
studies have linked the decreasing intergenerational mobility with occupational identity.
3.3 Model
Solon (2004) rationalizes the log-linear regression, which is commonly used in empirical
work to examine intergenerational income elasticity. I follow his model though making
one adjustment in the production function to fit into China’s context.
Assume there is one parent at time t−1, and one child at time t in family i. The parent
allocates after-tax lifetime income (1−τ)yi,t−1 between his/her own consumption Ci,t−1 and
investment for the child, Ii,t−1. Specifically, it is assumed that the parent cannot borrow
against the child’s prospective earnings and does not bequest financial asset directly. The
budget constraint for the parent is:
(1 − τ)yi,t−1 = Ci,t−1 + Ii,t−1. (29)
Meanwhile, the government also invests in the child through investment in public ed-
ucation, Gt−1. Solon (2004) considers the investment in children’s education from parents
and government as perfect substitutes, which is the conventional case in developed coun-
tries. Nevertheless, in developing countries as China, access to capital markets is limited.
In this scenario, I separate governmental investment (Gt−1) from parental investment (It−1),
and focus on the effect of the latter.
Parental and governmental investments generate the child’s intermediate outcome,
which can further generate his/her future income:
hit = θ ln(Ii,t−1) + ηGt−1 + eit, (30)
where θ is the marginal product of parental investment in the child.72 eit is the child’s un-
72The original model in Solon (2004) is expressed as hit = θ ln(Ii,t−1 + Gt−1) + eit.
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observed endowment affecting his/her outcome, such as unobserved ability. hit is a vector
of child’s intermediate outcome, including education, political status, and occupational
status. Education is a traditional determinant for earnings. As indicated by Blanden et al.
(2007) and Currie & Almond (2011), it is the major channel through which wealth can be
transmitted from one generation to the next. Thus schooling is my baseline intermediate
variable.
Children’s occupational and political identities are the innovative channels I investi-
gate in this paper. Occupational identity refers to being employed in the state-owned or
private sector. It is a dummy variable that equals one if the child is in the state-owned
sector. Otherwise it equals zero. Working in different sectors generates various returns in
different economic institutions. Under planned economy, working in the state-owned sec-
tor possibly yields higher return than being employed in the private sector. It is because
the state-owned sector monopolizes core industries such as electricity and water supply,
and is protected by the government against market vicissitude. Under the market econ-
omy, however, the monopolistic power of the state-owned sector is weakened by market
competition, and the private sector develops and competes with the state-owned sector by
providing high earnings. In summary, altruistic parents are expected to use their wealth
and networks to help their children involved in the sector yielding a high return, no matter
within which economic institutions.
Political identity refers to whether or not a citizen is a Communist Party member in
the Chinese context. As the economic reform is led by the Chinese Communist Party,
political identity is an important factor influencing income (Li et al., 2012b). Being a
Communist Party member is important for high earnings, as it facilitates promotion in
enterprises/institutions, and possibly opens up more opportunities to economic rents. Al-
truistic parents are anticipated to invest in children’s political identity in order to help
them obtain high earnings.
Specifically, the child’s unobserved endowment eit is assumed to be first-order autore-
gressive as specified in Solon (2004):
eit = δ + λei,t−1 + νit, (31)
where λ is the coefficient for heritability lying between 0 and 1. νit is a white-noise error
term.
The child’s intermediate outcome hit generates his/her income return yit in the loga-
rithm form:
ln yit = phit + µit, (32)
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where µit is the error term.
The optimization problem of the family is summarized as follows. The parent maxi-
mizes his/her Cobb-Douglas utility function subject to constraints:
max Ui = (1 − α) ln Ci,t−1 + α ln yit (33)
s.t. (1 − τ)yi,t−1 = Ci,t−1 + Ii,t−1 (34)
hit = θ ln(Ii,t−1) + ηGt−1 + eit (35)
ln yit = phit + µit (36)
where α lies between 0 and 1, representing parental altruism.




1 − α(1 − θp)
]
(1 − τ)yi,t−1 (37)
To derive the intergenerational income elasticity, insert Eq. (35) into Eq. (36):
ln yit = µ + p
[
θ ln(Ii,t−1) + ηGt−1 + eit
]
. (38)
Substituting Eq. (37) into Eq. (38), the intergenerational income elasticity is captured
as:
ln yit = µ∗ + θp ln yi,t−1 + peit, (39)
where µ∗ = µ + pηGt−1 + θp ln
{
αθp(1 − τ)/ [1 − α(1 − θp)]} .
Eq. (39) is the linear regression that estimates the intergenerational income elasticity.
3.4 Data
The data set I use is the Chinese Household Income Projects (CHIPs) in 1995 and 2002. It
is a series of annual micro-level surveys which aim to measure individual and household
income, as well as other socioeconomic factors in China. It is a joint piece of research
sponsored by the Institute of Economics at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Asian
Development Bank, the Ford Foundation, and the East Asian Institute at the Columbia
University. The survey is based on face-to-face interviews, and covers 1/3 of the 34
province-level administrative units in China. The provinces and municipalities under the
survey are depicted in Figure 3.1. I focus on urban areas only, in order to get rid of income
noise from household members’ working together on family farms. Rural residents and
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migrants from rural to urban areas are not included in the sample.73
The reasons why this data set is suitable for the present research is as below. First
of all, it records each individual’s detailed income from all sources in the preceding six
(1995 survey) or five (2002 survey) years. It provides a rare chance to calculate lifetime
income in a developing country such as China by taking an average across the years, and
getting rid of random income shock in one specific year. Secondly, this survey records
a detailed relationship among household members, which facilitates my linkage between
parents and children. Last but not least, the areas under this survey are geographically
and economically representative, which provides an opportunity to generate nationally
representative estimates.74
Table 3.1 presents the data description. There are 1,448 parent-child pairs in total,
among which 627 pairs (43.3%) with children born before 1970, and 821 pairs (56.7%)
with children born after 1970. To avoid measurement error in income from individuals
who have just entered the labour market, I restrict it so children had to be at least 23 years
old, and had to have worked for at least three years. The average ages of the children in
early and late cohorts are 30 and 25 respectively, which are at the early-middle stage of
the life cycle for the working population. The average fathers’ ages are 57 and 53, which
indicate a late stage for the working people. To even income shock in specific year(s),
I restrict it so those fathers have to have had at least three years’ income. There is no
restriction on mothers’ income, since there can be housewives with no income, especially
in the early birth cohorts. The household annual incomes from both fathers and mothers
are RMB 9,331 (USD 1,127) and RMB 15,432 (USD 1,864) in each cohort consequently,
adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to the price in 2002. Children’s annual
incomes are RMB 6,628 (USD 800) and RMB 8,940 (USD 1,080) respectively, adjusted
to the 2002 price. Children’s schooling years increase from 11.6 to 12.4 across cohorts,
though both of them fall into the same educational category as approaching the end of
senior high school or at the start of university. Percentages of children being Communist
Party members drop from 11.8% to 9.1% from early into late cohorts. The proportion of
working in the state-owned sector decreases as well, from 91.4% to 74.3% along with the
market reform.
A potential sample-bias problem exists in CHIPs data. The household members are
defined as those who live together stably or temporarily do not live together but have a
73Migrants from rural to urban areas still hold rural registration (Hukou), and do not have equal access
to educational and occupational opportunities as urban citizens.
74CHIP is considered geographically representative since the areas under survey cover the Northeast
(Liaoning), the South (Guangdong), the Southwest (Yunnan), and the West (Gansu). It is considered to be
economically representative as the surveyed areas include the richest parts in China such as Beijing and
Guangdong, as well as the least developed parts such as Gansu.
133
close economic relationship.75 In this case, those children who neither live together nor




Regression estimating the intergenerational income elasticity follows conventional spec-
ifications in the literature (Solon, 1992; Mazumder & Levine, 2002; Mayer & Lopoo,
2005; Lee & Solon, 2009). To capture the effect of institutional change on the IGE, I
separate the pooled data (from two waves) into two birth cohorts, and introduce a cohort
dummy Ct, which equals zero if a child was born in the early birth cohort (between 1949
when the People’s Republic of China was founded and 1970 (included)). Ct equals one
if an individual was born after 1970. The reason for choosing 1970 as a cut-off point is
as follows. The economic reform started from 1978. The normal age of joining primary
school is around seven in China. Thus those born after 1970 are considered to have re-
ceived education in the post-reform era. Distinguishing the two cohorts by education is
because that in the literature it is considered as the main reason for the intergenerational
income persistence (Blanden et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010). The regression is specified
as follows:
ln y1it = α0 + α1 ln y0i + α2Ct ∗ ln y0i + αX Xit + αCXCt ∗ Xit + ε1it (40)
where ln y1it is the natural logarithm of child’s annual income at time t for child i. In order
to estimate their lifetime income, all the children are at least 23 years old and have worked
for at least three years. ln y0i is the average annual logarithm income of parents over at
least three years. Ct is the cohort dummy described above. Xit is a vector of control
variables. Consistent with the literature (Solon, 1992; Lee & Solon, 2009), it include
child’s age, father’s average age over at least three years, quadratic forms of child’s and
father’s ages to capture the nonlinear correlation, child’s gender dummy, wave dummy
and provincial dummies.76
The coefficients of α1 and α2 are what I am interested in. α1 captures the IGE of
income in the early birth cohort. α2 estimates the change in IGE between early and late
75The CHIP sample is a subsample of the national census, and follows the definition of household
members from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.
76The reason for including the age of father rather than mother is because household income is mainly
from father’s side in China. In addition, as father’s and mother’s ages are highly correlated, it is sufficient
to include one of them only.
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cohorts. α1 + α2 displays the IGE in the late cohort. Standard errors are clustered by
households.
If parental income forms a stringent budget constraint for children’s achievements, the
IGE of income possibly varies across different income groups. Taking this probability into
concern, I classify parental income into upper and lower 50% income groups, which are
picked up by a dummy variable Qi.77 Qi = 1 if parental total income is in the upper 50%
income group in a specific cohort. Otherwise, it equals zero. The regression estimating
the IGE of income across different income groups and cohorts is as below:
ln y1it = β0 + β1 ln y0i + βQY Qi ∗ ln y0i + βCY Ct ∗ ln y0i + βQCY Qi ∗Ct ∗ ln y0i
+βX Xit + β
k
QX
Qi ∗ Xit + βkCXCt ∗ Xit + βQCX Qi ∗Ct ∗ Xit + η1it (41)
where ln y1it, ln y0i, and Xit share the same definition as before. Coefficients of β1, βQY ,
βCY ,and βQCY are the outcomes of interest. β1 captures the IGE in families in the bottom
50% income group in the early cohort. βQY , βCY ,and βQCY indicate changes in the IGEs in
the upper 50% income group in the early cohort, lower 50% in the late cohort, and upper
50% in the late cohort respectively, compared with that in the lower 50% income group
in the early cohort. The vector of control variables Xit is also interacted with the two
dummies of Qi and Ct. Standard errors are clustered by households.
3.5.2 Decomposition of intergenerational income persistence
Following the literature (Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Blanden et al., 2007), I decompose the
intergenerational income persistence through two Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) equa-
tions. The first regression estimating the marginal productivity of parental lifetime income
on child’s intermediate variables is as follows:
ln h1it = δ0 + δ1 ln y0i + δ2Ct ∗ ln y0i + δXXit + δCXCt ∗ Xit + e1it (42)
where h1it is a vector of child’s intermediate outcome, which includes education, owner-
ship of work unit, and Communist Party membership, as described in Section 3.3. Defi-
nitions of other variables remain the same, as described in Section 3.5.1.
The coefficients of δ1 and δ2 are outcomes of interest. δ1 captures the marginal pro-
ductivity of parental lifetime income on child’s intermediate variables in the early birth
cohort. δ2 indicates the change in parental marginal productivity from early into late
77Due to small sample size, I divide the sample into two subgroups only, upper and lower 50% income
groups.
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cohorts. The marginal productivity in the late cohort is δ1 + δ2.
The second regression capturing return to children’s intermediate variables is as be-
low:
ln y1it = γ0 + γ1 ln h1it + γ2Ct ∗ ln h1it + γX Xit + γCXCt ∗ Xit + µ1it (43)
where ln y1it, h1it, Ct, and Xit share the same definition as described above. µ1it is the er-
ror term. γ1 captures the return to child’s intermediate outcome in the early birth cohort.
γ1 +γ2 captures return in the late cohort. The baseline regression is the one with education
only, as schooling is the conventional channel in the intergenerational transmission (Blan-
den et al., 2007; Currie & Almond, 2011). Political and occupational identity is added in
by consequence. Details will be shown in Section 3.6.2.
Insert Eq. (42) into Eq. (43):
ln y1it = (γ0 + γ1δ0 + γ2δ0Ct) + γ1δ1 ln y0i + [(γ1δ2 + γ2δ1)Ct + γ2δ2C2t ] ∗ ln y0i
+[γ1δX + γX + (γ2δX + γCX )Ct + (γ1Ct + γ2C
2
t )δCX ]Xit
+(γ1 + γ2Ct)e1it + µ1it (44)
From Eq. (44) the IGE of income in the early cohort can be decomposed as:
βˆearly = δ1γ1 +
Cov(γ1e1it + µ1it, ln y0i)
Var(ln y0i)
(45)
δ1γ1 is the part that can be explained by the intermediate variables. Specifically, it is
the product of parental marginal investment in child’s intermediate variables (δ1) and the
return to those variables (γ1).
Cov(γ1e1it+µ1it ,ln y0i)
Var(ln y0i)
accounts for the unexplainable element.
Similarly, the IGE of income in the late cohort can be decomposed as follows:
βˆlate = (δ1 + δ2)(γ1 + γ2) +
Cov[(γ1 + γ2)e1it + µ1it, ln y0i]
Var(ln y0i)
(46)
(δ1+δ2)(γ1+γ2) stands for the explainable part by intermediate variables in the late cohort,
while Cov[(γ1+γ2)e1it+µ1it ,ln y0i]Var(ln y0i) represents the part remaining unexplained.
Similarly, when introducing the dummy of Qi for the upper or lower 50% income
group, Eqs. (42) and (43) can be rewritten as follows: 78
78Qi has the same definition as described above. It equals one if parental total income is in the upper
50% income group in each cohort. Otherwise, it equals zero.
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Var(ln y0i)
(52)
The subscripts of β in Eqs. (49) - (52) indicate the cohort-income subgroup to which
each estimate refers. One potential problem with this method is that either political or
occupational identity is closely related with education. Parents can either invest directly
in children’s political or occupational identity (rent seeking) or invest indirectly through
education, which is a pre-request for obtaining a certain political or occupational iden-
tity. A criticism of the rich second generation in contemporary China is that they gain
a combination of educational, political, and occupational privilege because of their su-
perior family background. How to distinguish the effects from education and that from
political/occupational identity is one challenge. I address this problem by implement-
ing robustness checks, including schooling as one additional control in the regression for
political and occupational identities. Details are presented in Section 3.7.
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3.6 Empirical Results
3.6.1 Estimates of Intergenerational income persistence
Table 3.2 presents the intergenerational income elasticity between parents and children
during China’s transition period. Panel A demonstrates IGE for all children. Specifically,
Columns (1) and (2) display the estimates in early and late cohorts, respectively. Column
(3) presents the corresponding differences between the two cohorts. In addition, taking
the various income distribution across generations into account, I examine the intergen-
erational income correlation, which is defined as multiplying intergenerational income
elasticity by σp/σc, where σp and σc are the standard deviations of logarithm income of
parents and children. Panel B displays matrices for the intergenerational income elasticity
by income group and cohort, and the differences among subgroups.
I find that child’s income increases by 0.315% with 1% increase in the parental income
in the early cohort (Panel A). It is statistically significant at a high 1% level of significance.
A rough but intuitive interpretation is that if a family’s income is RMB 1,000 (USD 121
in 2002 price) higher than the average in the parents’ generation, their child’s income will
be RMB 315 (USD 38 in 2002 price) higher than the average of his/her generation. The
estimated elasticity equals that of the UK, which is 0.32 for father-son pairs observed be-
tween 1991 and 2003 (Nicoletti & Ermisch, 2008). In the late cohort, the IGE increases
by 40%, reaching 0.442 with statistical significance at the 1% level. It approaches an
estimate of 0.47 in the U.S. (Grawe, 2004). The difference of 0.127 between IGE in the
early and late cohorts is statistically significant at the 10% level. Similarly, the intergen-
erational income correlation reveals a statistically significant increase across cohorts, by
approximately 45%.79
Panel B examines the intergenerational income elasticity in each income-cohort sub-
group. In the early cohort, the IGE for children in the lower 50% income group is 0.215,
with statistical significance at the 10% level. The corresponding one in families with
above-average income in the early cohort is 0.445 with 1% level of statistical significance.
The difference of 0.23 between the two income categories, however, is not statistically sig-
nificant. In the late cohort, the IGE differs significantly between the lower and upper 50%
income groups, with 0.331 for the former and 0.518 for the latter. Both of the two esti-
mates are at the high 1% level of significance. The statistically significant difference of
0.187 indicates enlarging inequality between the poor and the rich along with the market
reform. In other words, it is increasingly more difficult for children from impoverished
families to climb up the socioeconomic ladders in the post-reform era.
79The calculation is as follows: 0.105/0.231=0.455.
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3.6.2 Decomposition of intergenerational income persistence
In this section, I investigate the channels of income transmission across generations. In
addition to the conventional channel of education, I focus on examining the contribu-
tion of political and occupational identities to intergenerational persistence. Table 3.3
displays the relationship between mediating variables (educational, political, and occupa-
tional identities), child’s income, and parental income in early and late cohorts. Results
are derived from Eqs. (42) and (43). Column (1) presents the marginal productivity of
parental investment in child’s educational, political, and occupational identities. Columns
(2) - (4) show the return to each mediating variable, adding one variable at one time.
In the early cohort, parental income has a statistically significant influence in child’s
educational and occupational identities, but not their political identity. With a 1% increase
in parental income, a child’s schooling years are raised by 0.09%, and their possibility of
working in the state-owned sector by 4.4%. The two coefficients are statistically signif-
icant at the 1% and 5% levels of significance, respectively. However, there is no sta-
tistically significant relationship between parental income and child’s party membership.
In the late cohort, nevertheless, the correlation between parental income and the child’s
political identity increases sharply and is statistically significant. Specifically, with 1%
increase in parental income, the possibility of children being Communist Party members
goes up by 4.2%. The marginal productivity of parental investment in children’s educa-
tional and occupational identities does not change much either in magnitude or significant
level across cohorts.
Columns (2) - (4) present returns to the three mediating variables, adding education,
political and occupational identity by sequence. Return to education in the early cohort is
0.561, and is statistically significant at a high 1% level (Column (4) in Panel A). The re-
turn to Communist Party membership remains around 0.14, and is statistically significant
at the 5% level. No statistically significant return from children’s occupational identity is
found however. It is possible that the market under the planned economy is dominated by
the state-owned enterprises and institutions. Therefore, there is not much variation in the
sectoral choices. In the late cohort, the magnitude of the return to education decreases, ac-
companied by an increase in the magnitude of return to the political identity. Specifically,
the return to schooling drops from 0.561 to 0.417 (Column (4) in Panel B). Compared to
non-Communist Party members, the Party members have 15% higher income in the late
cohort. The estimate is at the 5% level of statistical significance. Occupational identity
does not present a statistically significant earning premium as that in the early cohort,
though the underlying reason could be different. It is possibly the competition from the
private sector in the post-reform era that decreases the wage premium of working in the
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state-owned enterprises/institutions.
Table 3.4 summarizes contribution from each mediating variable to intergenerational
income persistence across cohorts, with percentage in the parentheses. Education acts
as leading contributor in both early and late cohorts, explaining 15.9% and 8.1% of the
total IGEs, respectively.80 Regarding occupational identity, there is a sharp decrease from
0.018 to 0.0002 in the contribution of working in the state-owned sector along with market
reform. It is possibly the consequence of competition from the private sector that reduces
the income premium of working in the state-owned sector. Being Communist Party mem-
bers, however, contributes increasingly in the late cohort. The contribution even flips signs
from -0.002 to 0.006. It is possibly because in the pre-reform era, the Party is more likely
to recruit individuals from economically-disadvantaged families as revealed in Column
(1) of Table 3.3, although the estimate is not statistically significant. In the post-reform
era, nevertheless, the child’s possibility of joining the Party is positively correlated with
parental income.
More interesting findings are revealed in Tables 3.5 - 3.6, taking the differential effect
in each income group into account. Table 3.5 replicates results in Table 3.3 but investi-
gates the intergenerational income persistence across income category and cohort. Results
are derived from Eqs. (47) and (48). It is shown in Column (1) that no matter whether
in lower or upper 50% income groups of the early cohort, parental income does not have
a statistically significant influence on any intermediate variable. Regarding the return to
the mediating variables, I find that education generates a higher return in relatively poor
families than that of rich families in early cohort (0.611 vs. 0.445 in Columns (4) of
Panels A and B in Table 3.5), with statistical significance at the high 1% level. Being a
Communist Party member is more important for children from rich families than those
from poor households. This political identity generates a 17.3% income premium in rich
families versus 16.3% premium in poor ones, with statistical significance at the 10% level
(Columns (4) of Panels A and B in Table 3.5). In general, however, the patterns of parental
investment and return to earnings in rich and poor households do not differ much in the
pre-reform era.
In the post-reform era, however, the pattern of intergenerational transmission varies.
Economically differentiated parents invest exactly in the intermediate variable that gener-
ates the highest return. Specifically, for the poor families, parental investment in educa-
tion has the highest marginal productivity among the three intermediate variables. With
a 1% rise in parental income, the child’s schooling is increased by 0.114%. For their
80The calculation is as follows. In the early cohort, the education accounts for 0.05 of the intergenera-
tional income elasticity, which is 15.87% of the total IGE (0.315). Similarly, in the late cohort, education
accounts for 0.036, which is 8.14% of the total IGE (0.442).
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rich counterparts, nevertheless, parental investment is statistically significant in political
identity only. With a 1% increase in parental income, the child’s possibility of being a
Communist Party member is increased by 7.7%, and is statistically significant at the 10%
level. Columns (2) - (4) provide possible explanation for this phenomenon. Along with
the market reform, parents invest exactly in the attribute generating the highest return for
their children, which is education for the poor families (0.428 in Column (4) of Panel C)
and political identity for the rich (0.211 in Column (4) of Panel D). It implies that being a
Communist Party member plays a significant role for the rich in intergenerational income
transmission along the economic transition.
Table 3.6 summarizes contribution from each mediating variable by income group
and cohort. For either poor or rich families in the early cohort, education is the leading
contributor, accounting for 13.1% and 7.1% of the total IGEs, respectively.81 For the late
cohort, the leading contributor remains as education in households with below-average
income (0.0486 in Column (3) of Table 3.6). However, in above-average families, it is
the political identity that contributes most to the income persistence across generations
(0.0163 in Column (4) of Table 3.6). One possible reason is that as the economic reform
was led by the Party, being a Communist Party member implies easier access to economic
opportunities and rents. Chen et al. (2010) support this idea and claim that elites can
invest in their children to take advantage of the economic reform. Thus social mobility
decreases as economic institutions become more open. One remaining problem is that the
percentage of the total IGE explained by the three mediating variables among the upper
50% income group in the late cohort is low (Column (4) in Table 3.6). Other mechanism
is open to examination in future research.
3.7 Discussion
3.7.1 Robustness Check
Two potential challenges exist in decomposing the contribution from political and oc-
cupational identities. On the one hand, it is plausible that children from rich families,
especially in the late cohort, have a similarly high educational attainment. Thus, it is the
small within-group variation in schooling that induces the return to education insignifi-
cant. However, this hypothesis is not established because the mean and standard deviation
of schooling remains similar across income categories and cohorts. Specifically, the aver-
age schooling year is 13.3 with a standard deviation of 2.6 in families with above-average
81The calculation is as below. In the early cohort, it is 0.0281/0.215=0.131. In the late cohort, it is
0.0314/0.445=0.071.
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income in the late cohort. It is similar to the one in the corresponding income group in the
early cohort (12.2 years with a standard deviation of 2.6), and slightly longer than the one
in the lower half income category in the late cohort (11.6 years with a standard deviation
of 2.5). All of them fall into the same educational category as approaching the end of
senior high school or at the beginning of college/university. It is therefore unlikely that
the similar schooling among children in rich families accounts for the sharp drop in the
contribution of education toward intergenerational income persistence.
On the other hand, the potential correlation between occupational or political identity
and education may bias the IGE estimates. The Party selection criteria include superior
work ability, good inter-personal skills, and a positive attitude toward the Communist
ideology (Li et al., 2007). An increasing emphasis on educational qualifications rather
than political loyalty is found by recent research (Walder, 1995). Lin & Bian (1991) also
demonstrate a causal effect of education on Party membership in China. In addition, Party
membership, which is strongly influenced by education, is a qualification for being offi-
cials in the state-owned sector. To separate the effect of education from that of political or
occupational identity, I include education as one additional control in Eq. (47) to investi-
gate the effects of parental income on a child’s occupational or political identity. Tables
3.7 - 3.8 report the estimates from this robustness check. Compared to corresponding
coefficients in Tables 3.5 - 3.6, estimates under the robustness check remain similar with
reasonable variation. Specifically, the statistically significant parental investment in chil-
dren’s party membership for rich families in the late cohort remains robust both in the
magnitude and the level of significance.
3.7.2 Why Is There a Shift in the Leading Contributor from Educational to Politi-
cal Identity among Rich Families?
In Section 3.6.2 I present findings on the leading contributor to intergenerational income
persistence before and after the economic transition. In the pre-reform era, educational
identity contributes most to the income persistence across generations, in either rich or
poor families. In the post-reform period, however, households with various incomes in-
vest differently, but exactly in the way that generates the highest return for the children.
Specifically, it is schooling for the families with below-average income, but political iden-
tity for households with above-average income.
Why is there such a shift in the leading contributor from educational to political iden-
tity? One explanation lies in the fact that as the initiator of the market reform, the Chinese
Communist Party plays an increasingly important role in the transition process. However,
due to the incompleteness of the market economy, collusion between wealth and politics
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is easily formed and developed. Rich families are possibly more able to invest in chil-
dren’s political identity, which generates earning premium in the new era. This argument
is supported by the empirical evidence in Ichino et al. (2011) that party affiliation has
stronger explanatory power than education in determining intergenerational mobility. It
also echoes the findings in Chen et al. (2010) that social mobility decreases as economic
institutions becomes more open in China, because elites can invest in their children to take
advantage of the economic reform. Therefore, the investment in child’s political identity
through parental privilege in economic status is indeed a transmission of economic capital
to political capital. The consequence is not only the convergence of the privileged identity
(educational, occupational, and political identities), but also the increase of intergenera-
tional inequality.
What is worth mentioning is that parental investment in children’s identity and the in-
tergenerational transmission of identity are not always bad. The investment in schooling
improves the human capital of the labour force. The emphasis on political identity encour-
ages participation in politics. However, both of them require open economic and political
institutions. After all, the production of wealth and the redistribution and transmission of
wealth are two different processes.
3.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the degree and mechanism of intergenerational income trans-
mission along with China’s economic transition and development. Using a retrospective
data set from urban China, I discover two sets of findings. First, intergenerational income
persistence is increased along the economic transition and across income groups. On the
dimension of time series, the intergenerational elasticity (IGE) of income increases by
40% for cohorts educated before and after the market reform, from 0.32 to 0.44. On the
dimension of income category, the IGE in households with above-average income even
reaches 0.52 in the post-reform era. It is 56% higher than the corresponding one in the
lower half income category.
Second, I examine the channels of intergenerational income transmission, and inno-
vatively investigate the contribution from political and occupational identities in addition
to education. I find that in the pre-reform era, education acts as a leading contributor
to intergenerational income persistence in both poor and rich families. Along with the
economic transition and development, nevertheless, parents from various income groups
invest in differentiated ways, but exactly in the child’s intermediating variable which gen-
erates the highest return. Specifically, families with below-average income invest in chil-
dren’s schooling, as was circumstance before the market reform. Households with above-
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average income in the post-reform era invest in a new channel, political identity, which is
the leading contributor in the new era. Working in the state-owned sector contributes less
to intergenerational income persistence in the post-reform era than that in the pre-reform
era. The results remain robust taking the correlation between educational and political or
occupational identities into account.
The findings shed light on the necessity of intensifying China’s current reforms. As
the empirical evidence shows, the leading contributor to intergenerational income per-
sistence shifts from educational to political identity among families with above-average
income along with the economic transition. It calls for more open economic and politi-
cal institutions to provide equal opportunities for individuals, especially those from poor
families.
One caveat of this research is that the results present correlation rather than causality.
The decomposition method cannot address the endogeneity problem originating from un-
observed common factors affecting parental and children’s income. This problem is open
to investigation in future research.
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Figure 3.1: Provinces and Municipalities under the Chinese Household Income Project
(CHIP)
Notes: The provinces and municipalities under the Chinese Household Income Project
in 1995 survey are: Beijing, Liaoning, Shanxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Sichuan,
Gansu, Yunnan, and Guangdong. Chongqing is included in the 2002 survey as a munici-
pality which was separate from Sichuan Province in 1998.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Mean (standard deviation)
Early cohort Late cohort
Annual child’s incomea 6628.004 8939.762
(5,783.354) (7,622.202)
Annual family incomeb 9331.364 15432.46
(5,887.859) (11,384.180)
Child’s schooling years 11.644 12.448
(2.642) (2.667)
Child’s party membership 0.118 0.091
(Communist Party = 1) (0.323) (0.288)
Child’s occupation 0.914 0.743
(state-owned sector = 1) (0.281) (0.437)
Child’s gender 0.705 0.6
(male = 1) (0.456) (0.490)
Child’s agec 29.523 25.462
(4.298) (2.353)
Father’s aged 57.14 53.28
(4.683) (4.548)
Observations 627 821
Notes: Children are at least 23 years old, and have worked for at least three years before
the survey wave, in order to capture their lifetime income.
Income is converted to the 2002 RMB using Consumer Price Index. Specifically, in the
early cohort, child’s annual income of RMB 6,628 equal to USD 800 in 2002 price.
Annual family income of 9,331 equals USD 1,127. In the late cohort, RMB 8,940 is
equivalent to USD 1,080. RMB 15,432 is equal to USD 1,864.
a Child’s income refers to annual income in the survey wave.
b Parental income refers to the summation of father’s and mother’s annual average income
in the preceding 3 years (at least) of the survey wave.
c Child’s age refers to the age in the survey wave.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4: Account for the Contribution of Educational Attainment, Party
Membership and Ownership of Work Unit to Intergenerational Income
Elasticity in China’s Transition Period
contribution
(percentage)
early cohort late cohort
Educational attainment (schooling years) 0.05 0.036
(15.9%) (8.1%)
Party membership (Communist Party =1) -0.002 0.006
(-0.6%) (1.4%)




Percentage of explained 0.21 0.095
Notes: The contribution is calculated as the multiplication of the marginal product of
parental income on each input of children and the corresponding returns to the input. For
instance, the contribution in the northwest corner is calculated as follows: 0.09 (column
1 in Table 3.3) * 0.561 (column 4 in Table 3.3) = 0.05.
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Table 3.5: Relationship between Mediating Variables, Child’s Income, and Parental
Income by Income Group in China’s Transition Period
Marginal Productivity Income Regression
of Parental Incomea(δ) ln (child’s income) (γ)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Early cohortb& lower 50% income groupc
ln (child’s education)
0.046 0.572*** 0.541*** 0.611***
(0.038) (0.181) (0.182) (0.189)
Child’s party membership 0.005 0.148* 0.163*
(Communist party=1) (0.055) (0.087) (0.087)
Ownership of child’s -0.018 -0.309
work unit (state=1) (0.025) (0.213)
Panel B. Early cohortb& upper 50% income groupc
ln (child’s education)
0.07 0.520*** 0.480*** 0.445***
(0.055) (0.151) (0.143) (0.152)
Child’s party membership -0.003 0.167* 0.173*
(Communist party=1) (0.054) (0.095) (0.095)
Ownership of child’s 0.093 0.183
work unit (state=1) (0.061) (0.144)
Panel C. Late cohortb& lower 50% income groupc
ln (child’s education)
0.114*** 0.437*** 0.431*** 0.428***
(0.036) (0.136) (0.136) (0.139)
Child’s party membership -0.003 0.035 0.026
(Communist party=1) (0.038) (0.098) (0.098)
Ownership of child’s -0.02 0.051
work unit (state=1) (0.053) (0.087)
Panel D. Late cohortb& upper 50% income groupc
ln (child’s education)
0.021 0.308 0.272 0.286
(0.033) (0.229) (0.224) (0.222)
Child’s party membership 0.077* 0.199** 0.211**
(Communist party=1) (0.044) (0.093) (0.093)
Ownership of child’s 0.077 -0.08
work unit (state=1) (0.076) (0.068)
Observations 1,448 1,448 1,448 1,448
Notes: Robust standard-error estimates are in parentheses, and are clustered by households. * Significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. Income is converted to the 2002 RMB using Consumer
Price Index.
Children are at least 23 years old, and have worked for at least three years before the survey wave, in order
to capture their lifetime income.
a Parental logarithm income refers to the average annual logarithm income of parents in the preceding 3
years (at least) of the survey wave.
b Early cohort refers to children born between 1949 (the foundation of the People’s Republic of China) and
1970 (included). Late cohort refers to the case that children were born after 1970. They received education
and worked in the post 1978 economic reform era.
c Upper 50% income group refers to the scenario that parental income is in the upper 50% of their genera-






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.7: Relationship between Mediating Variables, Child’s Income, and Parental
Income by Income Group in China’s Transition Period: Robustness Test
Marginal Productivity Income Regression
of Parental Incomea(δ) ln (child’s income) (γ)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Early cohortb& lower 50% income groupc
ln (child’s education)
0.046 0.572*** 0.541*** 0.611***
(0.038) (0.181) (0.182) (0.189)
Child’s party membership -0.004 0.148* 0.163*
(Communist party=1) (0.057) (0.087) (0.087)
Ownership of child’s -0.03 -0.309
work unit (state=1) (0.026) (0.213)
Panel B. Early cohortb& upper 50% income groupc
ln (child’s education)
0.07 0.520*** 0.480*** 0.445***
(0.055) (0.151) (0.143) (0.152)
Child’s party membership -0.02 0.167* 0.173*
(Communist party=1) (0.055) (0.095) (0.095)
Ownership of child’s 0.084 0.183
work unit (state=1) (0.060) (0.144)
Panel C. Late cohortb& lower 50% income groupc
ln (child’s education)
0.114*** 0.437*** 0.431*** 0.428***
(0.036) (0.136) (0.136) (0.139)
Child’s party membership -0.019 0.035 0.026
(Communist party=1) (0.039) (0.098) (0.098)
Ownership of child’s -0.04 0.051
work unit (state=1) (0.052) (0.087)
Panel D. Late cohortb& upper 50% income groupc
ln (child’s education)
0.021 0.308 0.272 0.286
(0.033) (0.229) (0.224) (0.222)
Child’s party membership 0.073* 0.199** 0.211**
(Communist party=1) (0.043) (0.093) (0.093)
Ownership of child’s 0.071 -0.08
work unit (state=1) (0.076) (0.068)
Observations 1,448 1,448 1,448 1,448
Notes: Robust standard-error estimates are in parentheses, and are clustered by households. * Significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. Income is converted to the 2002 RMB using Consumer
Price Index.
Children are at least 23 years old, and have worked for at least three years before the survey wave, in order
to capture their lifetime income.
a Parental logarithm income refers to the average annual logarithm income of parents in the preceding 3
years (at least) of the survey wave.
b Early cohort refers to children born between 1949 (the foundation of the People’s Republic of China) and
1970 (included). Late cohort refers to the case that children were born after 1970. They received education
and worked in the post 1978 economic reform era.
c Upper 50% income group refers to the scenario that parental income is in the upper 50% of their genera-
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